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ABSTRACT 
The federal government has recently approved legislation to develop revenue insurance 
products that are affordable and user-friendly for livestock producers.  The features of the 
products will be the ultimate determinant of product acceptance among producers.  The 
objective of the study was to determine the relative importance of livestock revenue insurance 
product attributes as well as to identify the characteristics of beef cattle producers who prefer 
certain levels of a given product attribute.  Conjoint analysis was utilized to determine the 
importance of selected attributes. Conjoint Designer was used to develop eleven hypothetical 
insurance products from four attributes with three levels each.  Producers rated each product 
from 0 (least preferred) to 10 (most preferred).  The products were rated given four different 
economic scenarios to determine the influence of the cattle cycle on producers preferences and 
purchase decisions for products.  Data were collected via personal interviews with 52 beef cattle 
producers in 15 parishes in Louisiana.  A two-limit tobit model was used to analyze  producer 
preferences.  The part worth utility values estimated were used in a cluster analysis to segment 
producers based upon their preferences.  Univariate probit models were estimated for nine 
products to evaluate the influence of various producer characteristics on purchase decisions.   
The results of the aggregate conjoint analysis indicated that producers preferred products 
with a $2.24|$0.00/cwt premium|deductible, a 180-day policy length, a state price series, and an 
in-person method of marketing.  The price series made the largest contribution to the preference 
rating, and the results suggested that the economic scenario did not significantly impact 
preferences.  The cluster analysis identified three market segments that exhibited significant 
differences in primary source of income, farm size, marketing strategies used, and risk attitude.  
The results of the univarite probit models revealed that the economic scenarios had a significant 
impact on producers insurance purchase decision.  Producers who were risk averse and 
 xii
depended on income from beef cattle were more likely to purchase insurance.  Producers who 
were older and/or had other means of mitigating risk were less likely to purchase insurance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR), along with 
increased trade liberalization and a more integrated global marketplace, have made significant 
changes in the risk environment facing agricultural producers.  These factors have led 
government officials, agricultural producers, and other private entities to aggressively 
investigate alternative methods of mitigating the risks faced by producers.  The Fair Act marked 
the beginning of a major change in the traditional role that the federal government played in 
providing a safety net for production agriculture.  The 1996 Farm Bill increased producers 
exposure to risk by eliminating deficiency payments and annual supply management programs 
that have existed since 1973 (Skees, et al.).  The governments involvement in risk protection 
has shifted from a role of assertively making decisions that would protect producers as a whole 
to a role that requires producers to be more responsible for mitigating production and price risk 
on their individual operations.  As a result, the government is directing more funds towards 
insurance premium subsidies to encourage more producers to purchase insurance, which is 
expected to reduce total government outlays for disaster relief and other related direct payments 
to producers (USDA RMA).    
Although over 60 percent of all farms in the United States produce livestock (Census of 
Agriculture, 1997), the federal government had not placed much emphasis on providing risk 
management assistance for livestock producers, until recently.  Recent policy changes and 
increased trade liberalization have increased the volatility of prices for livestock producers, as 
well as for crop producers.  Livestock producers as well as government officials are now 
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concerned about the lack of protection from unstable prices in the livestock industry.  Livestock 
producers need risk management tools that can reduce exposure to price risk.  Livestock 
producers, when compared with crop producers, are better able to adjust inputs so that most 
natural disasters do not have a tremendous adverse impact on production.  On the other hand, if 
there are adverse changes in livestock prices, producers have very few methods of protecting 
their operations.  Current trends in the risk management arena indicate a move toward products 
that protect producers from price-related or revenue risk.  Since the 1996 Farm Bill, revenue 
insurance products have accounted for the majority of the growth in federal crop insurance 
programs (Schnepf and Heifner).  In order for livestock producers to survive in an increasingly 
competitive global marketplace, they must have an adequate array of risk management tools 
available.  
To address the apparent need to provide risk management alternatives to livestock 
producers, the federal government has recently approved legislation to develop livestock 
revenue insurance products. Livestock Revenue Protection (LRP) is part of the Agricultural 
Risk Protection Act of 2000, and its primary goal is to reduce the exposure of livestock 
producers to price risk.  Livestock revenue protection (LRP) was introduced before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Risk Management and Specialty Crops in March of 
1999, as a means of strengthening the safety net for livestock producers.  Policy makers 
recognized the need to reform current insurance programs so that additional economically 
significant enterprises could be included. The American Agri-Business Insurance Company 
along with the American Feed Industry Association took the lead in developing the product that 
was proposed to Congress.   By June of 2000, Congress had approved House Bill 2559, the 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000.  A pilot program for livestock revenue insurance was 
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included in Section 132 of H.R.2559.  Until the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000, 
federally-backed insurance plans providing livestock protection were prohibited by law.  The 
product developed from the pilot program will cover cattle, sheep, swine, goats, and poultry.  A 
total of $55 million was appropriated to cover all costs (except research and development) of 
conducting the livestock programs.   
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) is responsible for conducting the 
program with a budget of $10 million for each of fiscal years 2001 and 2002, $15 million for 
fiscal year 2003, and $20 million for fiscal year 2004 and each subsequent fiscal year.  The 
FCIC will evaluate the greatest feasible number and variety of pilot programs to determine 
which of the risk management tools offered are best suited to protect livestock producers.  The 
pilot programs will evaluate the use of futures and options contracts for developing insurance to 
provide livestock producers with reasonable protection from the financial risks of price 
fluctuations inherent in the production and marketing of livestock.   FCIC has the authority to 
provide reinsurance for insurance policies and also to subsidize the purchase of futures and 
options contracts for insurance policies offered under the pilot program.   
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Crop producers have numerous options available to manage production and price risk.  
Livestock production represents the largest segment of American agriculture in terms of value 
of production; however, policy makers have traditionally overlooked livestock producers as it 
relates to providing risk management alternatives that are user-friendly and affordable.  Cattle 
and calves, by far, make up the largest portion of all livestock produced in the United States.  
Beef production alone accounted for more than $40.5 billion in market value in 1997 and 
ranked second only to corn among all agricultural commodities produced in the U.S.  Beef 
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production is valuable to the domestic market as well as to export markets.  Effective risk 
management tools are imperative for American beef producers to remain competitive in the 
global marketplace.  According to the 1997 Census of Agriculture, the total number of farms in 
the U.S. decreased by 175,900 from 1987 to 1997.  Farms that raised livestock accounted for 
about 79 percent (138,714 farms) of all farms lost during this period.  This considerable 
decrease in the number of livestock operations may be partially attributed to the lack of risk 
management tools available. 
One reason that livestock producers have been excluded from traditional insurance 
policies is that the risk associated with livestock production differs considerably from that of 
crop production. Crop producers commonly face catastrophic risks that result from natural 
disasters, such as drought, flooding, and hail.  Adverse weather conditions can influence 
livestock production by creating poor range conditions or high grain costs, which can ultimately 
have a negative impact on weight gain and net revenue for livestock producers.  Overall, 
production risk is, however, much lower for livestock because livestock can more easily adapt 
to variations in weather than can crops.   
Price risk is more critical than production risk in livestock production (Bossman).  In 
general, livestock producers have not been adversely affected to the degree of crop producers by 
unforeseen catastrophes from weather, pests, or diseases.  Consequently, risk management 
strategies that focus on price protection will be more important to livestock producers.  Price 
uncertainty for producers is a combination of price-level and basis uncertainty.  Price level 
uncertainty results from imperfect information about future domestic and international supply 
and demand conditions.  These conditions determine the actual price that producers will receive 
for their livestock.  Basis uncertainty refers to the uncertainty about the difference between the 
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commoditys local cash price and its nearest futures contract price (Schnepf, et al.).  On an 
annual basis, the actual price received for livestock generally varies more than yield, which 
indicates that price is the most important factor in determining a producers annual revenue 
from livestock. 
The design of a product for livestock revenue protection (LRP) is a perplexing issue that 
must be addressed.  In order for LRP to be successful, insurance providers must know the 
policy attributes and attribute levels that are important to various types of producers.  It is also 
important to know the types of producers who will actually purchase livestock revenue 
insurance.  Policy makers are currently attempting to determine what to insure, how to insure it, 
and how much the coverage should cost.  This research will identify the relevant attributes of 
LRP as well as provide insight into the most effective product design.  Determining the key 
attributes and attribute levels of the policies and defining producers who prefer a certain set of 
attributes is important to the success of livestock revenue protection.  
Since the proposed insurance product will utilize the futures market to establish price 
guarantees for producers, it is also important to determine how producers will react to insurance 
under different economic conditions.  It is hypothesized that producers will prefer different 
products or different levels of coverage in various economic situations.  This study will address 
producers attitudes toward insurance when market prices for beef cattle change.  The study will 
observe producers reactions to the current market price being below, equivalent, and above the 
projected futures price when deciding whether to purchase insurance.  
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective of this study is to determine the relative importance of various 
attributes of livestock revenue insurance products among beef cattle producers in Louisiana.  
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The characteristics of the producers who prefer certain levels of a given attribute in a livestock 
insurance policy are also of interest.  The following specific objectives will be utilized to 
accomplish the overall objective of the study.  
1. To identify the relevant attributes of a livestock revenue protection product that will 
influence beef cattle producers selection decision among alternative products. 
 
2. To determine beef cattle producers choices among insurance products, and determine 
overall preference for livestock revenue insurance under different economic scenarios. 
 
3. To segment producers into clusters and compare the characteristics of producers 
according to their preference for insurance products. 
 
4. To determine an optimal set of policies that should be offered to meet the diverse needs 
of beef cattle producers. 
 
Determining the importance of various attributes will provide valuable insight to policy-
makers for the development of new revenue insurance products. Identifying the characteristics 
of producers who prefer certain attributes will provide useful product marketing information to 
insurance companies.  In addition, observing producers reaction to insurance products in 
different economic situations will provide valuable information.  Insurance providers may gain 
information on how to change premium prices or other features to make the products more 
attractive in certain economic situations. Insurance providers can use this information to target 
potential clientele with a policy that possesses the specific bundle of attributes preferred by 
similar producers.   
This study targets primarily cow/calf producers in Louisiana with herd sizes of at least 50 
cattle.  A total of 52 producers were selected for personal interview from fifteen parishes 
throughout Louisiana.  The parishes were selected based upon the number of producers that fit 
the herd size criteria in the parish according to the 1997 Census of Agriculture.  The parishes 
selected for the survey were Avoyelles, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron, De Soto, East 
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Feliciana, Franklin, Lafourche, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Rapides, Red River, St. Landry, 
Union, and Vermilion.  The selected parishes account for more than 50 percent of the targeted 
population of producers in the state of Louisiana.  Also, since cow/calf production in Louisiana 
is typical of other states in the southeastern region of the United States, the results of this study 
can be used to make inferences about the entire region. 
The participants in this survey represent tremendous diversity in terms of factors such as the 
producers herd size, age, education level, debt/asset ratio, risk attitude, farming experience, and 
marketing practices. The results of this study can assist policy makers and private insurance 
providers in properly allocating resources for product development and marketing.  Livestock 
producers will also be better informed about possible products that are available and, as a result, 
they will be able to make better decisions in selecting a policy for their particular operation. 
1.4 BACKGROUND 
There are a number of factors that can contribute to price fluctuations and declines in 
beef cattle markets.   Some factors considered possibly responsible for price variations in recent 
years are Canadian and Mexican live cattle imports, beef packer concentration, food safety 
issues, domestic meat supplies, static domestic demand, and inconsistent beef quality (Brester 
and Marsh).  The price that the producer receives for cattle is determined by market fluctuations 
that are beyond the control of the individual producer.  About 85 percent of producers sell 
primarily through auction markets, and they are unable to accurately forecast the price that they 
will receive on a given day (USDA APHIS).  Consequently, regular price fluctuations can have 
a significant impact on the annual revenue of a cattle operation.  Beef producers use various 
strategies, such as selling cattle in different seasons or on several different days during the 
season, to decrease the impact of volatile market prices.  U.S. beef cattle producers are exposed 
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to price fluctuations on a daily, monthly, and annual basis.  These price fluctuations increase the 
need for price or revenue protection products to stabilize prices received by producers 
throughout the year. 
A portion of the variability in beef cattle prices has been attributed to the cattle cycle.  
The cattle cycle generally lasts about 10 to 12 years and consists of expanding and contracting 
cattle inventory and prices.  A cattle cycle is measured from trough (lowest inventory of cattle) 
to trough over time.  Cattle prices show significant fluctuations during cattle cycles.  It is 
believed that cattle inventory increases over time as a result of higher prices (profits) and then 
declines due to lower market prices (Mathews et al.).  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship 
between cattle inventory and the price of feeder calves (500-550 pounds) from 1970 to 2000.   
The figure shows that the inventory of cattle and calves and the average price of calves move in 
opposite directions.  This figure shows cattle cycles from 1970 to 1979, 1979 to 1990, and 1990 
to the present.  In the current cycle, cattle inventory increased by about 2.6 million head from 
1994 to 1996; however, the price of calves declined by $27.5/cwt in the same period.  Record-
high feed grain prices and a severe drought contributed to the drastic decrease in prices during 
this period.   In any given year, the price that farmers receive for calves is likely to fluctuate 
from $5/cwt to more than $20/cwt, which can have a significant impact on the revenue received 
by beef cattle farmers.  This figure shows that price fluctuations caused by the cattle cycle 
increase the need for products designed to stabilize the income of beef cattle producers. 
At the present time, cash forward pricing and futures and options contracts traded at the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade are the primary tools available 
for managing the price risk associated with livestock production.  In cash forward pricing 
schemes, the seller is usually required to have a group of 60 or more calves that are relatively 
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uniform in terms of size and quality.  Cattle are presented to buyers either at the individuals 
(seller) farm or by video auction.  Buyers and sellers agree on a fair price for calves to be 
delivered at some point in the future.  Producers use futures and options contracts on 
commodities in various hedging strategies. Although these tools are available to reduce price 
risk, they are not widely used by producers.  A 1998 study by USDA APHIS (the study 
represented 85.7 percent of all U.S. beef cattle) found that these forward pricing strategies were 
used by only about 1.5 percent of U.S. beef cattle operations.  Cash forward pricing, such as 
video auctions, is used by a limited number of producers, but it requires uniformity among 
calves and a substantial amount of coordination to be carried out successfully. Futures and 
options trading requires a relatively high level of understanding and technical knowledge of 
commodity markets, and many producers are not comfortable with using this strategy.  Private 
insurers also provide mortality insurance to livestock producers, but its use is extremely limited, 
since most producers do not experience significant losses from animal mortality. 
The Cattle Cycle
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
Cattle Inventory 
(M illion H ead)
Feeder Steer Prices 
(D ollars/C w t)
 
Figure 1-1:  U.S. Cattle Inventory and Feeder Steer Prices (1970  2000).   
Source:  USDA Economic Research Service. 
 10
Developing a revenue insurance product for livestock producers that is affordable as 
well as user-friendly is not a simple task due to the systemic risk involved with livestock 
production.  Systemic risk exists when a shock occurs and individuals throughout the entire 
industry or system feel the effects.  When prices increase or decrease in livestock markets, the 
same impact is felt on all local markets in the U.S.   Therefore, if producers held insurance, a 
significant price decline would require insurers to have enormous reserves in order to indemnify 
all policies simultaneously.  Systemic risk prevents private insurers from achieving gains from 
pooling individual risks.  The potential losses to private insurers suggest that an actuarially fair 
premium would be far greater than producers would be willing to pay.  The problem of systemic 
risk is not as prevalent in crop production, because price fluctuations are somewhat less drastic 
and natural catastrophes are usually regional.  Producers of many crops also possess the ability 
to warehouse commodities when prices are low; however, livestock producers must take the 
market price available once the animals reach market weight.      
During fiscal year 2001, the FCIC worked with private companies to develop the 
products that will be used in the pilot programs and to determine the counties where the pilot 
programs will be implemented.  Counties will be selected by FCIC based on their ability to 
provide a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility, effectiveness, and demand among 
producers for the risk management tools evaluated in the pilot program.  Any producer of a type 
of livestock covered by the pilot program who owns or operates a farm in a selected county is 
eligible to participate (House Bill 2559). 
The successful implementation of these pilot programs will depend on involvement from 
the government, private insurers, and university research.  The primary goal of the pilot 
programs is to determine a group of products that can meet the needs of the diverse population 
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of livestock producers.  Because livestock producers have diverse management goals and other 
characteristics, they will be interested in insurance products that emphasize different attributes.  
At this point, there is limited information about the specific revenue protection alternatives that 
will be offered to livestock producers.  However, the initial proposal to Congress provides some 
insight into the general characteristics of LRP. 
 The goal of LRP is virtually the same as revenue insurance for crop production.  The 
product will be designed to protect producers against market price declines within a given year, 
while not interfering with price increases.  Futures options and futures contracts for livestock 
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) will be used as reinsurance for LRP 
policies.  Using the futures market to secure these insurance policies will help producers to deal 
with the problem of systemic risk and make the policies more affordable to producers.   
The proposed product will be marketed electronically, and premiums will be revised on 
at least a daily basis.  USDAs Risk Management Agency and state insurance departments will 
require licensed insurance agents or futures brokers to be involved with placing each policy.  
Information regarding policy terms and premiums will be easily accessible to each agent and to 
livestock producers via the Internet.  Producers will be expected to provide proof of ownership 
in order to purchase a revenue insurance policy. The policy can begin when the producer first 
takes possession of the livestock, and covers the animals for the entire period of ownership.  
Policies for cow-calf operations will range from 90 to 360 days.  The insurance policies are 
expected to protect revenue for a maximum of 360 days and, consequently, do not take the 
long-run production cycle into account. 
Individual producers can have several LRP policies in force simultaneously.  The 
proposed product recommends that producers insure a minimum of 50 fed cattle with a 25 head 
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increment and a minimum of 40 stocker/feeder cattle with a 20 head increment.  Producers will 
pay a deductible that ranges between $0 and $10 per cwt, such that the higher the deductible, 
the more risk the producer is willing to absorb.  The premium will also be calculated taking the 
selected deductible into account (the larger the deductible, the lower the premium price).  All 
premiums will be due within 10 days after the coverage is bound.  The indemnity payment 
under the policy will be based on the USDA Market News average price for that class of 
livestock during the last five days of the last month of the policy term.  Producers will not have 
to file a claim, and payments will be sent directly to the producer if the price falls below the 
covered price.  Producers retain the right to sell the livestock at any time during the coverage 
period, and indemnity payments will be made independent of the price at which the livestock 
were sold.  This feature may cause some moral hazard issues if producers insure at high target 
weights and intentionally purchase less feed inputs than normal to lower costs.  In this case, 
producers still pay a higher total premium, and also take the risk of prices being higher when 
the policy matures.  It is assumed that a profit-maximizing producer would not act in this 
manner, because he would be expected to purchase feed inputs at a level where a change in cost 
would be equivalent to the expected change in revenue (Bossman).    
It is imperative that the Federal government be actively involved in the development and 
administration of LRP.  The primary role of the government will be to subsidize premiums as 
well as the administrative costs of the program.  The FCIC has extensive experience with 
agricultural risks, and every U.S. state insurance department recognizes and accepts its 
reinsurance.  Each state will regulate the licensing and the solvency of the insurer, the reinsurer, 
and the agents who provide the policies.   
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1.4.1 Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance 
Babcock and Hayes make a strong argument for expanding the current crop insurance 
program to include livestock in a whole-farm revenue insurance product.  A whole-farm policy 
can offer producers protection for the entire farms revenue at a high but affordable coverage 
level.  Rational producers are more concerned about their end-of-year revenue than they are 
about the yields, output prices, or input costs of the individual crops that contribute to their 
year-end net revenue.  In terms of insurance, producers could benefit from lower premiums that 
result from pooling the risk associated with all enterprises.  Insurance premiums for a whole-
farm policy should be significantly lower than the sum of insurance premiums for each 
individual enterprise.  Higher coverage levels would also be affordable to producers because of 
the lower risk that results from diversification.  Babcock and Hayes suggest that on a 500-acre 
corn and soybean operation, premium rates would fall by more than 60 percent if 2,000 hogs 
were added to the mix.    
A whole-farm insurance product with livestock incorporated would operate similarly to 
Revenue Assurance.  Adding livestock greatly reduces the probability that an indemnity will be 
paid on other enterprises.  Indemnities on this product would be paid at the end of the period 
when all insured enterprises had been harvested and/or sold.  The futures market would be used 
as reinsurance for this product, just as with LRP.  A whole-farm policy revenue guarantee could 
make a 90 percent revenue guarantee available and strengthen the farm income safety net for 
producers.  
Through the pilot programs, policy makers will be able to gather valuable information 
about the attributes that are important to producers.  However, the number of producers 
involved in the pilot programs is limited by the funding that has been appropriated.      
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1.4.2 Example of LRP for a Cow/Calf Operation  
The following example illustrates how LRP will work for a cow/calf producer interested 
in protecting himself from a decrease in price over a 240-day period.  This example is based 
upon the basic product proposed to Congress by the American Feed Industry Association.   We 
assume that 100 calves are born in March with a target weight of 750 pounds by November.  
The current market price for feeder cattle is assumed to be $70 per hundredweight (cwt).  The 
producer would take the following steps to insure his revenue: 
 
Step 1:  The producer contacts a licensed LRP representative such as an insurance agent or a 
banker. 
 
Step 2:  The licensed representative provides a forecast price for November of $78/cwt.  The 
producer is provided a list of deductibles, from $0 to $10, based upon the amount of risk he 
wishes to cover.  (The forecast price is the price reported by USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) in November.  The policy pays on the average trade over five reported days.)  
 
Step 3:  The rancher decides to cover price drops below $75/cwt, a $3/cwt deductible.  The 
representative quotes a premium price of $2.50/cwt.   
 
The premium paid is equal to 100 feeders x 7.5 cwt x $2.50/cwt = $1,875. 
 
Step 4:  The licensed agent confirms ownership and possession of the producers cattle. 
 
Step 5:  In November, AMS reports the local market prices for the five days traded.  The five-
day reported average for November is $67. 
 
The producer is paid the difference between the $75 covered price and the five-day average 
price of $67.  The total indemnity paid is 100 feeders x 7.5 cwt x $8/cwt = $6,000. 
 
This example gives the basic operation of livestock revenue protection, showing the 
value of revenue protection for producers.  By having revenue protection, the producer in this 
example experienced a net gain of $4,125 (the indemnity payment minus the premium paid).  
The product used in this example does not reflect a government-subsidized premium, which is 
expected to be available to relieve a portion of the producers financial burden.  With a 
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subsidized premium, the producer would be made even better off as a result of the insurance.  
The Risk Management Agency expects to have several products possessing different attributes 
available to producers.   LRP establishes a guaranteed minimum amount of revenue, which can 
assist producers with securing loans and making more informed financial decisions.  The 
product provides livestock producers relatively simple, understandable, and self-directed 
protection from worldwide market pressures (Bossman).  
Given that an insurance product is comprised of multiple attributes, conjoint analysis 
(CA) provides an attractive methodology for analyzing and determining producers perceptions 
of specified product attributes.  Conjoint analysis is based on the idea that a consumer 
aggregates the individual values provided by each feature of a product to determine the total 
value of the product (Hair et al.).   Conjoint analysis allows respondents to evaluate complex 
products in a realistic decision context, and it provides a quantitative measure of the relative 
importance of one attribute as compared to another.  Livestock revenue insurance is a new 
product being designed, and conjoint analysis is commonly used to evaluate new product 
acceptance among consumers (Gineo, Halbrendt et al., Prentice and Bell, Sylvia and Larkin, 
Gillespie et al., Harrison et al., Stevens et al.).  Conjoint analysis provides the researcher with 
valuable information about the attributes and attribute levels desired by the consumer for a 
given product. 
Conjoint analysis is a survey-based approach that decomposes actual or hypothetical 
products into individual attributes and asks respondents for an overall evaluation of the 
products.  Once the relevant features and feature levels of a product are determined, a set of 
hypothetical products is developed from all possible combinations of feature levels.  
Respondents are required to evaluate only a small subset of the possible products in order to get 
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useful information about each feature and feature level of the product.  Conjoint analysis allows 
the researcher to determine a part worth utility for each given feature of a product by 
decomposing a respondents overall preference for the product.  The part worth values will 
provide private insurers and the government with valuable information on producers preference 
for basic features of insurance products as well as the desired levels of each feature.  The part 
worth utility estimates allow one to determine a respondents total utility for any combination of 
product features. The part worth estimates can be used as a basis for segmenting the market so 
that the most suitable products are designed for the given clientele (Jedidi et al. and Sy et al.). 
The characteristics or attributes of the products will be the ultimate determinant of their 
acceptance among producers.  This study will identify the relevant attributes of livestock 
revenue insurance products and employ CA to determine the importance of these specific 
attributes and the level of the attribute desired by Louisiana beef cattle producers.  The part 
worth utility values that result from CA will also be used to segment producers to determine the 
characteristics of producers in each segment.  Producers will evaluate hypothetical insurance 
products under four economic scenarios to determine whether preference for products changes 
in different situations.   The overall goal of the study is to determine differences in preference 
for products or attributes for producers with similar characteristics. This will assist with 
selecting the optimal livestock revenue insurance product that should be marketed to specific 
types of beef cattle producers. 
 Conjoint analysis has been used since the 1970s and utilized extensively for new product 
development in marketing research.  Although CA has been used to evaluate consumers 
preferences for many different products, it has not, to this point, been used to evaluate 
agricultural related insurance products.  Conjoint analysis provides the researcher with a tool for 
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understanding consumers reactions and preference structure for specified attributes of a 
product.  A considerable amount of attention is given to correctly defining the relevant 
attributes and attribute levels of the products.  Respondents evaluate a realistic set of products 
and make tradeoffs between the characteristics or attributes of the product similar to the process 
used in an actual purchase decision.  Once respondents have evaluated the products, part worth 
utility estimates can be generated econometrically for each respondent as well as for the entire 
sample.   The results of this analysis will show beef cattle producers overall preference for 
livestock revenue insurance and decompose this preference structure to identify the importance 
of individual features or attributes of the product.      
 Most previous studies related to insurance have employed an expected utility 
framework to determine income distributions that would result from different insurance 
contracts (i.e., Fraser, Vandeveer and Loehman, Wang et al.).  For example, Vandeveer and 
Loehman used an expected utility framework to determine farmer response to modifications in 
crop insurance.    Vandeveer and Loehman were able to look at existing crop insurance products 
and make modifications, such as more detailed classification of yield risk or higher yield 
guarantees.  The authors compared the cost and coverage of crop insurance to other methods 
used for assistance in the event of a disaster.  In contrast, for the current study, the actual 
insurance products have not been developed, which makes it impossible to form accurate or 
useful distributions.  The expected utility framework performs well and provides pertinent 
information on products that are actually available to consumers.  Since insurance products are 
currently in the developmental phase, an analysis to determine producers preference for various 
features of an insurance product is more appropriate than analyzing expected utility. 
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1.5 DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The dissertation will be organized into five chapters. Chapter Two consists of a 
discussion of available risk management strategies and a review of literature relevant to the 
research problem.  The theoretical framework and research methodology are explained in 
Chapter Three. The empirical model is also developed and explained in detail in Chapter Three.  
Descriptive statistics from the survey along with empirical results are discussed in Chapter 
Four.  Chapter Five consists of the summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further research 
in this area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SUMMARY OF RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
The USDA has made progress in expanding the risk management choices available to 
crop producers.  Examination of the evolution of risk-reducing products for crop producers 
provides insight for producing a successful product for livestock producers.   
Prior to 1996, producers received deficiency payments to reduce income variability 
when national average prices for program crops were low.  These payments were designed to 
help farmers manage the downside risk associated with unfavorable price movements.  Supply 
controls were also in place to prevent prices from being excessively low due to over-production 
of specific crops.  Starting in 1996, instead of deficiency payments, producers who participate 
in federal programs received fixed contract payments.  By eliminating many supply control 
programs, producers have also been granted the flexibility to plant the acreage desired of any 
crop based on their price expectations.  Without these programs in place to compensate for price 
variability, the burden has been shifted to producers to find methods to reduce the risk of 
experiencing substantial fluctuations in revenue from year to year.  
To make sound financial decisions about their operations, livestock producers need 
alternative risk management tools.  Livestock producers currently have few risk management 
strategies to choose among and limited understanding of those available.  The ability to make 
sound risk management decisions depends upon three fundamental factors:  1) understanding 
the farms risk environment, 2) knowing how the available risk management strategies work 
and which risks they address, and 3) selecting the strategy or combination of strategies that will 
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provide the protection that best suits the operators individual goals (Schnepf, et al.).  The 
complexity of the existing tools, hedging with futures and options, makes it difficult for 
livestock producers to use them.  Hedging with futures and options requires a level of training, 
experience, and expertise that most producers do not possess.  The lack of familiarity with the 
markets causes many producers to distrust the markets and the individuals who participate in 
them (Bossman).  The lack of simple, affordable risk management alternatives for livestock 
producers presents a problem that will require a degree of government intervention to remedy.       
A well-developed revenue insurance product will be beneficial to livestock producers.  It 
will provide livestock producers with cash-flow protection, loan collateral, increased confidence 
when developing crop-marketing plans, and stability for long-term business plans.  This will 
ultimately increase their financial security and ability to develop sustainable operations.  
Although the federal government will be expected to provide financial assistance for 
administrative costs and premium subsidies, there will be benefits from having more stable 
prices for livestock producers in the U. S. (Bossman). 
2.1.1 Crop Risk Management Alternatives 
The traditional risk management alternatives available to crop producers are 
diversification, the use of futures markets to lock in prices prior to selling, and crop 
insurance.  Diversification has always been a risk management tool employed by producers to 
stabilize whole-farm revenue.  By producing several different commodities, farmers expect that 
low prices or low yields for one commodity will possibly be offset by high prices or high yields 
for another commodity (Babcock).  For example, a farmer who produces corn and livestock 
benefits from diversification when the price of corn declines, but the price of livestock increases 
to help compensate for the loss in corn revenue.  This is a relatively low cost method that 
 21
reduces risk due to the low probability of low prices and/or yields existing across several 
enterprises within the same year.  Diversification does not require producers to have a 
tremendous amount of expertise or additional training.  With diversification, crop producers 
continue to be exposed to a significant amount of risk from natural disasters. 
The futures market provides producers an opportunity to hedge against price changes.  
Hedging simply involves shifting the risk of a price change in the cash market to the futures 
market.  Hedging replaces price risk with basis risk, which is based upon the difference between 
the futures contract price and the cash market price.  Most producers who use the futures market 
to reduce price risk take advantage of either futures options or futures contracts.  With a futures 
option, for a known premium, producers can acquire the right to sell (buy) their output (input), 
actual or anticipated, at a stated strike price.  An option grants the right to sell, which places a 
floor under returns without putting a limit on them.  The main difference between a futures 
option and a futures contract is that the option has a premium attached.  When prices move 
against the cash position, the trader would prefer to be hedged with a futures contract versus a 
futures option (Catlett and Libbin).  The futures market is not widely used by producers due to 
the transaction costs and expertise required to trade effectively.  
Crop yield insurance has also been available but not widely used by crop producers prior 
to recent federal reforms.  The traditional yield-based coverage, referred to as multiple peril 
crop insurance (MPCI), pays the producer an indemnity if the actual yield falls below a yield 
guarantee.  Under MPCI, a producer can purchase minimum catastrophic risk protection (CAT) 
for an administrative fee of $60 per crop, per county.  The premiums for CAT are fully 
subsidized by the federal government, but producers can purchase higher levels of coverage 
(termed buy-up coverage) with partially subsidized premiums.  The yield guarantee for MPCI 
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is determined by simply multiplying the actual production history (APH) yield by the selected 
coverage level.  The APH yield is a simple average of 4 to 10 consecutive years of a growers 
certifiable historical production records.   Coverage levels range from 50 to 75 percent of the 
APH yield (USDA, RMA).   With this coverage, a farmers revenue can still decline if his 
yields are high but prices low. 
2.1.1.1 Current Revenue Insurance Products 
As the federal government attempts to decrease its role in providing price and income 
support to producers, attention has been given to agricultural insurance as a means of mitigating 
risk.  The goal of crop insurance reform legislation is to increase participation, provide more 
comprehensive coverage, use market mechanisms, and lower costs to producers as well as 
taxpayers.  With the 1994 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act, the government decided to 
merge crop insurance with ad hoc disaster payment assistance.  Enormous capital outlays for ad 
hoc disaster assistance contributed to the overall federal budget deficit and increased the need to 
reform the crop insurance program.  This Act forced farmers to consider alternative methods for 
protection against unavoidable losses before they occur. 
Congress first mandated a study of the feasibility of revenue insurance in the 1981 Farm 
Act.  However, revenue insurance products were not introduced in the United States until 1996 
as an alternative strategy for managing the risk associated with price fluctuations.  These 
products were modified versions of Canadas Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) and 
Net Income Stabilization Accounts (NISA) that were first introduced in 1991.  The three 
primary products that were made available to producers were Income Protection (IP), Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assurance (RA).  The key modification in the U.S. 
revenue insurance products is the use of an intra-year, futures-based price to establish the 
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guarantee, while Canada used a long-term average price.  Canada found that using a long-term 
average price was costly and interfered with market signals (Skees et. al.).   
The three primary revenue insurance products available in the United States have very 
similar attributes. Each of these products combines price and yield risk protection in one 
product that provides downside revenue risk protection to producers.  With each of the current 
revenue insurance products, farmers receive an indemnity payment equal to the difference 
between the guaranteed and actual/realized revenue.  The federal government subsidizes 
premiums and also insures private companies against a portion of the losses related to each 
product.  The following discussion provides details of each of the three policies. 
2.1.1.1.1 Income Protection 
Income Protection (IP) protects producers against reductions in gross income that result 
from a decline in prices, yields, or a combination of both.  Income Protection requires the 
farmer to insure all of his/her acreage of a particular crop in a particular county as a single 
parcel or enterprise unit.   The revenue guarantee is calculated as RG = APH  PP1  CL, 
where RG is the revenue guarantee, APH is the actual production history, PP is projected price, 
and CL represents the coverage level.  The level of guarantee is unique to each producer, and 
the coverage level can range from 50 to 75 percent of the APH yield.   
To illustrate how IP operates, one can consider a corn producer with an APH yield of 
120 bushels per acre.  Let us assume the average futures price quote for December corn traded 
during the month of March is $2.50 per bushel, and the producer selects a 75 percent coverage 
level.  The revenue guarantee would be 0.75  120 bu  $2.50/bu = $225.  If the November 
average quote for the December futures contract is $3.00, and the producers actual yield is 70 
                                                 
1 The projected price is the futures price for harvest-time delivery at the time the producer purchases the policy. 
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bushels per acre, the producers actual revenue would be 70 bu  $3.00 = $210.  In this case, the 
producer would receive an indemnity payment of $225 - $210 = $15 per acre.  If revenue were 
above the level projected when the contract was initiated, the additional revenue would be profit 
for the producer.  Income Protection basically protects the producer against shortfalls in actual 
revenue below the expected revenue for a particular growing season.  IP premium rates are 
developed using historical information on the correlation between national prices and county 
yields, the relationship between APH yields and the county average yields that year, and the 
years projected price level.  As a result, the premium rates vary by county and among 
producers within a given county. 
2.1.1.1.2.  Crop Revenue Coverage 
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) is the most widely available form of revenue insurance, 
and it accounted for more than 26 percent of corn crop insurance sales in 1997 (Roberts, et al).   
Crop Revenue Coverage operates similar to IP in setting the revenue guarantee; however, CRC 
offers an additional coverage component called replacement coverage that allows the 
producers coverage to increase if futures price quotes rise.  The producer will receive the 
higher of the revenue indemnity (the same as IP) or the replacement coverage indemnity.  
To illustrate how CRC works, consider the corn grower in the example above.  Recall that for a 
70-bushel per acre yield and a price of $3, the producer would receive an indemnity payment of 
$15 per acre.  Under CRC, the change in the futures price over the season would be considered 
in determining the indemnity payment.  If the coverage level is set at 75% of the 120 APH 
yield, payment is made for yields below 90 bushels per acre (0.75  120 bu/acre = 90 bu/acre).  
With this scenario, there would be a 20-bushel shortfall.  The harvest price of $3 would be 
multiplied by the 20-bushel shortfall, and the producer would receive a replacement coverage 
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payment of $60 per acre.   Crop Revenue Coverage premium rates are calculated based 
primarily on the underlying APH rate for the crop.  Crop Revenue Coverage assumes that the 
correlation between price and yield is zero, since the replacement coverage option indemnifies 
in cases where prices are above or below the futures price.  The proportion of the CRC premium 
that is subsidized is less than IP.  Crop Revenue Coverage premium rates are always higher than 
IP (20  40% higher in most cases) due to the replacement coverage component. 
2.1.1.1.3 Revenue Assurance 
Revenue Assurance (RA) provides revenue protection for low prices, low yields, or a 
combination of both, similar to IP and CRC.  Revenue Assurance offers replacement coverage 
protection similar to CRC, and it also possesses a unique feature that allows producers to insure 
a whole farm unit.  Revenue assurance has a limited market availability that covers certain 
crops in certain geographical areas.  The market availability can be condensed into the 
following four categories by state and crops covered:  1) South Dakota and Minnesota; corn, 
soybeans, and spring wheat, 2) Iowa, Indiana, and Illinois; corn and soybeans, 3) North Dakota; 
corn, soybeans, spring wheat, sunflowers, canola, and feed barley, and 4) Idaho; canola, spring 
wheat and feed barley.   If the replacement coverage option is selected, the per-acre revenue 
guarantee is based on the greater of the projected harvest price or the fall harvest price, just as in 
CRC (USDA, RMA).   
To qualify for whole-farm unit coverage, the producer must have RA insurance on all 
insurable acres of covered crops in the applicable state.  The whole-farm revenue guarantee 
would be the sum of the guarantees calculated for each individual crop.  Producers who choose 
the whole-farm unit option will receive indemnity payments if the revenue at harvest from all 
insurable crops is less than the whole-farm revenue guarantee.  One attractive feature of the 
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whole-farm unit option is that premiums are much lower than with other options due to 
diversification.  Since the risk of low prices, low yields, or a combination of the two is spread 
across several crops, insurers can set premiums at lower levels.  Premium rates for RA are 
calculated assuming some degree of negative correlation between the revenue from each crop 
insured when the whole-farm unit option is selected.  Since the risk of revenue shortfalls is 
naturally reduced by diversification, premium rates are considerably lower than both IP and 
CRC (Skees, et. al.).  
Premium rates for crop insurance are, in general, determined by observing each of the 
following factors:  1) the type of crop, 2) number of acres of the insured unit, 3) the coverage 
level selected, 4) the farms loss experience and APH yield, and 5) the county yield and historic 
variability (Schnepf and Heifner).  The premium rates for most revenue insurance products are 
lower than for traditional crop insurance products that were based solely on APH yield.  
Premium rates are lower because the negative correlation between price and yield reduces the 
likelihood of indemnity payments.   Where there is a strong natural hedge (strong negative 
correlation between price and yield), revenue insurance products are less effective, because a 
decline in yield results in a significantly higher price.  Table 1 provides a side-by-side 
comparison of the three revenue insurance products discussed.  The USDA Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) shows a trend moving away from traditional yield insurance to revenue 
insurance.  A study of producers in Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Texas by Coble et al. 
indicated that purchases of yield insurance products (MPCI and CAT) decreased by about four 
percent, while revenue insurance products (IP, CRC, and RA) increased by approximately eight 
percent from 1998 to 1999. 
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Table 2.1: Side-by-Side Comparison of Revenue Insurance Products 
Feature 
Crop Revenue 
Coverage (CRC) 
Income Protection 
(IP) 
Revenue Assurance (RA) 
Unit Structure 
Basic2, Optional3, 
and Enterprise4 
Units 
Enterprise Units Basic, Optional, Enterprise, 
and Whole Farm5 Units 
Price reference 
for insurance 
guarantee 
100 percent of the 
applicable base or 
harvest price.  
Insurance guarantee 
may increase during 
the insurance period. 
100 percent of 
projected price. 
100 percent of CBOT 
projected price.  Insurance 
guarantee may increase 
during the insurance period. 
Maximum 
upward 
movement for 
insurance 
guarantee 
$1.50 per bushel  
of corn, $2.00 for 
wheat, and $3.00 for 
soybeans. 
 
Not Applicable 
 
None 
Coverage level 
percents 
50  75 percent in 5 
percent increments. 
50  85 percent for 
certain crops in 
selected counties. 
50  75 percent in 5 
percent increments. 
50  85 percent for 
certain crops in 
selected counties 
65  75 percent for basic and 
optional units.  
65  85 percent for whole-
farm  and enterprise units. 
Basis for 
insurance 
guarantee 
Higher of: 1) 
Minimum guarantee 
(APH yield x 
coverage level x 
projected price.); or 
2) Harvest guarantee 
(APH yield x 
coverage level x  
harvest price) 
APH yield x 
coverage level x 
projected price. 
APH yield x coverage level x 
projected price. 
 
If  harvest price option  
selected and fall harvest 
price is greater than  
projected harvest price: APH 
yield x coverage level x fall 
harvest price.  
Eligibility for 
insureds with 
special rating: 
 
High Risk Land  
 
 
 
 
Eligible for coverage
 
 
 
 
Not Eligible for 
coverage 
 
 
 
 
Eligible for coverage 
                                                 
2  Basic unit refers to all insurable acreage of the insured crop in the county for which the insurer has 100 percent 
crop share on the date coverage begins. 
3 Optional unit refers to a basic unit that is divided due to the crop being planted in a manner that is clearly 
different from other optional units (Ex: Units can be divided according to irrigated and non-irrigated acreage).  
4 Enterprise unit refers to all insurable acreage of the insured crop in the county for which the insurer has a crop 
share on the date coverage begins. 
5 Whole-farm unit refers to all insurable acreage of each insurable crop in the county for which the insurer has a 
share on the date coverage begins for each crop. 
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2.1.2 Federal Crop Insurance Delivery 
 Current crop insurance contracts are delivered through a partnership with the USDA and 
private insurance companies.  Crop insurance policies are currently sold, serviced, and 
underwritten through private companies and their agents, but the USDA backs these companies.  
The USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) is responsible for the overall administration of 
crop insurance programs for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC).  Without 
government support, crop insurance would not exist.  When natural disasters occur, a large 
number of producers are commonly affected in an area at the same time.  This prevents 
sufficient risk pooling across producers, and consequently, actuarially fair insurance premiums 
determined by private insurers would be entirely too high for producers to accept.   
 There are about 18 insurance companies that market crop insurance through more than 
18,000 independent agents.  Many of these agents sell insurance for more than one company.  
Private insurance companies develop most of the new insurance products that are approved by 
the FCIC.  They also offer private coverage to supplement federal crop insurance.  Private 
insurance companies take on a portion of the underwriting risk by assigning their crop insurance 
policies to risk-sharing categories or reinsurance funds.  The companies are paid a subsidy by 
FCIC to cover administrative, operating, and loss adjustment costs.  FCIC requires all 
companies that qualify to deliver crop insurance to provide an annual plan of operation.  FCIC 
approves these plans and examines the types of reinsurance funds the company will use to 
reduce possible underwriting losses.          
Between 1995 and 1998, the RMA spent, on average, about $1.2 billion per year on 
premium subsidies, administrative and operating subsidies, and net underwriting losses from the 
federal crop insurance program (Dismukes).  The premium subsidies are made mainly to 
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encourage producers to participate in crop insurance.  The government also makes significant 
outlays to defray the costs that the insurance company would normally incur from being 
involved in crop insurance.  Overall, the government provides almost a win-win situation for 
both producers and private insurance companies who participate in the federal crop insurance 
program. 
2.1.3 Participation in Current Insurance Programs 
 The rate of participation in crop insurance programs has increased significantly in recent 
years.  Participation peaked at 75 percent in 1995 as a result of the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform 
Act, which required producers to obtain crop insurance if they wanted to participate or receive 
benefits from any federal farm program.  In 1993, there were 70,000 crop insurance policies 
that provided $11.3 billion in protection for 83.7 million acres of crops and participation 
increased to 1.2 million policies that provided $27.9 billion in protection for 181.6 million acres 
by 1998 (USDA RMA).  A large portion of this increase in participation is a result of changes 
made in the 1996 Farm Bill.  This bill ended the requirement that participants in farm programs 
obtain insurance, but it introduced revenue insurance and increased the number and types of 
insurance plans available to producers (Dismukes). 
 In 1998, about 61 percent of the eligible acres in the U.S. were covered by crop 
insurance.  Producers paid a total of approximately $900 million in crop insurance premiums, 
but the government paid about $1.4 billion, with the majority going to premium subsidies.  
FCIC subsidizes between 13 to 100 percent of producer premiums depending on the type of 
insurance and the coverage option chosen.  For minimum catastrophic coverage (CAT), the 
government pays 100 percent of the premiums (Schnepf and Heifner).  Premium subsidies make 
crop yield and revenue insurance low-cost tools to assist producers with reducing risk of 
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revenue losses.  The government subsidizes premiums mainly to encourage a higher level of 
participation, but premium subsides may cause some distortions. 
 Strategies to reduce risk are expected to involve a tradeoff between expected income and 
risk exposure.  However, premium subsidies for crop yield and revenue insurance distort this 
tradeoff and allow producers to reduce income risk and simultaneously increase expected 
returns (Schnepf and Heifner).  This means that over time, the producers expected returns as a 
result of having insurance are greater than the total actual insurance premium paid by the 
producer.  Since the expected benefit of purchasing insurance is positive, premium subsidies 
can be viewed as a method of boosting producers income over time.  The national aggregate 
indemnity/premium ratio for producers has averaged around 1.77 since 1995.  This suggests that 
a $1 premium payment has resulted in $1.77 of expected indemnity benefit on average (Schnepf 
and Heifner).  In addition to these benefits, producers also benefited from a reduction in risk.  
Under conditions where a dollars worth of expected return can be purchased for less than a 
dollar of premium, one would expect almost universal participation in insurance programs.       
 The government remains concerned about low participation in crop insurance programs 
given how economically favorable they are to producers.  There are several factors that may 
cause a producer not to purchase crop insurance.  One reason that producers may not participate 
is that they underestimate their risk of loss.  Others do not believe that expected indemnities 
exceed or even equal their required premium payment.  Another potential problem is that 
producers may not understand or have enough information to make a sound decision selecting 
from the wide array of products.  The number of products available has grown rapidly and 
producers have not received sufficient training to utilize them effectively.  As a result, crop 
yield and revenue insurance products may be as complicated as some other forms of risk 
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protection to producers.  Other factors that may influence a producers decision to purchase 
insurance are the producers overall level of wealth, management objectives, and ability to 
reduce risk through alternative strategies (Schnepf and Heifner).  Operations that have a large 
equity base may not purchase insurance because the impact of a crop loss may be relatively 
small when compared to their equity.  Producers with management objectives to maximize 
profit or enterprise growth may also put less emphasis on risk management strategies.  When a 
producer can mitigate risk by other means, such as off-farm employment or enterprise 
diversification, crop insurance is not as attractive.  Despite the increase in participation in recent 
years, the RMA continues to conduct educational and outreach efforts to promote participation 
in crop insurance.  As participation increases, the need for publicly funded disaster assistance 
programs decreases. 
Although premium subsidies provide obvious benefits to producers, there are also some 
related problems or consequences.  One problem with subsidized premiums is that they are 
calculated as a percentage of the total premium to be paid by the producer.  Since premiums are 
higher for production on riskier land (land with a wider yield variability), producers possessing 
this land may have an incentive to produce on land that may not normally be cultivated.  
Premium subsidies, therefore, provide more benefit to producers with land in high-risk areas 
(Schnepf and Heifner).  Premium subsidies not only encourage increased production by 
producers with high-risk land but also encourage acreage expansion by the typical producer.  
Premium subsidies provide producers with an increase in expected returns for every insured 
acre.  Therefore, producers see an opportunity to increase returns over time by expanding the 
area in crop production.   
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Coffey et al. examined the potential effects of subsidizing premiums for livestock 
insurance.  The study compared the risk efficiency of selling cattle with no means of price 
protection, purchasing insurance with an actuarially fair premium, and purchasing insurance 
with a 50 percent premium subsidy.  Expected Value Variance Analysis and Stochastic 
Dominance Criteria were used to rank the three marketing alternatives for a variety of risk 
attitudes.  The study suggests that the marginal benefit provided by subsidized premiums will 
cause producers to increase production and produce beef under riskier conditions (Coffey et al).  
This suggests that producers may expand their operations to a level that exposes them to the 
same level of risk that existed prior to the subsidy.   In the long run, the expansion that results 
from premium subsidies can have a negative impact on beef cattle prices.      
2.1.4 Livestock Risk Management Alternatives 
 Although the risk management strategies available to livestock producers are limited, 
producers do use different methods in an attempt to reduce the risk associated with livestock 
production.  Since livestock producers do not face the same degree of production risk as a crop 
producer, they more commonly focus on methods for reducing price risk or fluctuations in 
revenue.  The vast majority of beef cattle producers market their animals through local auctions.  
APHIS conducted a survey of beef cattle producers from the top 23 cow-calf states and found 
that about 85 percent of cow-calf producers market cattle through auction markets.  Using this 
method of marketing cattle exposes producers to the daily price fluctuations that occur in 
auction markets.  Many producers attempt to reduce price risk at auction markets by bringing 
calves to market on several different days during the year, as opposed to marketing all on the 
same day.  Producers expect this to provide a more even balance on the cash market price that 
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they receive for their cattle.  Although this method can stabilize prices to a degree, producers 
are still exposed to a significant amount of price risk. 
Some producers who have a quality herd of cattle market their animals by private treaty.  
With this marketing technique, buyers typically come to the cattle producers operation, and the 
two parties agree upon a price for the cattle.  The price that producers receive for animals sold 
through this technique is commonly higher than the cash market price.  This is due primarily to 
the usual higher quality of the cattle, an established relationship with buyers, and the buyers 
ability to observe breeding stock and animal health records.  Some producers choose to produce 
purebred cattle mainly to be sold as breeding stock such as bulls or replacement heifers.  These 
producers also market their cattle primarily through private treaty or select sales.  Purebred 
producers can also generally demand more for their animals than the cash market price.  The 
study by APHIS found that about 10 percent of producers market animals via private treaty.   
Many producers who sell animals by private treaty also market their lower quality animals 
through local auction markets.  The option to sell through private treaty is a way to diversify 
their marketing practices and reduce price risk.  
Beef cattle producers also have forward pricing strategies available as a method of 
mitigating price risk.  Forward pricing is the most effective tool for reducing price risk for beef 
cattle, but it is not widely used by producers.  APHIS reported that only 1.5 percent of 
operations used forward pricing as a means of marketing calves.  Forward pricing is used more 
frequently by larger, more organized cattle operations (USDA APHIS).  Forward pricing 
involves locking in a price on calves before they are ready to market.  The primary methods of 
forward pricing are cash forward pricing and futures and options trading.  Of these two 
methods, cash forward pricing is the most common.  About 49 percent of producers who use 
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forward pricing use cash forward pricing, while about 28 percent use futures and options.  
Producers involved in forward pricing market, on average, about 50 percent of their calves 
through this channel (USDA APHIS).  Cash forward pricing requires producers to be highly 
coordinated and have calves at a fairly uniform weight and quality.  Under most cash forward 
pricing arrangements, buyers want to purchase calves in groups of 60.  This makes this method 
of marketing more appropriate for larger producers.  Futures and options trading is not widely 
used because of the amount of expertise needed to successfully employ this technique.  
Producers who use these strategies are able to protect against price related risk, but a well-
developed revenue insurance product will provide an opportunity for a greater number of 
producers to protect their operations.     
2.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Since livestock revenue protection is a relatively new concept, the literature available on 
the subject is limited.  However, much of the literature on crop revenue insurance can be 
utilized because of the similarities between the two.  In addition to literature on crop insurance, 
literature that employs multiattribute utility and conjoint analysis is also relevant for this 
review.  
2.2.1 Crop Insurance Literature 
Standard multiple peril crop insurance was first introduced by the federal government in 
1938 to protect farmers against low yields that resulted from uncontrollable catastrophes, such 
as adverse weather, insect damage, soil and plant diseases, etc. (Black and Dorfman).  Prior to 
1994, the federal crop insurance program was characterized by poor participation and actuarial 
performance because most farmers still relied on federal disaster relief programs to supplement 
them in the time of crisis.  Crop insurance reform has been a top priority of the federal 
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government in recent years due to the extremely large capital outlays resulting from the natural 
disasters of recent years.  As the federal government continues to express intentions of reducing 
the availability of disaster relief to producers, private insurance becomes more important.  
Revenue insurance has become a popular topic in the crop insurance arena due to the 
tremendous amount of price risk that producers face.  A survey of crop producers in 
Mississippi, Texas, Indiana, and Nebraska conducted by Coble, et al. indicated that over 70 
percent of producers ranked price variability as the greatest source of risk.    
An issue that is extremely important to the agencies that will be providing insurance to 
producers is determining the characteristics of producers who will purchase insurance.  Black 
and Dorfman (2000) conducted a study of Georgia cotton and peanut farmers that focused on 
identifying these characteristics.  The primary variables selected for the analysis were 
expectation of disaster relief payments, education, average farm size, farm diversification, farm 
debt, off-farm income, average yield, and rented farmland.  The study employed logit analysis 
to determine the effect of explanatory variables on farmers crop insurance purchase decisions.   
The majority of the estimated coefficients were consistent with a priori expectations. 
The estimated coefficients on household income, total assets, and diversification were all 
negative, which suggested that these producers have the ability to self-insure to a degree.  The 
coefficient on education also had a negative sign. This suggests that better educated farmers are 
less likely to purchase insurance, because they are better managers and exposed to more 
sophisticated risk management strategies.  The debt coefficient had a positive sign, which 
suggested that the more debt a producer has, the more likely he is to purchase insurance.   The 
variable for rented farmland produced a negative coefficient, which was contradictory to 
previous studies.  It was expected that farmers with more rented acres would be more likely to 
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purchase insurance.  This contradiction was attributed to farmers having acreage in several 
surrounding counties and feeling a sense of protection from geographical diversification.  The 
age and years in farming coefficients produced confusing results (negative and positive 
coefficients, respectively), which suggested that an older farmer was less likely to purchase 
insurance, but one who had been farming longer was more likely to purchase insurance.   
Smith and Baquet evaluated the demand for multiple peril crop insurance using cross-
sectional data from 370 randomly selected Montana wheat farms.  In this study the farmers 
crop insurance purchase decision was analyzed in two steps:  (1) should insurance be purchased 
and (2) if insurance is purchased, what level of coverage should be purchased.  Participation and 
coverage level were evaluated to provide information about the effects of farm size, yield 
variability, and premiums on the crop insurance purchase decision.  Information on yield 
distributions from each farm was collected and the expected returns from the purchase of crop 
insurance was computed.  Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics such as education, 
age, farming experience, marketing strategies used, enterprise diversification, off-farm income, 
and the amount of farm debt were analyzed to determine their impact on the producers crop 
insurance purchase decision.  The producers participation and coverage level were modeled 
separately using Heckman two-stage estimation procedures.  The first stage of the Heckman 
procedure estimates a probit model and the second stage is estimated by including the inverse 
Mills ratio obtained from the probit model as an explanatory variable.    
 In this study, the coefficients for age, years farming, farm size, marketing tools used, 
and off-farm employment were not statistically significant in either stage of the crop insurance 
purchase decision.  The amount of farm-related debt, education level, and a history of receiving 
emergency disaster relief payments were found to have a significant positive relationship with 
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the producers decision to purchase insurance.  There was a negative relationship between 
average yield and participation.  Premium rates did not have a significant effect on 
participation, but there was a significant negative relationship associated with the coverage 
level.  The results of the study suggested that as yield variability increased, producers with 
negative expected returns became more price responsive in their coverage level decision, and 
producers with positive expected returns became less price responsive.     
The price guarantees for livestock revenue insurance will be set based upon futures 
prices for beef cattle.  Therefore, the producers attitude toward the futures market may 
influence his decision to purchase insurance.  Pennings and Leuthold analyzed the relationship 
between producers behavioral attitudes and the use of futures contracts.   The study was 
conducted on a stratified sample of 440 Dutch swine farmers using computer-assisted personal 
interviews.  The study identified observable characteristics that could be used to measure a set 
of unobservable (latent) behavioral variables.  The characteristics evaluated were risk attitude, 
perceived risk exposure, perceived performance, market orientation, understanding of the 
futures market, debt-to-asset ratio, and entrepreneurial freedom.  The reliability of the 
unobservable variables was tested using confirmatory factor analysis and a covariance structure 
model was specified.  The covariance structure model simultaneously estimated the latent 
variables from observable variables, and also evaluated the structural relations between these 
variables and the farmers use of futures contracts.  Maximum likelihood procedures were used 
to estimate the model.  Cluster analysis was used to test for heterogeneity among respondents to 
determine if distinct groups of producers used different criteria when deciding to use futures. 
The results of the overall model found that perceived performance, entrepreneurial 
freedom, and level of understanding had a significant influence on the probability of using 
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futures contracts.  Risk attitude and perceived risk exposure were not statistically significant in 
the overall model.  In the cluster analysis, Wards method was used and two distinct segments 
were identified.  The segments identified divided producers into those who had a relatively low 
probability of using futures (120 producers) and those who had a relatively high probability of 
using futures (320 producers).  In the model for Segment 1, risk attitude, perceived risk 
exposure, and debt-to-asset ratio had a significant influence on the use of futures contracts.  In 
Segment 2, market orientation, entrepreneurial freedom, and perceived performance were found 
to play a significant role in the producers decision to use futures contracts.  The results 
suggested that producers in Segment 1 used financial structure characteristics in their decision, 
while producers in Segment 2 used marketing characteristics in their decision.  Although most 
studies treat farmers as a homogenous group, this study showed that pooling data across farmers 
when heterogeneity exists could mask the impact of important variables.             
The willingness-to-pay for livestock revenue insurance is another issue of importance 
that must be addressed. Fraser (1992) conducted a study of the Australian wheat industry to 
determine willingness-to-pay (WTP) for crop insurance.  He developed an indirect method to 
estimate WTP that uses formulas to capture the impact of crop insurance on the producers 
expected income and variance of income.  These impacts were evaluated based upon a model of 
producer welfare that included price risk, yield risk, and risk attitude of the producer.  The 
study, which analyzed 50 and 75 percent coverage levels, found that WTP was extremely 
sensitive to the level of coverage.  Estimates of WTP were found to be relatively insensitive to 
the level of price variability, but a strong positive relationship was shown for the level of yield 
variability.     
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A study by Knox and Richards (1999) employed a two-stage estimation procedure to 
analyze the producers decision for crop insurance coverage.  The decision process is first based 
upon how much land to insure, then upon the level of coverage.  In the first stage, a multinomial 
logit model is used to estimate the probability that producers in each county choose a certain 
coverage level.  In the second stage, the model differentiates between the determinants of 
producers demand for a minimal level of protection (50 percent coverage) and a more 
comprehensive level.  The data used in the study were county-level measures of the number of 
insurance contracts, total premiums, liabilities, and indemnities for California grape growers at 
each level of coverage and price election level between the years 1986 and 1996.  The authors 
concluded that producers choose among coverage levels based upon expected premiums and the 
variance of returns.  Variability of returns to insurance had very little impact on the choice of 50 
percent coverage, which is consistent with Frasers findings. However, variability had a 
significantly greater effect at the 75 percent coverage level.  At the participation level, the mean 
and variance of indemnities were also important.  Variables that measured the extent of self-
insurance produced results similar to Black and Dorfman.  Farm size, enterprise diversity, and 
farm income variables were all found to be significant factors in the producers decision to 
purchase insurance.  
The design of the insurance product will play a significant role in determining the level 
of participation as well as the benefits to the producer.  At this point, the specific livestock 
insurance policies have not been developed.  One way that crop revenue insurance policies are 
differentiated is according to whether the policy pays indemnities based upon individual farm 
yield or area yield.  Wang et al. conducted a study to determine the effects of the design on 
farmer participation and welfare.  The analysis allowed producers to use a variety of risk 
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management tools including futures, options, and crop insurance.  The study found that an 
individual farm yield index for crop insurance payouts allows more efficient management of 
farm yield risk, but transaction costs, moral hazard, and adverse selection problems are greater 
than would exist with an area yield index.  This study also concluded that the performance of 
different designs was extremely sensitive to coverage levels. 
 Vandeveer and Loehman conducted a study to determine how farmers would respond to 
modifications in crop insurance.  They also compared the cost and coverage of modified 
insurance to other methods of disaster assistance.  The crop insurance modifications considered 
were more detailed yield risk classifications and higher yield guarantees.  Personal interviews 
were used to collect data from 55 corn farmers in Tippecanoe County, Indiana.  Respondents 
were asked to evaluate multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) based on individual farm yields, 
MPCI based on area yields, disaster payments based on individual yields, and disaster payments 
based on area yield losses.  Each respondent was presented a card that explained the features of 
each contract and gave the prospective outcomes with and without insurance for a hypothetical 
farm.  Each card contained seven different yield outcomes, the probabilities of each outcome, 
what the indemnity payment would be, and the total revenue with and without insurance.  
Respondents indicated whether they would purchase each contract or not, and they also ranked 
them from most preferred to least preferred.  A ranked logit model was used to predict the 
probability of a producer choosing a particular alternative, based on the producers 
characteristics as well as characteristics of alternatives in the choice set.   
The study found that the probability of purchasing insurance would increase for 
producers with the following characteristics:  a higher probability of low yields, higher debt, 
low probability of disaster payments, low off-farm income, and a greater risk aversion.  The 
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results of the study suggested that having a more detailed yield risk classification and higher 
yield guarantees would increase participation as well as improve the actuarial performance of 
crop insurance in areas where participation had been generally low (Vandeveer and Loehman).  
The results of this study were published in 1994 and since that time some of the modifications 
suggested by Vandeveer and Loehman have been made in the crop insurance program.  The 
Federal government has increased the array of products to include those with area and 
individual yield classifications as well as higher guarantees.  
2.2.2 Multiattribute Utility 
The multiattribute utility framework can be applied to many problems that relate to 
agriculture.  Gillespie and Eidman used a multiattribute decision framework to estimate the 
relative importance of risk and other factors on an independent hog producers contracting 
decision.  They hypothesized that producers place a high value on autonomy, which in many 
cases will offset the risk-reducing benefits of a contract.  A multiattribute decision framework 
was used to model the independent producers preference function for alternative production 
arrangements.  Certainty equivalents for 20 producers were elicited through personal interview 
for each of four business arrangements.  Producers in the study indicated that autonomy 
preference dominated risk preference in their selection of alternative business arrangements.  
 In a similar study, Foltz et al. investigated multiattribute rankings of alternative cropping 
systems from both agricultural output and environmental quality perspectives.  In this context, 
multiattribute decision analysis provides a model that allows a farmer to consider the 
importance of externalities associated with his operation by selecting among choices with 
different economic and environmental attributes.  A weighted-additive utility function was 
selected for the analysis.  The study analyzed cropping systems that included four crop types, 
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three input levels, three tillage systems, and two soil types.  Foltz et al. concluded that decision 
makers with high environmental concerns and high soil productivity preferred a cropping 
system with a corn/soybean rotation, a low level of input use, and minimum tillage.  When 
decision makers were more concerned about the environment and had less productive soil, they 
preferred a cropping system with continuous corn, low input use, and minimum tillage.  
Decision makers who were less concerned about the environment were found to select a much 
broader range of cropping systems on both soil types (Foltz et al.). 
2.2.3 Conjoint Analysis 
Conjoint analysis (CA) is a multi-attribute utility framework that has been widely used 
in marketing research.  A survey by Cattin and Wittink estimated that conjoint analysis had 
been utilized for around 1,000 research projects within the first decade that it was used (1970 
1980), and it has continued to grow in popularity.  They found that about 60 percent of all 
conjoint studies relate to consumer goods, followed by nearly 20 percent for industrial goods, 
with transportation, financial services, and other services accounting for the remainder of the 
studies.  The majority of all commercial conjoint applications are for new product/concept 
identification and to determine the price or willingness-to-pay for a given product (Cattin and 
Wittink).  
Conjoint analysis is used to decompose the complex decision making process and assess 
the impact of specified product attributes on a consumers choice of or preference for different 
products.  Different products result from different combinations of levels of attributes.  CA 
allows one to determine the product attributes that are important to consumers and the level of 
product attributes that are the most (least) desirable for particular consumers.  This 
methodology asks consumers to compare products and make realistic choices based upon sets of 
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predetermined attributes in a survey context. From this, the structure of a consumers 
preferences can be estimated.  CA decomposes an individuals utility for a product into some 
combination of part-worth utilities defined for the relevant characteristics, or attributes, of the 
product (Baker and Crosby). 
Conjoint analysis has been applied extensively to analyze different types of projects, 
many of which are agriculturally related.  The procedure offers tremendous flexibility, which 
allows it to be extended across disciplines.  By utilizing a survey-based approach, CA relies on 
individuals backgrounds and judgments of products to estimate the relative importance of each 
attribute in the overall preference rating.  The marginal contribution of each attribute is referred 
to as the part worth utility of the attribute.  A large part worth value associated with an 
attribute suggests the attribute is of relatively high importance.   
Conjoint analysis allows one to measure, evaluate, and rank the relative importance of 
the individual characteristics of a product.  The researcher creates a set of hypothetical products 
by combining attributes at various levels.  The hypothetical products are presented to consumers 
who are asked to provide their overall evaluation of each product in the form of a preference 
rating or ranking.  Once the individual has evaluated each multiattribute product, the relative 
importance and value of the attributes are estimated.  In the empirical model, the ratings or 
rankings serve as the dependent variable and the attribute levels are the independent variables.  
The coefficients that are estimated by OLS or two-limit tobit models represent the part worth 
utilities of the attributes. By summing the part worth utilities of all levels of the attribute, the 
relative importance of each attribute can be determined (Prentice and Benell).  The resulting 
information can be used to design products that maximize consumer appeal for the product 
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(Holland and Wessells).  Conjoint methodology is primarily applied in agricultural literature to 
evaluate new product acceptance, willingness to pay, and market segmentation.   
Of the three common applications, new product acceptance studies are the most popular.  
In these studies, CA is used to measure and understand the tradeoffs that purchasers make 
among multiattribute products.  Conjoint analysis is a valuable method for determining how 
successful new products will be once introduced and also for analyzing the impact of changes in 
the attributes of existing products.  Some marketing and agricultural economics studies that 
have used conjoint methodology to evaluate new product acceptance or concept identification 
include Acito and Jain; Prentice and Benell; Hobbs; Harrison et al.; Halbrendt et al.; Gineo; 
Stevens et al.; Yoo and Ohta; Sylvia and Larkin; Gillespie et al.; Dennis; Holland and Wessells; 
and Boyle et al.  Conjoint analysis attempts to replicate the purchasing decisions of consumers 
by asking respondents to make choices and tradeoffs between products as one does during an 
actual shopping experience.  The fact that CA allows consumers to respond to a more realistic 
market situation gives it a major advantage over the similar contingent valuation approach 
(Baker and Crosbie).   
Studies conducted by Gillespie et al. and Harrison et al. provide good examples of the 
application of conjoint methodology for new product acceptance evaluations in agricultural 
economics.  Gillespie et al. performed an analysis to determine the most preferred ratite meat 
product to be used by meat handlers at alternative prices.  The objectives of the study were to 
estimate current and past knowledge of ostrich meat by restaurants and retailers, to estimate 
buyer ratings of potential ostrich meat products from most to least preferred, and to estimate the 
relative importance of a selected group of attributes of ostrich meat. Conjoint analysis was used 
to estimate the preference for different ostrich meat products for the retail and restaurant 
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sectors, and also the relative importance of attributes considered in the decision to purchase 
ostrich meat.  The attributes evaluated were portion size, meat product form, branding, and 
product purchase price.  Respondents were asked to rate each of nine product profiles on a scale 
from 0 to 10 based upon their preferences.  A censored two-limit tobit model was used for the 
analysis, where 0 was the lower limit and 10 was the upper limit on the product ratings.  The 
most preferred product in the restaurant and retail sector was a 6-ounce, branded filet at $4 per 
pound.   
In an analysis conducted by Harrison et al., the overall objective was to explore the 
market potential for minced meat products derived from small crawfish, which are typically 
priced well below market price or discarded by processing plants.  Attributes of two value-
added seafood products (soup/chowder base or a stuffing product) derived from underutilized 
crawfish were analyzed using conjoint data from seafood restaurants in the southern United 
States.  The most relevant attributes for the products were determined to be price, form, and 
flavor of the product.  Respondents indicated that preferences for each attribute level would be 
dependent upon the type of product (base or stuffing) the mince was used to prepare.  In this 
study, the part-worth values were estimated using ordinary least squares regression. The results 
indicated that the most preferred product for the soup/chowder base was a fresh product with a 
price discounted by 30% of the price of crawfish tail meat, with a concentrated crawfish flavor.  
For the stuffing product, the most preferred was similar, except a mild flavor was preferred.           
Contingent valuation is the most common method for determining willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) values.  In recent years, CA has attracted considerable attention as an alternative method 
for determining the price or WTP for a specified product.   Several studies in the agricultural 
economics literature (Reddy and Bush; Mackenzie; Gan and Luzar; Lin et al.; Roe et al.; 
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Stevens et al.; Miquel et al.) have applied CA to measure WTP.  Conjoint analysis asks the 
respondent to rate alternative products; whereas, contingent valuation asks the respondent to 
provide a price for alternatives.  Because of this difference in design, CA may potentially 
reduce the magnitude of hypothetical bias that exists with contingent valuation.  The conjoint 
ratings format also provides the advantages of allowing respondents to directly express 
ambivalence or indifference and of explicitly defining substitutes.  These two advantages may 
reduce nonresponse and encourage respondents to explore their preferences and tradeoffs 
(Stevens et al.). Hicksian WTP measures for product attributes can be estimated from potential 
tradeoffs between changes in product price and other attribute levels that leave the overall 
product ratings unchanged (Mackenzie).  Utilizing conjoint for WTP allows the researcher to 
determine the tradeoffs that buyers make between quality and price.  Boyle et al. argue that the 
estimates of Hicksian surplus that result from CA may be biased upward, however.  If conjoint 
choices do not include a would not buy or status-quo alternative, a nonzero value is implied 
in the estimated likelihood function for respondents who would not choose one of the 
alternatives.  In this situation, the estimates provided may be overstated. 
Mackenzie was the first agricultural economist to use CA to calculate WTP measures.  
A logit-based conjoint analysis of willingness to pay for individual attributes of deer-hunting 
trips in Delaware was developed.  Survey respondents rated alternative hypothetical hunting 
trips on a scale of 1 to 10 to identify potential tradeoffs between various attribute levels.  The 
chosen attributes were travel time, trip costs, hunting party, site congestion, probability of 
bagging a deer, and annual license fee.  Hicksian WTP measures for trip attributes were 
estimated from potential tradeoffs between changes in trip costs and changes in other attribute 
levels that leave trip ratings unchanged.  The ratings were recoded into ordinal rankings for the 
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analysis.  Regressing ratings against attribute levels using rank-order logit versus OLS avoids 
the dilemma of attributing cardinal significance to the ratings. 
Conjoint analysis can be used for market segmentation in order to gather information 
about the characteristics that are important to the targeted market.  For a market segmentation 
study, individuals are grouped based upon demographic characteristics, business arrangements, 
and estimated part-worth utilities.  The overall goal is to identify groups that have similar 
preferences or consumption patterns for certain attributes.  Baker and Crosbie, Jedidi et al., and 
Sy et al. conducted studies with market segmentation as the primary focus.  Terms that capture 
the interactions between attribute preferences and other variables specific to the individual are 
added to the model.  Baker and Crosbie conducted a study to identify homogeneous groups of 
consumers based on their preferences for food safety attributes relative to other characteristics 
of fresh produce. Cluster analysis was used to group the respondents into relatively 
homogeneous groups on the basis of the similarity of their preference functions. Market 
segmentation can assist companies with developing marketing strategies that will result in better 
allocation of resources. Once the important characteristics are identified, suppliers can develop 
and market products that fit the preferences of individuals in different segments of the 
population (Reddy and Bush). 
Sy et al. conducted a study to determine the values placed on specific characteristics of 
bulls and steers in the different segments of the beef production system.  The study segmented 
the market into purebred breeders, commercial cow-calf producers, and cattle feeders, and it 
evaluated the preferences that each segment attaches to the characteristics of cattle using CA.  
The six characteristics used to evaluate the offspring of bulls were calving ease, weaning 
weight, feed efficiency, carcass yield, fertility of female offspring, and milking ability.  The 
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steer characteristics used were carcass yield, weaning weight, feed efficiency, conformation, 
slaughter weight, and temperament.  Respondents evaluated bulls and steers by providing 
ratings on an eleven-point (0-10) preference scale.  An ordered probit model was the 
econometric procedure selected to conduct this analysis.  The results indicate that (1) purebred 
breeders place the highest value on weaning weight and milking ability; (2) cow-calf operators 
rate calving ease and temperament the highest; and (3) feeders consider slaughter weight and 
feed efficiency as the most important attributes of steers.    
The earlier literature (Cattin and Wittink, 1982) found that profile rankings were used 
most frequently for CA studies.  However, the majority of the current literature reviewed used 
product ratings.  Mackenzie contends that ratings provide at least as much information about 
respondent preferences as ordinal rankings since they also provide an indication of intensity of 
preference.  When an equal rating is used, it is considered an indication of the respondents 
indifference or ambivalence between the products.  If the number of profiles being evaluated is 
large, rating the profiles is an easier task for the respondent than providing rankings.  When 
rankings are used, it is assumed that respondents can rank all alternatives unambiguously with 
no indifference or ambivalence between the proposed alternatives  (Mackenzie).    There is 
considerable debate about the cardinal significance of product ratings.  For instance, if a 
respondent gives product X a rating of 8 and product Y a rating of 4, it does not necessarily 
mean that the respondent is indifferent between one of product X and two of product Y.   Also, 
ratings are not really continuous variables since their variations are restricted to the rating scale 
defined by the researcher (Mackenzie). 
Roe et al. contend in a 1996 article that it is possible to recode ratings to rankings and 
directly analyze the data using a random utility framework, if transitivity of preferences is 
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assumed.  The rating a respondent provides for the commodity is assigned ordinal values to 
develop rankings for the commodity.  The commodity with the highest rating would be ranked 
first and the commodity with the lowest rating would be ranked last.  Also, when ties exist, both 
products receive the same ranking, and the next rank is skipped. On the other hand, a recent 
study (2001) by Boyle et al. concluded that the recoded ratings did not recover rankings 
accurately. 
Preference models using CA can be estimated either at the individual or the 
aggregate/segment level.  Conjoint analysis is commonly performed at the individual level 
because of the significant amount of variation between individuals in consumer preferences.  
Green and Srinivasan indicate that significant improvements in predictive validity result when 
preference models are estimated at the individual level versus the aggregate level.  On the other 
hand, estimating at the individual level requires an extremely large amount of data per 
individual.  When limited information is available, the degrees of freedom are small and the 
statistical reliability of the estimates is questionable.  Because of the amount of data required, 
some studies (Holland and Wessells, and Halbrendt et al.) are limited to estimating an aggregate 
model. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Insurance is a tool for reducing risk by combining a sufficient number of exposure units 
to make their individual losses collectively predictable.  The purpose of insurance is to reduce 
the variance of income that results from uncontrollable, unforeseen circumstances.  Farmers 
attitudes toward risk can vary greatly and are key determinants in selecting risk management 
strategies.  A farmer with a strong aversion to risk will be willing to pay more for a given level 
of risk reduction than a farmer with a weaker aversion to risk.  An individual is expected to 
purchase insurance if the expected returns over time are greater than or equal to total premium 
payments over time.  When an insurance policy is actuarially fair, expected returns will equal 
premium payments in the long run (Keeney and Raiffa).   
The level of risk an individual is willing or able to bear varies with the persons 
financial situation, availability of other alternatives, and attitude toward risk (Schnepf and 
Heifner).  In general, individuals with higher levels of wealth are willing to accept higher levels 
of risk.  Producers who have a substantial amount of debt are likely to take on less risk so that 
their debt can be adequately serviced.  The preferred or optimal risk management strategy may 
vary due to the management objectives of the producer.  Risk management strategies will differ 
according to whether a producer is trying to maximize profit or enterprise growth.  Some 
producers strive to obtain the highest possible return for an acceptable level of risk, while others 
may seek to minimize the risk associated with a desired level of income.  Producers who are 
able to reduce risk through other alternatives, such as off-farm income, forward pricing, or 
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enterprise diversification, may be less likely to purchase insurance to mitigate risk.  An 
individuals risk attitude plays a major role in the risk management strategy selected.  Producers 
who are more risk averse are generally willing to sacrifice a portion of their expected returns in 
order to reduce risk.  Risk averse producers are expected to purchase insurance and may 
combine insurance with other methods of reducing risk.   
A decision maker is risk averse if he prefers receiving the expected consequence of any 
nondegenerate6 lottery with certainty to engaging in the lottery itself.  When a decision maker is 
risk averse, he is willing to pay a positive risk premium.  The risk premium for a lottery is the 
difference between the expected value of the lottery and its certainty equivalent7.  Simply 
stated, the risk premium represents the amount of an attribute the decision maker is willing to 
sacrifice from the average in order to avoid the risks associated with the lottery.  The risk 
premium is equivalent to the deductible in a common insurance policy.   Related to the risk 
premium is the insurance premium.  The insurance premium is the amount the individual is 
willing to pay to eliminate his responsibility for a lottery.  The insurance premium is the 
negative of the certainty equivalent of a lottery (Keeney and Raiffa).   Agricultural insurance is 
a risk-sharing arrangement that allows producers to pay an insurance premium to transfer some 
of the risk of loss to the government. 
Two problems that commonly arise when evaluating agricultural insurance products are 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  Both of these problems increase the private and public 
costs of insurance.  Adverse selection occurs when potential buyers with different levels of risk 
can purchase insurance at the same premium.  Consequently, high-risk individuals primarily 
                                                 
6 A nondegenerate lottery is one where no single outcome has a probability of one of occurring. 
7 The certainty equivalent of a lottery is the amount x such that the decision maker is indifferent between the lottery 
and x for certain. 
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purchase insurance.  Moral hazard exists when those protected by an insurance policy 
intentionally act in a manner that results in an indemnity payment.  With automobile insurance, 
moral hazard is observed when individuals stage accidents or receive large payments for 
medical claims when they are not actually injured.  With crop insurance, moral hazard is 
observed when producers abandon crops and do not apply inputs so that yields will be low and a 
higher indemnity paid.   
The actuarial performance of insurance is affected by these problems because producers 
purchase insurance only when conditions are favorable for gains.  Coinsurance has been 
incorporated into crop insurance policies as a method of reducing moral hazard.  With 
coinsurance, the producer absorbs a specified fraction of any loss incurred.  Coinsurance makes 
moral hazard behavior less lucrative because producers receive a lower indemnity price for each 
unit (bushel, ton, etc.) of loss.  Vandeveer and Loehman pointed out that under the multiple 
peril crop insurance program (MPCI), farmers received an average of $1.88 in indemnities for 
each dollar they paid in premiums from 1980 to 1990.  By 1998 Schnepf and Heifner reported 
that this ratio had decreased to about $1.77.  This suggests that modifications in crop insurance 
have to some extent reduced adverse selection and moral hazard.   
It is important to understand the concepts of insurance because participants in this study 
will evaluate different insurance product profiles.  However, consumer behavior provides the 
actual foundation on which the theoretical model is built.  The utility function provides a 
convenient framework for evaluating producers preferences for alternative insurance products.  
The researcher can estimate a utility function from a respondents evaluation of the given 
insurance product profiles.  The utility function orders consumer preferences among the 
possible consumption bundles in the consumption set.  The basic hypothesis is that a rational 
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consumer will always maximize his or her utility by selecting the most preferred bundle from 
the set of affordable alternatives.  In the utility maximization problem, the set of affordable 
alternatives are those that satisfy the consumers budget constraint.  If m represents the fixed 
amount of money available to the consumer and p = (p1,,pk) represents a vector of prices for 
goods 1,,k, then the set of affordable bundles, B, can be written as follows: 
[1]  mB    :X in  pxx   
The utility maximization problem can be written as (Varian): 
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Equations 1 and 2 imply that a consumer maximizes his/her utility by allocating available 
resources among competing goods.  This traditional analysis of consumer behavior can be used 
effectively when the maximization problem is concerned with a single objective.  However, for 
the case of evaluating livestock revenue protection, the framework must be further expanded to 
explicitly illustrate the impact of multiple attributes and objectives on an individuals utility. 
3.1.1 Multiattribute Utility Theory 
In making a decision, an individual evaluates the possible consequences and expected 
utility of various alternatives.  Then, he or she chooses the course of action that provides the 
highest expected utility.  The most common or traditional utility theory assumes that an 
individuals utility is a function of a single attribute objective such as wealth or income. 
However, most complex decision problems involve multiple, conflicting objectives.  
Multiattribute utility theory can be used for decision analysis when a decision involves multiple 
attributes or objectives.   Producers have different management objectives, financial status, risk 
preferences, demographic characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics, which will cause 
them to prefer insurance products with a number of different attributes. 
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 One can use multiattribute analysis to investigate the way in which a decision maker 
establishes tradeoffs between alternative attributes to maximize his utility.  Attributes, in 
multiattribute decision analysis, refer to the various factors that can have a significant impact on 
a decision makers choice between alternative situations.  If only one attribute is evaluated in a 
model when additional attributes are important to the decision maker, then the model will 
provide biased, inaccurate results.  Therefore, it is important to consider all attributes that could 
influence an individuals preference for a given situation when assessing utility (Keeney and 
Raiffa).   
The general framework for a multiattribute decision problem assumes that an objectives 
hierarchy has been specified and that attributes x1, x2,.....,xn have been determined to be 
appropriate for the problem.  Let X represent a composite good (insurance product) with n 
attributes, where X = (xij,,xnj) and xij represents the ith attribute level of the jth product profile.  
The utility function for the jth multiattribute product can be written as follows: 
[3]  
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This utility function is analyzed over the n attributes, where there are a total of j alternative 
products.   
An additive utility function implies additive independence of the attributes.  An 
attribute, Xi, is additive independent of attribute Xj when conditional preferences for attribute Xi 
given Xj do not depend on the particular level of Xj (Keeney and Raiffa).  The additive utility 
function can be written as follows: 
[4] njnj21j xbxbxb  ...     U 21j   
In this linear equation, bi represents the weight or part worth utility for each attribute for 
the given product profile.  In this utility function, one can add separate contributions of each 
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attribute to obtain total utility for the profile.  If interactions between attributes are found to be 
significant, another functional form will be specified. 
3.1.2 Conjoint Analysis 
Conjoint analysis (CA) offers a flexible methodology that can be applied in almost any 
area in which consumer decisions are being evaluated.  Conjoint analysis is a multivariate 
technique that uses a survey-based approach to understand how respondents develop 
preferences for products or services.  In a conjoint experiment, a product is decomposed into 
relevant factors or attributes that can be combined to fully describe the product.  From the 
specified attributes and attribute levels, hypothetical products are constructed for respondents to 
evaluate.  One is able to determine the importance of product attributes and their levels by 
allowing respondents to evaluate only a fraction of the possible product combinations.  
Respondents evaluate the products through a realistic procedure that is very similar to making 
tradeoffs among products in everyday decision-making.  Respondents to conjoint survey 
questions are asked to either rate or rank the different product profiles that are comprised of 
various levels of the pre-specified attributes.  Respondents are provided a numerical scale, 
which is used to rate each profile, or they rank each of the profiles numerically from most to 
least preferred.  Therefore, products that are given a higher overall rating or ranking provide 
more utility to the consumer.    
Utility is the conceptual basis for assessing the value of a product or service with CA.  
When the observed rankings or ratings are collected from respondents, they are used as the 
dependent variables, the specified attributes are the independent variables, and the part worth 
utility values are estimated econometrically.  The respondents total utility for a product is 
determined from the combination of individual or part worth utility values for each attribute of 
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the product.  The part worth utility estimates can be combined for any combination of attributes 
so that the total utility for a wide range of products can be determined.  The part worth estimates 
can also be used as a method to segment the market (Green and Srinivasan).  Individuals with 
similar estimates are clustered together to identify differences in characteristics.     
From Equation 4, the utility, Uj, represents an observable utility measure. The 
judgmental values (ratings or rankings) that the respondent provides for a profile are the actual 
observable utility measures, and they represent the dependent variable for the model.  The 
independent variables in the model, xij, are the attribute levels specified for each product 
attribute. The weights of the independent variables (part worth utilities), denoted by bi, are 
estimated econometrically.  Thus, Equation 4 can be rewritten as follows: 
[5] njnj21j xbxbxb  ...     R 21j  
Here, Rj represents the actual rating or ranking provided by the respondent. 
Producers are assumed to select the combination of attributes that will maximize their 
utility subject to their individual objectives (Varian).   This suggests that the decision maker 
will choose product j over j+1 only if Uj > Uj+1.  The theoretical framework for estimating the 
marginal contribution of specific attributes of livestock revenue protection products is based on 
consumer demand theory developed by Lancaster.  The Lancasterian theoretical framework is 
used, which suggests that goods are not the direct object of utility; rather, it is the characteristics 
of the goods from which utility is derived.  The decision makers theoretical utility model can 
be expressed as follows: 
[6] Uj = f(X1j, X2j, Xnj; Z1, Z2,Zn | n) + e 
In Equation 6, Uj represents the utility an individual receives from product j, Xij represents the 
ith attribute level for product j, Zi represents the socioeconomic profile for each individual (i 
=1,,N), n represents a vector of parameter estimates for each attribute level, and e is an error 
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term.  The variables x and Z are main effect variables for product attributes and individuals 
profiles, respectively. 
 The partial derivative of the consumers utility of the jth product with respect to the 
product characteristic, ∂U(x*)j/ ∂xnj, gives the value or part worth that the consumer assigns to 
the nth characteristic level of the jth product (Louviere).  According to this formulation, the 
change in a cattle producers utility for an insurance product is determined by variations of the 
insurance attributes.  The conceptual and empirical strength of conjoint analysis comes from the 
information gained from analysis of the trade-offs made among product attributes that can be 
used to establish the perceived preference for all available products (Gan and Luzar). 
 The contribution of each individual attribute to the respondents total utility defines the 
preference for the given product.  Knowing the preference structure of producers provides a 
tremendous amount of flexibility in examining both individual and aggregate attitudes to a wide 
range of products.  The part worth utility values provide the researcher the flexibility to perform 
the following tasks:  1) define the object with the optimum combination of features; 2) show the 
relative contributions of each attribute and each level to the overall evaluation of the object; 3) 
use estimates of consumer judgments to predict preferences among objects with differing sets of 
attributes; 4) isolate groups of potential consumers who place differing values on the attributes 
to define potential segments; and 5) identify marketing opportunities by exploring the market 
potential for attribute combinations not currently available (Hair et al.).       
3.2 METHODOLOGY 
This section outlines the methodology that was used to achieve each of the specific 
objectives of this study.  Conjoint analysis was chosen over expected utility for this study 
because the objective of the study was to determine the relative importance of different 
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attributes for insurance.  Conjoint analysis uses hypothetical products developed from varying 
different levels of key attributes to determine a respondents preference structure for a product.  
Respondents evaluate a relatively small number of products, and the estimated part worth 
values are used to determine the total utility for any product derived from the specified 
attributes.   
Conjoint analysis involves a somewhat structured framework necessary for estimating a 
consumers preference structure.  The following four steps must be taken when applying 
conjoint analysis to a particular problem: 
1. Attribute Generation 
2. Preference Model Specification 
3. Data Collection Method 
4. Estimation Method   
 
At each step in the analysis, it is important to evaluate each alternative and decide on the 
technique that best fits the situation being analyzed.  The predictive ability of the model hinges 
on the technique selected at each step.  These steps provide the foundation for the methodology 
to be used to address the specific objectives of this study. 
3.2.1 Attribute Generation  
The first and perhaps most important step in a conjoint experiment is attribute 
generation.  Attributes included in a conjoint experiment should be those most relevant to 
potential customers and those that satisfy the managerial constraint variables.   An attribute is 
relevant to a product if overlooking its existence leads to different predictions about the 
choice or ordering of the goods by the consumer.  If the attribute does not positively or 
negatively influence a consumers preference function, it is considered irrelevant (Lancaster).  
All attributes and attribute levels must be easily explained for an accurate evaluation.  Attributes 
also need to be defined distinctly and represent a concept that can be precisely implemented so 
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that perceptual differences among individuals are not a factor.  For example, an attribute such as 
quality should not be included if specified by imprecise levels such as high, medium, or low, 
because individuals may perceive quality differently.  In addition to defining the important 
attributes of a product, it is also important to accurately define the relevant levels of each 
attribute.  The specified attributes and levels should be able to completely describe the specified 
product.  Some attributes considered important might not be included in the profiles if they are 
relatively constant across all products (Hair et al.).  
The number of attributes included in the analysis has a direct impact on the statistical 
efficiency and reliability of the results.  The number of attributes and levels added to the profile 
increases the number of parameters to be estimated.  With more parameters, one must increase 
the number of profiles evaluated or there will be a reduction in the reliability of parameters.  
Also, when possible, the number of attribute levels should be balanced across factors.  Hair et 
al. indicated that the relative importance of an attribute increases as the number of levels 
increases. 
The ability of the study to provide valuable results depends considerably on the selection 
of the most appropriate attributes and attribute levels.  Therefore, careful consideration was 
taken to identify these attributes.  Three steps were taken to determine the attributes that were 
appropriate for this study.  The steps taken were: 1) gathering information from experts who 
have worked extensively with insurance, 2) obtaining producer opinions about potential 
insurance product attributes, and 3) conducting trial interviews with producers.  Using these 
steps assisted with verifying that the specified attributes were those that adequately defined the 
product as well as influenced a producers utility for the product.  
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The first step required gathering information on possible attributes from experts from 
the USDA Risk Management Agency, private insurance firms, and universities that have 
worked extensively with crop insurance issues.  Cattin and Wittink indicated that the marketing 
researchers who participated in their study almost always used expert judgments in defining 
product attributes.  Two RMA employees, two private insurance consultants, and three outside 
university experts contributed to the attribute generation process.  Communication with these 
individuals took place primarily through several telephone conversations and e-mail 
transmissions.  Also, one meeting with both a representative from a private company and a 
university professor was conducted to specify attributes, discuss relevant attribute levels, and 
determine a concise definition of each attribute for producers.  The process of selecting a list of 
attributes took several months to complete.  The opinions and ideas of these individuals were 
gathered and a comprehensive list of attributes was developed.  The comprehensive list 
included the following attributes:  
1. Premium Price  
2. Coverage Level/Deductible  
3. Policy Length  
4. Averaging Period 
5. Whole Farm versus Individual Enterprise  
6. Minimum and Maximum Weight 
7. Early Exercise  
8. Method of Marketing  
9. Price Series   
10. Operating Costs (Gross Margin) 
 
Each of the above attributes was carefully considered and further discussed to determine 
their relevance in a conjoint experiment.   This process involved conversations with two beef 
cattle producers and discussions with LSU faculty members.  The producers provided insight on 
whether the various attributes were realistic and if they were important enough to affect their 
preference for an insurance product.  University faculty primarily reviewed the attributes to 
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determine if they were needed to define the product or if they could be properly used in a 
conjoint experiment.  A total of five of the ten attributes identified were selected to define the 
hypothetical products for the conjoint study.  The attributes not selected were averaging period, 
whole-farm versus individual enterprise, minimum and maximum weight, early exercise, and 
operating costs.  Each of the attributes not included are defined and reasons for exclusion 
discussed below.  
Averaging Period refers to the number of days at the end of the insurance policy over 
which the cash market price is averaged to determine if an indemnity payment will be received.  
Insurance companies are considering options ranging from one to ten days.  As the number of 
days included in the averaging period increases, the premium price paid by the producer 
decreases.  This attribute is of more interest to insurance companies because a longer averaging 
period allows them to include more prices in the average that determines if an indemnity 
payment is made.  Producers indicated that this feature would have little influence on their 
decision to purchase insurance.  For this study, a five-day averaging period was assumed. 
Minimum and Maximum Weight refers to the minimum and maximum total weight of 
cattle the producer can insure annually.  Currently, a futures contract requires a producer to 
contract a minimum of 40,000 pounds.  Individuals developing livestock revenue insurance are 
considering setting a minimum weight at some point below the required weight for a futures 
contract. A maximum of 800,000 pounds is also being considered to prevent excessive 
payments to individual producers.  It was determined that using this question in a conjoint study 
would not provide much information.  Producers with smaller herds will prefer a lower 
minimum and the maximum will not affect their utility.  Producers with large herds will be 
concerned about the maximum but the minimum will not affect their utility.  The minimum 
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requirement assumed for this study is that the producer insures a minimum of 25 calves per 
contract and has a herd size of 50 cows or more.  
Whole-Farm versus Individual Enterprise coverage indicates whether the policy will 
guarantee revenue for several enterprises on the farm or cover livestock as a separate enterprise.  
Several enterprises are included with whole-farm coverage, which allows for pooling risk across 
enterprises and a lower premium price.  This attribute could not be included in the conjoint 
stimulus because two sets of premiums and deductibles would be required to evaluate whole-
farm insurance and individual enterprise insurance.  Also, for this study the majority of 
producers do not raise crops, so whole-farm insurance would automatically be found less 
important.  The method used for designing the hypothetical products made this feature 
impossible to include in the analysis.  A separate question was asked to determine whether the 
producer who had other crops would prefer a whole-farm product.   
Early Exercise indicates that the producer has the option to exercise the policy at any 
time during the coverage period.  This means that if the cash price increased and producers 
wanted to sell cattle they would have the option to do so instead of being required to hold cattle 
until the end of the contract period.  Individuals with RMA suggested that producers are likely 
to have the option to sell cattle at any time before or after the coverage period.  The insurance 
company will determine payments strictly based upon the difference between the cash market 
price at the end of the contract and the price guarantee.  Other procedures would increase 
transaction costs due to increased monitoring and record keeping.      
Operating Costs or Gross Margin coverage signifies a product that has the cost of 
feed inputs incorporated into the policy.  This coverage protects producers from net revenue 
losses due to high grain prices or adverse weather conditions that may increase expenses for 
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feed.  Cow-calf producers within the study area do not use substantial amounts of grain in the 
typical year, so this feature was excluded.  This may be of interest to feedlot producers who use 
a significant amount of grain.  In a conjoint study, this product would have to be evaluated 
separately because of different premium and deductible levels.   
The attributes selected for the study were premium, deductible, policy length, price 
series, and method of marketing.  Industry experts consistently suggested that these attributes be 
included and producers also indicated that these attributes had an impact on their preference for 
livestock revenue insurance.  The objective of the attribute generation process is to be able to 
accurately define the product with relatively few attributes because previous research (Green 
and Srinivasan) has concluded that individuals suffer from information overload when 
evaluating objects defined on a large number of attributes.  This leads to respondents providing 
a significant number of inconsistent responses. Table 3.1 provides the attributes and the 
attribute levels selected to define the insurance products for the conjoint study. 
Each of the five selected attributes is defined based upon three different levels.  The 
attribute levels selected represent the full range of possibilities for each attribute of the product.  
Each attribute selected for the conjoint analysis is defined below.  
Premium refers to the amount an individual pays to purchase an insurance policy.  For 
livestock revenue insurance, the premium is expressed on a dollars-per-hundredweight basis.    
The insurance premium is paid at the time the policy begins.  The premium values used for this 
study are based on those calculated for Livestock Revenue Protection by the American Feed 
Industry association.  From Table 3.1, the three premium price levels used were: $2.24/cwt, 
$1.25/cwt, and $0.50/cwt.  A 30 percent government subsidy was also applied to the premiums.  
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Currently, USDA subsidizes crop insurance anywhere from 13 to 100 percent; therefore, a 30 
percent subsidy is considered to be realistic for livestock revenue insurance. 
The Deductible is defined as the difference between the futures price and the price the 
producer wants to guarantee when the policy expires.  The deductible is also expressed in 
dollars per hundredweight.  The three deductible levels shown in table 3.1 are:  $0.00/cwt, 
$5.00/cwt, and $10.00/cwt.  Each deductible corresponds to a given premium price, so these 
two attributes were combined into one attribute for the study.  As the premium price goes down, 
the deductible naturally goes up.  It would be counterintuitive to analyze insurance products that 
have either a high premium and a high deductible or a low premium and a low deductible.  In 
the conjoint stimulus, the attribute was specified as Premium/Deductible with the following 
combinations:  $2.24/$0.00, $1.25/$5.00, and $0.50/$10.00, all in dollars per hundredweight. 
The deductible sets the price guarantee but does not require producers to make actual cash 
payments.  For example, if the futures price quoted at the beginning of a policy is $95/cwt and 
the producer wants to guarantee at least $90/cwt, then the deductible would be $5/cwt (the 
difference between the two prices).  The price guarantee will always be at or below the quoted 
futures price. 
 The Policy Length refers to the number of days the producer plans to insure the price of 
his cattle.  The three levels specified for policy length were: 90 days, 180 days, and 360 days.  
For this study, producers were all given the scenario of marketing a 500 pound calf, so the 360 
day policy allowed producers to lock in a price on calves from cows that were at least three 
months bred.  Indemnity payments are determined by averaging prices once the policy expires. 
 The Price Series specifies the price that will be averaged when the contract expires to 
determine whether an indemnity payment will be made.  For this study, the three price series 
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levels were:  State, Regional, and National.  For example, if the state price series is used, the 
insurance company will take the average price in the state of Louisiana over a specified number 
of days and compare it to the futures price to determine if the producer will receive an 
indemnity payment.  For Louisiana producers, the state price series should be preferred because 
Louisiana prices are generally below those for the region or the nation.  Even though the state 
price series is generally preferred, producers can make some tradeoffs between other features 
they prefer in the conjoint analysis.   The regional price series would average prices in the 
southeastern region of the United States and the national price series averages prices for the 
entire United States.      
Table 3.1:  Selected Livestock Revenue Insurance Attributes 
Attribute Attribute Level 
Premium ($/cwt) $2.24 
 $1.25 
 $0.50 
  
Deductible ($/cwt) $0.00 
 $5.00 
 $10.00 
  
Policy Length 90 Days 
 180 Days 
 360 Days 
  
Price Series State 
 Regional 
 National 
  
Method of Marketing In Person 
 Telephone 
 Internet 
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 The Method Of Marketing signifies how the insurance company will interact with the 
producer to set up insurance contracts.  The three levels of this attribute are:  In Person, 
Telephone, and Internet.  The first insurance contract the producer sets up is done in person, and 
the method of marketing determines how the producer prefers to interact with the agent after 
that time.  Insurance companies are interested in finding out the effectiveness of each of these 
methods because each one has a different associated cost.  The cost to the insurance company is 
less when either the telephone or Internet is used.  This may impact the cost of the policy. 
 The attributes selected were combined into hypothetical insurance products using the 
Bretton-Clark Conjoint Designer software.   This process is discussed in detail in section 3.23 
Data Collection Procedures.  The entire survey was pilot tested with three producers to 
determine the level of understanding or difficulty of questions.  The questions were revised after 
the first pilot survey and administered to two different producers.  Questions were revised until 
producers were comfortable completing the entire survey.  The preliminary interview provided 
insight on improving the presentation of the products and the terminology used to explain the 
product characteristics to beef cattle producers.  Cattin and Wittink found that approximately 60 
percent of the firms interviewed used direct questioning of subjects to assist with the attribute 
generation process.  
3.2.2.  Preference Model Specification  
The preference model used in a conjoint experiment depends upon the conjoint 
methodology selected.   The three primary methodologies are traditional, adaptive, and choice-
based conjoint.  In selecting a methodology, one must consider the number of attributes used, 
whether an individual or aggregate level analysis is preferred, and the functional form of the 
model.  Researchers most frequently use traditional conjoint analysis because of its predictive 
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accuracy and simplicity when analyzing a product with relatively few attributes.  An additive 
model containing a maximum of nine attributes is generally assumed in a traditional conjoint 
experiment.  Each respondent evaluates the profiles and the analysis can be performed at the 
individual level.  Adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) is used when the number of attributes 
needed to fully explain a product is large.  Adaptive Conjoint Analysis also uses an additive 
model, but it can accommodate as many as 30 product attributes.  Preference data are collected 
through an interactive computer-based approach, and it can be analyzed on an individual basis.  
A respondents previous answers are used at each step to select the next paired comparison to 
be evaluated (Green and Srinivasan).  The data collection process generally takes longer than 
traditional conjoint.  The advantage of the choice-based conjoint (CBC) methodology is that it 
gives the researcher the ability to directly determine the existence of interaction effects in the 
model.  With CBC, product profiles are evaluated in sets rather than one-by-one.  CBC is 
limited due to its ability to evaluate a maximum of six attributes, and it must be estimated at the 
aggregate level (Hair et al.).  For this study, the traditional conjoint methodology is selected 
based mainly on the desire to conduct individual-level analyses.  Green and Srinivasan found 
that traditional conjoint performed better than ACA when the number of attributes was less than 
nine.  
3.2.2.1 Composition Rule  
Selecting the appropriate composition rule to explain a respondents preference structure 
is extremely important in a conjoint experiment.  Either an additive model or a model with 
interaction terms can be used to express the relationship between attributes.  The additive model 
is the primary form used with the traditional conjoint methodology.  The additive model is a 
simple functional form that captures only the main effects of the attributes.  The additive model 
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assumes that a variables impact on utility is independent of the levels of other attributes.  The 
part worth values of each attribute are simply summed up to obtain the respondents total value 
for a product.   
A model with interaction effects included has additional terms that allow certain 
combinations of attribute levels to be more or less than their individual sum.  The part worth 
values for each term are still summed to obtain the total value of the product.  Use of a model 
with interaction effects is sometimes assumed to be more realistic; however, in many cases, 
including the interaction effects does not increase the predictive power of the model (Green and 
Srinivasan).  When the interactive model is applied, there is a loss of statistical efficiency as 
more parameters are estimated.  The predictive power of the model often decreases when 
interaction terms are included because the reduction in statistical efficiency is not offset by 
increases in predictive power as a result of the interaction terms.  Interaction terms are more 
prevalent in situations where the attributes are less tangible or involve aesthetic or emotional 
reactions (Hair et al.).  Also, a greater number of hypothetical products must be presented to 
consumers as a result of additional parameters being estimated.  Including additional profiles 
increases the complexity of the rating or ranking and is likely to decrease the reliability and 
validity of responses (Green and Srinivasan).  The author identified no theoretical or empirical 
evidence that suggests that interaction terms should be used to explain relationships between 
any of the selected attributes, so the additive model was used in this study. 
3.2.2.2 Part Worth Relationship 
The part worth relationship focuses on the assumptions made about the association 
between the levels of a factor.  Either a linear, quadratic, or separate part worth relationship can 
be specified.  The linear or vector part worth relationship is the most restrictive form because 
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only a single part worth is estimated for an attribute.  The quadratic form relaxes the assumption 
of linearity and allows for curvilinear relationships.   The separate part worth model is the most 
general form because it allows separate part worth estimates for each attribute level (Green and 
Srinivasan).  The separate part worth relationship gives more detailed information about a 
respondents preference structure, and the estimates found can be examined to check for linear 
or quadratic relationships.  The separate part worth relationship was used to analyze the 
contribution of attributes in this study.  This model assumes that preference for an object is an 
additive function of the values of its attribute levels.  Equation 5 provides the general form of 
the additive utility model. 
The econometric specification can be written as follows: 
[7] Uij = Xij β* + eij  
In this model, Uij represents the utility the ith individual derives from the jth alternative, Xij is a 
vector of variables representing values for each of the attributes of the jth product for the ith 
individual, β* is a vector of unknown parameters, and eij is the random disturbance.  The 
random disturbance may reflect unobserved attributes of the alternative, random choice 
behavior, or measurement error.  
3.2.3.  Data Collection Procedures 
The data collection process involves selecting the method for presenting product profiles 
to producers and also the survey administration process.  The characteristics of farms included 
in the survey sample will also be discussed in this section. 
3.2.3.1 Presentation Method 
The primary presentation methods in conjoint analysis are the trade-off matrix, pairwise 
comparison, and the full-profile method.  The trade-off matrix, or two factors at a time 
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approach, requires an interactive data collection procedure, which is commonly administered by 
computer.  Respondents compare two attributes at a time and rank all combinations according to 
their preference.  Because respondents compare only two attributes at a time, this process is 
easy to administer and reduces information overload.  On the other hand, respondents are 
required to make a large number of judgments even when the number of levels is small (Hair et 
al.).  This process also prevents respondents from making realistic choices among complete 
products.  
The pairwise comparison method works similar to the trade-off method except the pair-
wise comparison method compares product profiles and the trade-off method compares 
individual attributes.  With the pairwise comparison method, respondents rate two product 
profiles at a time to evaluate their preference.   Pairwise comparison is the underlying technique 
used in ACA and has the advantage of being able to accommodate a large number of attributes.  
One disadvantage of this method is that each profile used typically does not include all 
attributes.       
The full profile method is used most frequently in conjoint experiments.  Cattin and 
Wittink found that nearly seventy percent of firms surveyed utilized the full profile approach.  
This method asks respondents to evaluate a product profile defined by a complete set of 
attributes.  Respondents can either rate or rank products and make realistic choices between 
each product.   The full profile method also illustrates the tradeoffs made among attributes more 
explicitly than other methods.   
For this study, the full profile approach was utilized because it was relatively simple to 
administer, required fewer judgments, and adds a realistic description of the products.  Hair et 
al. recommend the full profile approach when the number of attributes is less than six.  The 
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revenue insurance products are completely defined using each of the specified attributes.   Cards 
representing each revenue insurance product were developed using PowerPoint slides.   
3.2.3.2 Stimuli Creation 
A full factorial design, which includes all possible combinations of attributes and 
attribute levels, requires the respondent to evaluate one profile at a time. The number of product 
profiles evaluated in a full factorial design is the product of the number of levels associated with 
each attribute8.  For this study, there were four attributes each with three levels, and the full 
factorial design results in a total of 81 (3 x 3 x 3 x 3 = 81) product profiles for each respondent 
to evaluate.  This is an unreasonable number of products for an individual to accurately 
compare, so alternative experimental designs were considered to reduce the number of profiles. 
The confounded block and the fractional factorial design were compared to determine 
the most appropriate design for this study.  The confounded block design allows for estimation 
of all main effects as well as estimation of attribute interactions.  If attribute interactions exist, it 
implies that product attributes are not perfectly independent.  Consequently, an additive 
functional form is not appropriate for estimation of part worth utilities (Harrison et al.).  All of 
the profiles from a full factorial design can be used when confounded block is employed; 
however, the number of profiles that each subject has to evaluate is reduced.  The confounded 
block design divides the total profiles into blocks and reproduces each block a number of times 
(Louviere).  Each respondent does not evaluate exactly the same set of product profiles as other 
respondents.      
A fractional factorial design is a sample of attribute levels selected from a full factorial 
design without losing information to effectively test the effects of the attributes on producers 
preferences.  This approach provides an orthogonal array of product profiles to be evaluated by 
                                                 
8 For example, a product with 3 attributes each with three levels would yield 27 product profiles (3 x 3 x 3 = 27). 
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each respondent.  With the fractional factorial design, all main effects can be estimated, but 
attribute interactions are not considered.  The number of products to evaluate is reduced to a 
manageable level for the respondent.  The fractional factorial design performs well for both 
individual and aggregate level analyses. For this study, the fractional factorial design was 
selected because it performs better with individual level analyses.  Bretton-Clarks Conjoint 
Designer software was used to perform the fractional factorial design for this study. With four 
attributes with three levels each, the number of profiles was reduced from 81 to 9.  Two 
additional products were added to this selection for producers to evaluate in this study.  One 
card was added to increase the number of degrees of freedom in the individual level analysis, 
and the other card was added as a holdout card to test the internal validity of the model.  To 
view the cards used, see Appendix A.    
3.2.3.3.  Measurement Scale for the Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in CA is usually stated as overall preference or intention to 
purchase.   The type of measurement scale for conjoint can be either nonmetric (paired 
comparisons or rank order) or metric (rating scale).  Respondents are asked either to rate or rank 
alternative profiles with traditional conjoint analysis. Ranking the profiles provides the 
flexibility to estimate different types of composition rules, but it is easier to administer and 
analyze ratings.  The ratings or rankings provided by respondents serve as the dependent 
variable and part worth values are estimated econometrically.   
The vast majority of all literature reviewed presented rating scales to survey participants.  
Mackenzie (1990) suggests that ratings provide at least as much information about respondents 
preferences as ordinal rankings since they also provide some indication of intensity of 
preference.  Rating each product also allows respondents to express indifference between 
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products.  This survey included a conjoint question asking respondents to rate each of the 
products on an eleven-point Likert scale.  A scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is least 
preferred and 10 represents the most preferred product, was used to evaluate each product.  The 
rule of thumb suggested by Hair et al. is to have eleven categories when sixteen or fewer 
profiles are being evaluated.   
3.2.3.4 Survey Administration 
When using traditional conjoint methodology, surveys can be administered either by 
mail, telephone interview, or personal interview.  The decision between these techniques is 
made on the basis of data reliability and budgetary constraints.  If the survey instrument can be 
designed to clearly explain the conjoint process, then either a mail questionnaire or telephone 
interview may be sufficient to collect the necessary data.  The concerns are the respondents 
understanding of the process and the amount of burden placed on the respondent by the number 
of profiles.  When respondents are familiar with the products or can clearly understand them, 
either mail or telephone surveys can be conducted.  The personal interview approach is 
preferred because it provides the most reliable data.  The number of individuals in the sample 
set may be limited by budgetary or time constraints, but the interviewer is able to completely 
explain the product and answer any questions the respondent may have. 
Initially, the plan was to administer the survey for this study by mail questionnaire for 
producers across the southeastern region of the U.S.  However, after discussions with industry 
experts and preliminary survey administration with producers, mail survey was determined not 
to be the most effective method for administering the survey.  Since livestock revenue insurance 
is a new product, a tremendous amount of explanation is required.  In the preliminary 
discussions, producers either did not completely understand the product or did not understand 
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how to complete the conjoint portion of the survey.  With these problems, the response rate in a 
mail-survey context would be extremely low.  As a result, the personal interview method was 
selected for survey administration.      
Selecting the personal interview method would definitely increase the reliability of the 
data collected; however, the sample region had to be reduced to include only beef cattle 
producers within the state of Louisiana.  Beef cattle production in the entire southeastern region 
is typically done on cow-calf operations.  Cow-calf production in Louisiana is comparable to 
production in other states in the region; therefore, results obtained from Louisiana producers 
can be useful to private insurers and producers in other cow-calf producing states in the region. 
Given the increase in data reliability, this study would provide more useful results than a 
regional mail survey.  
The 1997 Census of Agriculture lists 804,595 farms with a total of 34,066,615 beef 
cattle in the U.S.; however, a large portion of this group will not be a part of the target audience 
for livestock revenue insurance.  Livestock revenue insurance is expected to focus on producers 
who have a minimum of 50 cows in their herd in the typical year.  There are 169,483 beef cattle 
farms (about 21% of all farms in the U.S.) in the U.S. that have 50 or more animals.  Although 
the national target audience for livestock revenue insurance includes only about 21 percent of 
all beef cattle farms, these farms account for 69.3 percent (23,622,596 cattle) of the total cattle 
in the U.S.  In Louisiana, there are over 2,500 farms that fit the criteria, which represents about 
20 percent of all beef cattle farms in the state and more than 65 percent of the total cattle (1997 
Census of Agriculture).    
The producers included in the sample were selected with the assistance of County 
Extension agents in 15 Louisiana parishes.  The parishes were selected based upon the number 
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of farms in the parish with the herd sizes to fit the target population for revenue insurance.  
County Agents in each parish were sent a letter explaining the purpose of the survey and 
requesting their assistance with identifying producers to participate (See Appendix B).  A brief 
presentation of the survey was given at the LSU Cooperative Extension Annual Conference to 
further inform agents about the importance of the study.  Each agent was then contacted by both 
email and telephone to inform them of the number of participants needed in each of four size 
categories in the parish.  The herd sizes were divided into the following categories:  50 to 99, 
100 to 199, 200 to 499, and 500 or more cows.  Agents were also requested to select producers 
who exhibited diversity in terms of age, employment status, and marketing practices.  A total of 
50 respondents was desired for the analysis, so a total of 60 interviews were requested 
throughout the state.  More producers were requested to account for the possibility of not being 
able to schedule and maintain appointments with all producers.  Vandeveer and Loehman used a 
total of 55 personal interviews for their analysis of modifications to the crop insurance program.    
This study elicited information from cow-calf producers located in parishes throughout 
the state of Louisiana.  The sample was comprised of cow-calf producers from the following 15 
Louisiana parishes: Avoyelles, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron, De Soto, East Feliciana, 
Franklin, Lafourche, Natchitoches, Pointe Coupee, Rapides, Red River, St. Landry, Union, and 
Vermilion.  The state map in Appendix C shows that these parishes are located in all regions of 
the state.    Table 3.2 provides a synopsis of the selected parishes for this study.   
There are 1,255 farms (about 51% of the state total) with 50 or more beef cattle in the 
selected region, which was the targeted audience for the study. Farms with larger herd sizes are 
expected to be more interested in livestock revenue insurance, since they are likely to depend 
more on income from livestock.  Table 3.2 shows that as the herd size category increases, the 
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percentage of farms in the selected parishes also increases.   Establishing criteria to include 
farms with 50 or more cows is an attempt to reduce the number of hobby farmers that take 
advantage of revenue insurance. 
Table 3.2:  Beef Cattle Farms in Targeted Parishes.   
Herd Size  
(Number of farms) 
Parish 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+ 
Louisiana 1,471 673 317 57 
Avoyelles 47 17 7 2 
Beauregard 53 22 14 2 
Calcasieu 70 37 27 2 
Cameron 44 19 15 4 
De Soto 42 27 9 2 
E. Feliciana 49 23 10 1 
Franklin 27 26 9 1 
Lafourche 42 23 13 3 
Natchitoches 51 20 28 5 
Pointe Coupee 33 23 10 2 
Rapides 57 23 7 2 
Red River 25 10 7 5 
St Landry 43 21 13 1 
Union 38 20 4 1 
Vermilion 59 32 24 2 
Total 680 343 197 35 
Percent of State 46.2% 51.0% 62.1% 61.4% 
 
 
A total of 52 personal interviews were conducted to gather the data necessary for the 
conjoint analysis.  Table 3.3 shows the numbers of producers from each parish that were 
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included in the analysis.  The participants represented are fairly balanced across herd sizes; 
however, the largest number of participants were in the 500 or more category.  The survey 
questionnaire was seven pages in length and consisted of the following five sections:  Section I 
 Farm Characteristics; Section II  Record Keeping Practices; Section III  Risk Management; 
Section IV Demographics; and Section V  Revenue Insurance (See Appendix D).  The data 
collection process took place over a six-week period during the months of January and February 
2002.   Personal interviews were conducted either at the individuals farm, office, or at the 
Parish Extension office.  The purpose of the study and the content of the survey were 
completely explained to each respondent, and the entire survey administration process took 
about one hour on average.  Administration times ranged from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours across 
all respondents.  
Table 3.3:  Sample of Farms by Parish. 
Herd Size 
(Number of Farms) 
Parish 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+ 
Avoyelles 1 1  2 
Beauregard 2 1 1  
Calcasieu   2 2 
Cameron 1  1 3 
De Soto  1  1 
E. Feliciana 1 2  1 
Franklin  1 1  
Lafourche 2 1 1  
Natchitoches 1  2 3 
Pointe Coupee  1 1 1 
Rapides 1 1 1  
Red River 2  1 1 
St Landry  1   
Union 1  3  
Vermilion  1  2 
TOTAL 12 11 14 16 
 
 78
Each respondent rated a total of eleven products on a 0 to 10 scale.  Product 11 was 
included as a holdout card to test the internal validity of the model.  Respondents were asked to 
group products based on features that they preferred and provide a rating for each product.  
Most respondents first ordered products according to their preference and then provided ratings 
for each product.  Respondents typically understood the concept of revenue insurance quickly 
and seriously evaluated products according to their preferences.  
In addition to rating each product, respondents were presented with four different 
economic situations to consider for their ratings.  Table 3.4 shows the different economic 
scenarios used for each producer.  The scenarios were selected based upon pricing information 
acquired from AMS. The purpose of evaluating different economic scenarios was to see how 
the cattle cycle affects the producers preference and purchase decision for each product.  The 
scenarios were selected to see how products are rated and purchased in the following situations: 
1) prices are near the top of the cycle but predicted to increase; 2) prices are near the bottom of 
the cycle and expected to increase; 3) prices are predicted to be constant, and 4) prices are near 
the top of the cycle and predicted to drop.  Producers were expected to be most willing to 
purchase insurance when prices are expected to drop (Scenario 4), and they are expected to be 
least likely to purchase insurance when prices are predicted to be constant (Scenario 3).    
The respondents were given a particular economic scenario and asked to rate each 
individual product.  Once respondents rated each individual product, a product with a median 
rating was selected and the producer was asked if he or she would purchase the product if it 
were the only product available.  The economic scenario was then changed and the rating 
process repeated for each scenario.  This provides a wealth of information about the types of 
products that producers would purchase under different economic situations.  Insurance 
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providers can use this information to determine how to adjust premium prices under different 
economic situations. 
Table 3.4:  Economic Scenarios Used in the Conjoint Analysis. 
Economic Scenario Current Price Futures Price 
Scenario 1 $90.00/cwt $100.00/cwt 
Scenario 2 $70.00/cwt $80.00/cwt 
Scenario 3 $80.00/cwt $80.00/cwt 
Scenario 4 $100.00/cwt $90.00/cwt 
 
 
3.2.4.  Estimation Method 
OLS and tobit models are commonly used when profiles are rated by individual 
respondents (Baker and Crosbie, Harrison et al., Gillespie et al., Lin et al., Roe et al., Stevens et 
al., and Sylvia and Larkin).  A study by Harrison et al. found that OLS provided slightly better 
predictions relative to the tobit model, but the OLS estimates were theoretically biased relative 
to the tobit model for two data sets.  However, the tobit model performed better than a probit 
model for predicting ordinal rankings.  For this study, the aggregate model ratings data will be 
analyzed using a two-limit tobit model.  The two-limit tobit model treats the ratings as a 
censored cardinal measure of utility.  Given that the dependent variable (the respondents 
rating) is censored on both ends at 0 and 10, the two-limit tobit technique is more appropriate 
than OLS for estimating the model. When bounded ratings are estimated with OLS, the results 
give truncated residuals and asymptotically biased estimates. With this approach, there is an 
assumed transformation from ratings space to utility space, and there is also an implicit 
assumption that the utility distance between each unit change in rating is constant.  The model 
can be written as follows: 
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where *iy is the latent variable and yi is the observed dependent variable (product rating).  In this 
model, L1i and L2i represent the lower and upper limits of the dependent variable, respectively.   
The likelihood function for the model is expressed as follows (Maddala): 
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The marginal effect for the two-limit tobit can be written as follows: 
 
[10] 
   
  
x Prob  
12
2
*








	



 


	



 










iiii
ii1i
i
i
xLxL
LyL
yΕ
x
xi
 
 
The change in xi influences the conditional mean of *iy  in the distribution, and it also affects the 
probability that the observation will fall in that part of the distribution (Greene).   
In conjoint measurement, the respondents utility for a product is a function of the part 
worth utility values.  The part worth values are estimated econometrically.  A dummy variable 
approach, mean deviation coding, is used to code the attribute levels for the regression analysis.  
With mean deviation coding, the parameter estimates are expressed as deviations from the 
overall mean preference rating.  In this process, the base level attribute is coded as 1 instead of 
0, and the levels of each attribute are constrained to sum to 0.  The base attribute level is 
calculated as the negative sum of the other levels of the particular attribute.   The intercept term 
 81
becomes the mean preference rating (Gillespie et al. and Harrison et al.).  The empirical model 
to estimate the part worth utilities is specified as follows: 
 [11]  
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where,  
Rn = the preference rating for the nth respondent, and n = 152. 
x1 = 1 and x2 = 0 represents the $2.24|$0.00/cwt Premium|Deductible level.  
x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 represents the $1.25|$5.00/cwt Premium|Deductible level. 
x1 = -1 and x2 = -1 represents the $0.50|$10.00/cwt Premium|Deductible level. 
x3 = 1 and x4 = 0 represents the 90 day Policy Length level.  
x3 = 0 and x4 = 1 represents the 180 day Policy Length level.  
x3 = -1 and x4 = -1 represents the 360 day Policy Length level.  
x5 = 1 and x6 = 0 represents the State Price Series level.  
x5 = 0 and x6 = 1 represents the Regional Price Series level. 
x5 = -1 and x6 = -1 represents the National Price Series level. 
x7 = 1 and x8 = 0 represents the In Person Method of Marketing level.  
x7 = 0 and x8 = 1 represents the Telephone Method of Marketing level.  
x7 = -1 and x8 = -1 represents the Internet Method of Marketing level. 
The β0 coefficient represents the intercept term, and the coefficients β1, β8 represent the part 
worth estimates for the respective levels of the premium/deductible, policy length, price series, 
and method of marketing attributes.  
The model is estimated for each economic scenario and the relative importance of each 
attribute is computed from the part worth utility values.  The range of its levels divided by the 
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sum of the ranges across all attributes represents the relative importance for an attribute.  The 
difference between the highest and lowest part worth utilities establishes the utility range for an 
attribute.  The relative importance for the ith attribute is calculated as follows: 
[12]   RIi = [Utility Rangei/ Σ Utility Ranges for all Attributes]  100, 
where, RIi is the relative importance measure for the ith attribute.  The part worth estimates 
from the empirical analysis are used to determine the optimal insurance product across all 81 
products produced by the fractional factorial design.   This will provide valuable information to 
producers and insurers on the characteristics of products that are most and least preferred.    
3.2.4.1 Cluster Analysis 
An individual conjoint analysis is performed for each producer so that producers can be 
grouped based on their part worth estimates to provide additional information about the types of 
producers who prefer certain product attributes or product profiles. Cluster analysis is used to 
group the respondents into a number of mutually exclusive groups on the basis of the similarity 
of their preference.  Cluster analysis captures relationships between attribute preferences and 
individual specific variables.  The objective of cluster analysis is to maximize the homogeneity 
of the objects within a group while also maximizing the heterogeneity between the clusters.  
Knowledge of the heterogeneity among producers will assist with understanding factors that 
influence a producers insurance product purchase decision. 
Cluster analysis does not actually estimate the variate empirically but instead uses the 
variate specified by the researcher to define clusters.  The similarity between each pair of 
observations is measured according to the Euclidean distance between the pairs.  The most 
common clustering algorithms used are classified as either hierarchical or nonhierarchical.  The 
hierarchical procedure involves the construction of a hierarchy of a treelike structure.  The 
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hierarchies are determined by either an agglomerative or divisive procedure.  In the 
agglomerative method, each observation starts out as its own cluster and in each subsequent 
step the two closest clusters are combined into a new aggregate cluster.  The researcher can 
make the tradeoff between the number of clusters and the degree of heterogeneity between 
clusters.   
The divisive procedure is the opposite of the hierarchical procedure.  The divisive 
procedure begins with one large cluster containing all of the observations.  In each subsequent 
step the most dissimilar observations are removed and placed into similar clusters. The process 
continues until each observation is in one of a number of separate clusters.   
Nonhierarchical procedures assign objects into clusters once the number of clusters is 
specified.  Unlike the hierarchical approach, this procedure does not just continue to make 
clusters, but it defines the best clusters based upon the number specified.  First, a cluster center 
is identified and all objects are assigned to the most similar cluster until the number of clusters 
desired has been reached (Hair et al.).   
For this study, the SPSS statistical software is used to perform the cluster analysis based 
on the estimated part worth values.  Wards method is used to identify clusters.  Wards method 
is an agglomerative procedure designed to optimize the minimum variance within clusters.  The 
primary decision that has to be made is determining the final number of clusters to be formed.  
The most commonly used criteria for determining the number of clusters to use is examining a 
measure of similarity or distance between clusters at each successive step.  Either a similarity 
value can be specified or the difference in values between successive steps can be used as a 
criteria. With a total of 52 observations being included, the number of clusters defined is 
expected to be relatively small (no more than four clusters).  The estimated part worth values 
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from the individual models are used to determine the clusters.  The estimates are entered in the 
following matrix form.    
   
β11      β12       β13       β14       β15       β16       β17       β18 
β21         β22       β23       β24       β25       β26       β27       β28 
.                                  .                                               .        
.                                  .                                               .  
.                                  .                                               .    
βn1        βn2        βn3      βn4       βn5       βn6        βn7        βn8 
 
 
In this matrix, estimates in each column represent part worth estimates for each of the product 
attributes and each row represents the estimates for a different respondent (n = 52).  The 
parameters are defined as follows: 
 βi1 = Part worth for a premium and deductible of $2.24/cwt and $0.00/cwt, respectively.      
 βi2 = Part worth for a premium and deductible of $1.25/cwt and $5.00/cwt, respectively. 
 βi3 = Part worth for a policy length of 90 days. 
 βi4 = Part worth for a policy length of 180 days. 
 βi5 = Part worth for a State price series. 
 βi6 = Part worth for a Regional price series.  
 βi7 = Part worth when method of marketing is In Person. 
 βi8 = Part worth when method of marketing is Telephone. 
 i = 1,.52 
The βijs represent the part worth estimate for the ith respondent for the jth product attribute.   
Once the clusters are defined, descriptive statistics will be used to determine whether 
there are differences among producers based upon several socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of producers.  If there are clear differences between clusters for these factors, 
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then these factors are likely to have an influence on a producers preference for a product.   This 
information can be used to assist companies with identifying target markets for specific 
products.   
Two-limit tobit models were run on the data for each cluster to examine the preference 
structure for individuals within the cluster.  The model for each individual cluster was estimated 
in the same manner as the aggregate model for all respondents is estimated.  Part worth 
estimates and the relative importance of attributes was evaluated to determine differences in 
preference exhibited by producers in each cluster.  The part worth estimates obtained from the 
two-limit tobit models for each cluster were compared to estimates for all other clusters and also 
compared with the estimates from the overall model.    
Descriptive statistics for each cluster were evaluated based upon the following 
characteristics associated with each producer:  age, education level, farming experience, herd 
size, purebred production, marketing strategy, risk attitude, knowledge of market prices, 
enterprise diversification, debt-to-asset ratio, and primary source of income.  These are all 
factors that may influence producers preference for a given livestock revenue insurance 
product.   These variables are also used to further assess the homogeneity within clusters and 
the heterogeneity between clusters defined in the clustering algorithm.   
Difference-in-means tests were performed to determine if the clusters exhibit a 
significant difference between the means for the specified factors.  Clusters were compared in 
pairs to determine if there was a significant difference.  A t-test was used to determine the 
significance of the difference between the means of two populations.  The t-test selected for the 
analysis was able to test for differences in means when the variances of the populations being 
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compared were unknown and unequal (Kanji).  The following hypotheses were be tested for 
each factor. 
H0: µ1  =  µ2 
H1: µ1  ≠  µ2 
The population mean, µi, represents the mean of the factor being evaluated for a given cluster.  
The means of two clusters were compared each time.  The null hypothesis, H0, states that there 
is no significant difference between the means for the two populations, and the alternative 
hypothesis, H1, states that there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
populations.  The test statistic is defined as follows: 
[13] 
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In equation 13, ix represents the sample mean, 
2
is  represents the variance, and ni represents the 
sizes of the given samples.  The number of producers in each cluster is expected to be unequal, 
and this t-test can compare means with unequal sample sizes.  The value of the t-statistic can be 
compared with Students t-distribution with degrees of freedom determined by the following 
formula (Kanji): 
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When the t-statistic is greater than the critical value found in the t-table, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, which suggests that there is a significant difference between the means of the two 
groups being compared. 
3.2.4.1.1.  Factors Compared Between Each Cluster 
Age is a demographic characteristic that is expected to affect a producers attitude 
toward risk and insurance.  Smith and Baquet hypothesized that producers who are older are 
usually more risk averse, and may be more likely to purchase livestock revenue insurance.  
However, age was found to be insignificant in their study.  On the other hand, Black and 
Dorfman found that older producers were less likely to purchase insurance.  Older producers 
typically have lower levels of debt (more wealth) and, consequently, are more able to self-
insure against losses in their beef cattle operations.  Since there is likely to be a high correlation 
between age, risk attitude, and wealth, different combinations of these factors will be observed.  
If the impact of age on a producers preference is positive, then risk attitude may also play an 
important role.  On the other hand, if the impact on preference for a product is negative, then 
wealth may be more important.   Older producers are expected to choose products with lower 
premiums since their level of wealth will usually allow them to absorb a portion of the risk of 
beef cattle price fluctuations.  Older farmers are expected to prefer insurance products that are 
marketed in person or by telephone to Internet marketing.   
Education level can also impact preferences because producers who are more educated 
often have better management skills.  Producers with higher levels of education are expected to 
have a better understanding of the products, and they are also expected to be more willing to 
adopt new technology.  On the other hand, producers who are more educated are likely to have 
off-farm employment, which may have a negative impact on preferences (Black and Dorfman).  
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Smith and Baquet found a positive relationship between the choice of insurance coverage and 
education level.  Producers are categorized based upon whether they have less than a high 
school education, a high school diploma, some college or technical school, a four-year degree, 
or a graduate degree.  Producers who are more educated are expected to prefer paying lower 
premium levels since they commonly have off-farm employment, which provides the ability to 
absorb a portion of the risk associated with price declines.  More educated producers are 
expected to prefer either telephone or Internet method of marketing to in person because these 
methods are more convenient for individuals who have off-farm employment.  They are also 
expected to be more comfortable using computers and the Internet. 
Farming experience refers to the number of years a producer has been operating a 
farm.  The impact that this factor may have on preferences for a product may also be positive or 
negative.  Producers who have more farming experience can be considered to have better 
management skills than producers with less experience.  In this case, more experienced 
producers are more likely to purchase an insurance policy.  In addition, farming experience and 
age are positively correlated.  This suggests that producers with more farming experience may 
be interested in insurance because of their greater aversion to risk.  Producers with more 
farming experience may be willing to pay higher premiums in order to increase coverage.     
Herd size is expected to have a positive relationship with participation in livestock 
revenue insurance.  Producers with large herds usually depend more on the income that comes 
from livestock than producers with small herds.  For this reason, they may prefer to purchase 
insurance products that give them the maximum protection.  Also, herd size may impact 
decisions by influencing the transaction costs per head of insured cattle.  If fixed costs are 
associated with insuring, then costs per head will be lower for farms with larger herds (Smith 
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and Baquet).  Smaller producers may not consider the time and information required to 
purchase a product worthwhile.  Producers with larger herds are expected to prefer paying 
higher premiums to guarantee the maximum possible price for their calves.  Producers with 
larger herds are able to use livestock revenue insurance to cover a portion of their herd, while 
utilizing other strategies for the remainder of the herd.  Producers with larger herds are expected 
to show a preference for products that are marketed through the Internet, so that the time 
required for purchasing a policy may be further reduced.   
Purebred producers often react differently to market changes than commercial 
producers because they usually receive a premium for selling breeding stock.  Purebred 
producers are expected to be less likely to purchase insurance.  These producers may prefer 
policies with shorter lengths so that they have the time to observe calves and determine if they 
can be sold as breeding stock.       
Debt-to-asset ratio is expected to have an impact on producers purchase decisions and 
preferred level of coverage.  Producers with higher debt-to-asset ratios are more likely to 
purchase insurance to reduce the risk of loss.  On the other hand, producers with little or no debt 
are commonly able to self-insure against losses.  Producers with higher levels of debt will 
purchase a policy with a premium and deductible that at least covers their necessary break-even 
income.  Several studies (Black and Dorfman, Smith and Baquet, and Pennings and Leuthold) 
have found a positive relationship between debt-to-asset ratios and selection of various risk 
reducing strategies.  These producers may select lower premiums if the guarantee is enough to 
ensure that the debt can be paid.  Producers with higher debt-to-asset ratios may prefer policies 
with longer lengths so that revenue can be guaranteed far in advance.      
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The primary source of income for a producer influences his or her demand for 
insurance as well as the type of policy preferred.  Producers who receive the majority of their 
income from farming are expected to purchase insurance more frequently.  This reduces income 
variability over time.  Producers with other sources of income are not affected as much by 
fluctuations in cattle prices.  They are able to take on more risk.  Producers who depend mostly 
on income from farming are likely to prefer higher premiums so that they can insure the 
maximum price for their calves.   
A producers risk attitude is measured by his self-characterization.  Producers were 
asked to characterize their risk attitude relative to other investors. They were given the 
following three choices: a) I tend to take on substantial risk in my investment decisions (risk 
prone), b) I neither seek nor avoid risk in my investment decisions (risk neutral), or c) I tend to 
avoid risk when possible in my investment decisions (risk averse).  Producers who characterize 
themselves as risk averse are expected to be more likely to purchase insurance.  Risk averse 
producers are willing to trade a higher level of expected returns for a reduction in risk.  
Therefore, they are expected to pay higher premiums so that they are fully protected in the event 
of a major price decline.  Risk attitude is also expected to be correlated with age.  As age 
increases, the aversion to risk may also increase.  Producers who are very risk averse will also 
prefer a longer policy length so that income is less variable over time.  
Marketing strategies may have either a positive or negative impact on a producers 
preference for a product.  Producers who primarily utilize auction markets to sell their cattle are 
expected to be more likely to purchase insurance.  These producers can use insurance to 
stabilize income from livestock.  Producers with smaller herds usually use auction barns to 
market a large portion of their calves.  Smaller producers may prefer a policy with a lower 
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premium in order to guarantee a moderate level of income.  Producers who currently use other 
marketing strategies such as video auctions, private buyers, or select sales may be less likely to 
purchase insurance.  These producers already receive prices above the cash market price.  
However, some may see livestock insurance as a means of diversifying strategies.  Producers 
who utilize forward pricing are likely to purchase insurance on a portion of their herd.   These 
producers may prefer shorter policy lengths since they are able to stabilize income with other 
strategies. 
Enterprise diversification involves producing more than one enterprise so that the risk 
of loss is reduced. Producers with multiple enterprises are less likely to purchase insurance 
because they are, on average, exposed to less risk.  Producers with several enterprises usually 
depend less on their income from livestock.  These producers are likely to purchase a product 
with a lower premium so that they can be protected from drastic price changes. 
3.2.4.2.  Purchase Decision 
Evaluating the producers preference ratings for revenue insurance products provides 
valuable but limited information about the products individuals would actually purchase.  
Although a producer may assign a relatively high rating for a particular product, there are 
several factors that may influence his or her decision to actually purchase the product.  For 
example, a producer who rates a product 10 (most preferred) may not be willing to purchase 
the product, while another producer who rates a product 5 may be willing to purchase it.  
Factors such as the producers risk attitude, wealth, and dependence on revenue from beef cattle 
may impact the decision to purchase a given product (Smith and Baquet, Black and Dorfman, 
Pennings and Leuthold).   
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In addition to rating each product, producers are asked to indicate whether or not they 
would purchase each product if it were available.  After producers rate all products, the product 
with the median rating is selected and the producer is asked if he would purchase the product if 
it were the only product available.  If the producer responds yes, then a product with a lower 
rating is selected and the same question asked.  If the producer responds no then a product 
with a higher rating is selected and the question repeated.  This process will continue until the 
product with the lowest rating that would be purchased by the producer is identified.  Once this 
product is identified, it is assumed that all products with a higher preference rating will also be 
purchased.  The producers purchase decision is evaluated for each of the four economic 
scenarios to determine if purchase decisions change under different market conditions. 
The purchase decision is evaluated using a univariate probit model.  The dependent 
variable is a binomial choice of either purchasing 1 or not purchasing 0 each insurance 
product. Therefore, each observation is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution.  
The distribution for the probit model is as follows (Greene): 
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The log-likelihood function for the probit model is 
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The univariate probit model for a binary outcome is specified by the following equation. 
[17] iii xy  
* , 
yi = 1 if *iy > 0  and yi = 0  if 
*
iy  ≤ 0, 
εi  ~ N(0,1) 
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In the equations above,  (.) represents the standard normal cumulative density function, *iy  is 
an unobserved or latent variable, yi is the observed dependent variable, β represents the 
estimated parameters that reflect the impact of changes in x (independent variables in the 
model) on the probability, and ε is the normally distributed error term.  The specification for the 
general probit model for producers purchase decisions is given as: 
[18] Prob(Y=1) =f(HERD, VIDEO, PRIVATE, RISK1, EDUC1, DEBT1, DIVRSE, 
         FPRICE1, AGE, D1, D2, D4) 
 
Table 3.5 provides an explanation for each of the variables included in the purchase decision 
probit model.  
HERD is a continuous variable for the herd size of each farm.  The total number of 
cows and bred heifers in the operation makes up the herd size for this variable.  In general, a 
positive relationship between herd size and the probability of purchasing insurance is expected. 
Producers with larger herds are usually more dependent on the revenue from beef cattle 
production, and therefore, they should be more willing to protect their revenue by purchasing an 
insurance policy.  However, the relationship between herd size and the probability of 
purchasing insurance is somewhat ambiguous.  There may be a negative relationship between 
herd size and the probability of purchasing a policy since larger producers are more likely to 
utilize other strategies for reducing price-related risk.  Smith and Baquet did not find farm size 
to have a significant influence on the insurance purchase decision.  
AGE is a continuous variable representing the age of producers in the study.  Theory 
provides little guidance about the expected signs for producers age (Smith and Baquet).  Older 
producers are commonly more risk averse and, consequently, they are expected to be more 
likely to purchase insurance.  On the other hand, older producers may have greater wealth, 
which would allow them to self insure against the risk associated with beef cattle production.  
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Also, older producers are often less likely to experiment with new risk management strategies.  
The hypothesized value for the age parameter is negative for most insurance products because 
of the effects of wealth and willingness to adopt new risk management strategies. 
Table 3.5: Explanatory Variables Included in the Purchase Decision Probit Models. 
Variable Explanation 
PURi  
 
 
Dependent dummy variable indicating whether the producer would purchase 
the insurance product or not.  (1= purchase, 0=otherwise).  
i=1,9 for the 9 insurance products evaluated. 
HERD Number of cows and bred heifers in the operation.  
AGE The age of the respective producer. 
VIDEO 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer markets cattle via 
video auction (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
PRIVATE 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer markets cattle via 
private treaty (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
RISK1 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer is risk averse (1=yes, 
0=otherwise). 
EDUC1 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer has less than a 
college education (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
DEBT1 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producers debt-to-asset ratio 
is 20% or less (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
DIVRSE 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer has more than one 
enterprise in the operation (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
FPRICE1 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether or not the producer monitors beef cattle 
futures prices on at least a weekly basis (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
D1 Dummy variable indicating Economic Scenario 1 (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
D2 Dummy variable indicating Economic Scenario 2 (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
D4 Dummy variable indicating Economic Scenario 4 (1=yes, 0=otherwise). 
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VIDEO is a dummy variable indicating whether producers utilize video auction or 
forward contracting as part of their marketing strategy.  The hypothesized sign for the video 
parameter is positive.  Producers with knowledge of video auction strategies are aware of the 
importance of risk management strategies, and they are expected to be more comfortable with 
utilizing an insurance policy to guarantee a price.  Many producers who use video auctions may 
purchase livestock revenue insurance to add diversity to their risk management strategy. 
  PRIVATE refers to the use of private treaty as a means of marketing cattle.  Producers 
who market cattle to private buyers generally have high quality animals, and they are usually 
able to sell them at a price higher than the cash market price.  Most purebred producers use this 
marketing strategy.  Producers with extremely large operations market through private treaty 
less frequently, and if they do, it accounts for a small percentage of the total cattle sold.  
Producers who market the majority of their animals through private treaty are expected to be 
less interested in purchasing livestock revenue insurance.    Private sales allow them to mitigate 
price risk without directly paying a premium or commission.  Therefore, this variable is 
expected to have a negative relationship with the decision to purchase livestock revenue 
insurance. 
RISK1 is a dummy variable that represents producers who characterize themselves as 
risk averse.  Gillespie and Fausti evaluated this self-rank elicitation procedure and the results 
were found to be more consistent with actual decisions made under risk and uncertainty than 
other elicitation procedures.  According to theory, risk averse producers are expected to be more 
likely to purchase insurance.  Risk averse producers are willing to sacrifice higher expected 
returns in order to reduce risk (Keeney and Raiffa).  As the degree of risk aversion increases the 
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probability of purchasing insurance is expected to increase. Therefore a positive sign is 
expected for the estimated coefficient for RISK1. 
EDUC1 is a dummy variable that represents producers with less than a college 
education.  Education level has the potential to either positively or negatively impact a 
producers decision to purchase insurance.  It can be argued that producers with higher 
education levels may have better management skills and a better understanding of the benefits 
of insurance.  In this case, better management skills would increase the probability of 
purchasing insurance causing the expected sign of EDUC1 to be negative.  On the other hand, 
more educated producers more commonly receive higher levels of off-farm income, which 
reduces their dependency on beef cattle income.  Off-farm income can be used to supplement 
farm income when necessary.  Therefore, more education can lead to an increased ability to 
self-insure, which would cause EDUC1 to be positive.  
DEBT1 is a dummy variable that represents producers with a debt-to-asset ratio of 20 
percent or less.  These producers have relatively high net worth.  Producers who have high net 
worth are expected to be less likely to purchase insurance.  As a producers debt increases, he is 
expected to be more willing to purchase insurance in order to guarantee that financial 
obligations will be met.  The expected sign for the DEBT1 coefficient is negative.   
DIVRSE is a dummy variable that denotes whether a producer has multiple enterprises 
in his operation.  Enterprise diversity serves as a strategy for reducing revenue-related risk.  As 
the number of enterprises increases, the expected total revenue from all enterprises becomes 
more stable from year to year.  Producers that are more diversified are expected to be less likely 
to purchase livestock revenue insurance.  Black and Dorfman found a negative relationship 
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between enterprise diversity and the demand for insurance.  So, the expected sign for this 
coefficient is negative. 
FPRICE1 is a dummy variable that represents producers who monitor beef cattle 
futures prices on at least a weekly basis.  This variable is expected to have a positive 
relationship with the decision to purchase insurance.  Producers who are more knowledgeable 
of the futures market situation are expected to be better able to make informed decisions about 
purchasing insurance. Producers who frequently monitor prices use their knowledge of the 
market as a part of their risk management strategy.    
 D1, D2, AND D4 are dummy variables representing Economic Scenarios 1, 2 and 4, 
which will be presented to producers before they rate each product.  Economic Scenario 3 is the 
base scenario, which presents producers with market conditions where the current cash price is 
$80/cwt and the projected futures price is $80/cwt.  Scenario 3 is expected to be the least 
favored situation for purchasing insurance; therefore, the coefficients for the other three 
economic scenarios are expected to have positive signs.  Table 3.4 (above) provides a 
description of the market situation specified by each economic scenario.  The economic 
scenario is expected to have a significant influence on whether or not the producer purchases 
insurance.  
 The full factorial design given four product attributes each with three levels produced 81 
possible livestock insurance products.  Many of these products are unrealistic and would be 
purchased by a relatively small percentage of producers; therefore, it would not be useful to 
include these products in the purchase decision analysis.  A subset of nine realistic products was 
selected to analyze how producer characteristics impact the insurance purchase decision.  The 
products were selected by varying the levels of one product attribute, while holding the level of 
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all other attributes constant at the midpoint.  This strategy for selecting the products was used 
based on expert opinions, which suggested that midpoint attribute levels would be preferred by a 
large portion of producers.  By varying the levels of one attribute while holding all others 
constant, one can identify the differences in purchase decision that results from changing the 
level of the specified attribute.  For the price series and method of marketing attributes experts 
indicated that the midpoints (regional and telephone, respectively) were the most likely to be 
offered.  Several levels of both the premium and policy length attributes will be available; 
however, the midpoints of these attributes are expected to be attractive to a large portion of 
producers.  Separate probit models will be estimated for each of the nine products.  Table 3.6 
shows the attributes for each of the nine products included in the purchase decision analysis. 
Table 3.6: Products Selected to Evaluate Producer Purchase Decisions. 
Product Attributes 
Products 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Product 1 $2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 2 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 3 $0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 4 $1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 5 $1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 6 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 
Product 7 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 
Product 8 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 
Product 9 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS    
  Since County Extension Agents were used to identify the producers, the producers 
included in this study are likely more progressive than the average producer in the parish.  The 
selected producers had an established working relationship with the County Agents and most of 
them were active in parish extension livestock activities.  Producers who are actively involved 
in local, state, and national organizations are generally well informed and, thus, able to make 
informed financial and risk management decisions for their operations.  Although producers in 
this study were hand selected by county agents, they possess characteristics representative of 
beef cattle producers with similar herd sizes throughout the state and nation.  The following 
discussion will illustrate the diversity that exists among producers included in the sample. 
 According to the 1997 Census of Agriculture, there were 23,823 farms in Louisiana.  
Louisiana is characterized by farms that are slightly smaller than the United States average.  
Table 4.1 provides a synopsis of farms in Louisiana.  The states average farm size was 331 
acres compared to 487 acres on average for the entire U.S.   In Louisiana, more than 34 percent 
of the farms are less than 50 acres; however, for this study, there will be a greater percentage of 
large farms because of the herd size requirement that will likely be associated with livestock 
insurance products.  Sixty percent of Louisiana producers sell less than $10,000 worth of 
agricultural products each year (50.4 percent of producers in the U.S.).  More than half of the 
farmers in the state do not consider farming their principal occupation.  Other facts in Table 4.1 
will be referred to later to compare Louisiana producers with survey respondents. 
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Table 4.1: Description of Louisiana Farms in 1997. 
Characteristic Value 
Number of Farms 23,823 
Average Number of Acres per Farm 331 
Farms by Size (Percent)  
    1 to 49 acres 34.2% 
    50 to 179 acres 31.2% 
    180 to 499 acres  17.3% 
    500 to 999 acres 8.5% 
    1,000 to 1,999 acres 5.8% 
    2,000 acres or more 3.0% 
Farms by Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold  
    Less than $10,000 59.7% 
    $10,000 to $49,999 17.6% 
    $50,000 to $99,999 5.1% 
    $100,000 to $249,000  8.1% 
    $250,000 or more 9.6% 
Farms by Value of Land and Buildings  
    Less than $100,000 36.0% 
    $100,000 to $499,000 45.8% 
    $500,000 to $999,999 9.4% 
    $1,000,000 or more 8.8% 
Average Age of Producers (Years) 53.7 
Operators by Tenure  
    Full Owner 55.1% 
    Part Owner 31.3% 
    Tenant 13.6% 
Principal Occupation  
    Farming 47.4% 
    Other 52.6% 
  
 Source: 1997 Census of Agriculture 
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In terms of beef cattle production, Louisiana cattle producers marketed about $142 
million in cows and calves in 1997.  There were 12,669 farms with beef cattle in Louisiana 
accounting for approximately 53 percent of all of the farms in the state.  Many farmers 
produced other crops along with beef cattle to diversify their operations.  Table 4.2 provides a 
breakdown of the number of farms and the number of cattle produced by herd size in the state.  
In 1997, Louisiana beef cattle producers grazed more than 490,400 cows, which suggests that 
the average herd size in the state was about 39 head.  In the population targeted for this study 
(producers with 50 or more cows) there were only 2,518 producers in 1997, which was 19.9 
percent of all beef cattle producers in the state.  Table 4.2 shows that although a small 
percentage of producers in the state fit the expected requirements for livestock revenue 
insurance, these producers accounted for 64.8 percent of the beef cattle in the state.  Since the 
2,518 farms in the targeted population produced a total of 317,954 cattle, the average herd size 
of farms in the targeted population is about 126 head. 
Table 4.2:  Louisiana Farms and Beef Cattle by Herd Size, 1997 
Herd Size Number of Farms Number of Cattle 
< 50 Cows 10,151 172,483 
50  99 Cows 1,471 97,255 
100  199 Cows 673 86,612 
200  499 Cows 317 87,119 
500 + Cows 57 46,968 
TOTAL 12,669 490,437 
 
 
4.1.1 Farm Characteristics 
In 1997, sole proprietors controlled the vast majority of all farming operations in 
Louisiana and the United States, 87 percent and 86 percent, respectively.  Table 4.3 shows that 
75 percent of the interviewed respondents operated as sole proprietorships, while 15.4 percent 
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were involved in partnerships. Most partnerships involved agreements between family 
members.  Family and non-family corporations accounted for less than ten percent of the 
sample.  Larger operations made up the majority of partnerships and corporations for the 
selected group of producers; however, half of them also were sole proprietorships.  This 
suggests that a single individual was responsible for the majority of all farm production and 
marketing decisions, and the majority of the production and financial risks and benefits of beef 
cattle production accrued to an individual.     
Table 4.3: Farm Business Structure by Herd Size Category (Number of Farms) 
Herd Size 
Business Structure 
50 to 99 100 to 199 200 to 499
500 or 
more Total 
Percent of 
Producers
Sole Proprietorship 12 10 9 8 39 75.0% 
Partnership 0 1 3 4 8 15.4% 
Other1 0 0 1 4 5 9.6% 
1Other= Family and Non-Family Corporations 
 
 The survey results provide a mix of responses in terms of the primary source of income.  
Fifty percent of the respondents indicated that farming was their primary source of income.  
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of surveyed producers who consider farming their primary 
source of income by herd size. The figure shows that as herd size increased the percentage of 
farms that rely primarily on farm income also increased.  About 81 percent of respondents (13 
of 16 respondents) with 500 or more cattle depended primarily on income from farming.  A 
survey by the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) indicated that beef 
cattle were the primary source of income for nearly 79 percent of farms with 300 or more cattle 
in the top 23 cow-calf states.  Some producers in this study receive a significant portion of their 
income from other farming enterprises (broilers, crop production, etc.), which explains the 
producers in the 50 to 99 category with farming as the primary source of income.   
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Figure 4-1: Percent of Surveyed Farms Indicating Farming Was the Primary Source of 
Income by Herd Size. 
 
 
The primary source of income is likely to play a major role in how an individual makes 
farm-related financial decisions.  Individuals who have off-farm employment or other sources 
of income can often take on more risk in their farming operations.  In periods when farm 
income decreases substantially as a result of low commodity prices, these producers can 
supplement farm income with income from the other sources to maintain the size and structure 
of the operation.  Producers with farming as a primary source of income are expected to respond 
more to market changes and adjust the size and structure of their operations accordingly.  
Although farming may not be the primary source of income, most respondents consider the 
farm an important source of income.  Producers were not asked to provide information on total 
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household income, so income from the spouse was not considered.  The spouses income could 
be another means of providing a cushion for farm decisions. 
This study contains mainly producers who considered beef cattle production to be an 
important part of their farming operation.  Table 4.4 shows that 69.2 percent of all respondents 
indicated that between 81 and 100 percent of their farm income came from beef cattle 
production.  Some producers raised cattle in conjunction with other agricultural commodities.  
About 27 percent of the operations in the study received between 21 and 60 percent of their 
farm income from beef cattle production.  Only 3.8 percent of respondents received 20 percent 
or less of their farm income from beef cattle production.   A total of 46 respondents (88.5 
percent) were current members of the Louisiana Cattlemens Association.  This also suggests 
that beef cattle production is important to the producers in the sample.  Producers who are 
active in commodity organizations benefit from access to current information and 
communication with other producers.    
Table 4.4:  Percentage of Farm Income from Beef Cattle Production. 
Percentage Number of Respondents Percent of Respondents 
0 to 20 percent 2 3.8% 
21 to 40 percent 9 17.3% 
41 to 60 percent 5 9.6% 
61 to 80 percent 0 0.0% 
81 to 100 percent 36 69.2% 
 
 Survey respondents operated a total of 154,419 acres throughout Louisiana.  The total 
operated land includes land owned, rented, and leased for all purposes.   Respondents owned 
67.5 percent of the acreage (104,224 acres) operated, and the remaining 32.5 percent was either 
rented or leased acreage (50,195 acres).   Of the total acreage operated, producers used 66.8 
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percent of the land (103,215 acres) for beef cattle production.  Table 4.5 shows that the acreages 
for producers in the sample were significantly higher than the state and national farm sizes of 
331 and 487 acres, respectively.  Since this sample included only producers who had more than 
50 cows, higher acreage totals were expected for producers.  The average farm size for 
respondents was 2,969.6 acres, and the average acreage used for beef cattle production was 
1,984.9.   The measure of skewness reported in table 4.5 indicates that these figures are skewed 
to the right by a few large operations.  Figure 4.2 also provides a histogram for acreage used for 
beef cattle, which illustrates the amount of skewness in the distribution.  There were two 
operations included in the survey that owned 30 thousand or more acres and used over 15 
thousand acres for beef cattle production.   In addition, there were eight operations that used 
more than 3,000 acres for beef cattle production.  Most of the farms that used 3,000 or more 
acres were located in southwestern Louisiana, where marshland is used for cattle production.  
Marshland is relatively less productive and relatively inexpensive to lease per acre.  Several 
acres are required per cow on marshland because of limited vegetative growth.   There were 35 
farms (67.3 percent) in the selected group that used between 85 and 1,500 acres for beef cattle 
production.  
Table 4.5:  Average Farm Size of Surveyed Producers (Acres). 
 
Average 
(acres) 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness 
Owned 2,004.3 6,817.68 4.93 
Rented or Leased 965.3 1,535.94 1.98 
Used for Beef Cattle 1,984.9 3,496.41 3.86 
Total Operated 2,969.6 6,796.23 4.56 
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Figure 4-2:  Distribution of Acreage Used For Beef Production. 
 
Table 4.6 shows that the selected group of producers was relatively balanced across herd 
size categories.  There were 23.1 percent of the respondents with 50 to 99 cows, 21.2 percent 
with 100 to 199 cows, 25 percent with 200 to 499 cows, and 30.8 percent with 500 or more 
cows in their cow-calf operation.  These figures were based on the number of cows and bred 
heifers reported.  Respondents owned a total of 19,730 cows and bred heifers, 971 herd bulls, 
and 1,517 replacement heifers.  In addition, they sold about 14,225 calves in 2001 and grazed 
4,132 stockers.  Two operations owned a total of 242 feeders.  Given these figures, producers 
ran about 20 cows to every bull on average and an average of about 29 replacement heifers were 
kept per farm.  The average herd size across all respondents was about 380 head, compared to 
an average herd size of 126 head for Louisiana producers in the targeted population. 
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Table 4.6: Herd Size Category of Respondents. 
Herd Size Number of Farms Percentage of Farms 
50 to 99 12 23.1% 
100 to 199 11 21.2% 
200 to 499 13 25.0% 
500 or more 16 30.8% 
 
 
 Survey respondents were primarily cow-calf producers; however, some were involved in 
other phases of production.   A total of 39 producers were involved in 100 percent cow-calf 
production, and all operations consisted of at least 40 percent cow-calf production.  There were 
13 producers who grazed stockers on their operations and two with feeder calves.  On average, 
stockers accounted for about 30 percent of the animals on farms where they were raised.   
Farms with stockers and feeders were typically those that operated 1,500 or more acres.  
 There were 18 respondents (34.6 percent) involved in purebred production to some 
degree.  Table 4.7 shows that purebred production accounted for less than 50 percent of the total 
herd for the majority of these producers.  Only five producers raised primarily purebred beef 
cattle on their operations, and these operations typically had smaller herd sizes.  Purebred 
producers generally raised cattle for breeding stock, such as herd bulls and replacement heifers.  
Respondents indicated that they were normally able to sell breeding stock for prices that were 
higher than the cash market price.  Many of these producers saw purebred production as a 
means of enterprise diversification, which reduced their exposure to price risk.  Although the 
majority of their animals were sold by private treaty for breeding stock, purebred producers 
indicated that they used auction markets to sell the lower quality animals in their herd.  
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Table 4.7:  Breakdown of Purebred Production. 
Percent 
Purebred Production Number of Producers 
Average Herd Size 
(cows) 
0 to 25 percent 6 271 
26 to 50 percent 6 229 
51 to 75 percent 1 160 
76 to 100 percent 5 64 
Total 18  
 
 
 Most of the labor on farms in the sample was provided by family members or by 
producers assisting each other when work beyond the normal day was required.  A total of 41 
farms in the sample had either one or two family members that worked on the farm in the 
typical year.  The remaining eleven farms had either three or four family members working on 
the farm.  Eleven farms hired one part-time employee and nine others employed between two 
and five part-time workers.  Some larger farms employed full-time workers in addition to 
family members.  There were ten farms that employed one full-time worker, and eleven farms 
employed between two and five full-time employees.   
 Producers selected for the survey differed significantly from the average producer in 
Louisiana and the U.S. in terms of market value of farms.  The 1997 Census of Agriculture 
indicated that farms valued below $100,000 accounted for 36 and 27.6 percent of farms in 
Louisiana and the U.S., respectively.  In the group of producers selected for the survey, no 
producers owned farms valued this low.  A higher than average value was expected for 
producers in this study due to the participation requirements.   Table 4.8 revealed that 50 
percent of the respondents had operations valued between $100,000 and $499,999, and an 
additional 11.5 percent of producers had farms valued between $750,00 and $999,999.  In the 
selected group, the largest percentage (38.5 percent) of producers had operations valued at $1 
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million or more.   In contrast, producers with operations valued at $1 million or more 
represented 8.8 and 9.7 percent of operations on the state and national levels, respectively.    
Table 4.8:  Estimated Market Value of Farms. 
 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Less than $100,000 0 0.0% 
$100,000 to $249,000 14 26.9% 
$250,000 to $499,000 12 23.1% 
$500,000 to $750,000 0 0.0% 
750,000 to $999,999 6 11.5% 
$1,000,000 or more 20 38.5% 
 
 Although operations in the sample were relatively large, a significant portion of 
respondents indicated that they planned to expand the size of their operation in the next five 
years.  A total of 23 producers  (44.2 percent of the producers surveyed) indicated that they 
planned to expand the size of their cattle operation in the next five years.  An equal proportion 
of producers (44.2 percent) said that they wanted to maintain the size of their operation.  Only 
six producers (11.5 percent) indicated that they planned to reduce the size of their operation in 
the next five years.   Of these six producers, five were over the age of 60 and provided the 
majority of the labor on the farm.  Therefore, physical limitations may have been a factor 
contributing to the decision to reduce the size of the operation.    
 Almost 35 percent of producers reported a debt-to-asset ratio of zero, while 36.5 percent 
had a debt-to-asset ratio between 1 and 20 percent.  Table 4.9 shows a breakdown of the number 
of farms in each herd size category with a given debt-to-asset ratio.  The majority of producers 
with no debt had herds of 199 cows or less.  Producers with the highest debt-to-asset ratios were 
those with larger cattle operations.  This seems logical due to the higher fixed costs associated 
with land, buildings, and equipment required for larger herds.  Also, producers with smaller 
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herds more commonly had income from other sources to help pay off farm-related debt.  There 
were no producers with a debt-to-asset ratio above 60 percent.  As the debt-to-asset ratio 
increased, the total number of farms in each category decreased.  The overall results suggest 
that the group of producers selected for the survey were financially secure. 
Table 4.9: Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Producers by Herd Size (Number of Producers). 
Herd SizeRatio 
50 to 99 100 to 199 200 to 499 500 or more 
Zero 6 5 3 4 
1% to 20%  3 5 4 7 
21% to 40% 1 1 2 4 
41% to 60% 2 0 4 1 
61% or more 0 0 0 0 
 
A substantial portion of respondents was involved in at least one other agricultural 
enterprise in addition to beef cattle or hay production.  Nearly 40 percent of producers raised 
some other type of crop or livestock in addition to beef cattle.  Of the 52 respondents, only 
seven (13.5 percent) had two or more enterprises in addition to beef cattle on their operations.  
Rice and timber were the most common enterprises in which producers were involved.  
Respondents also produced row crops, such as corn, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, and cotton.  
Three respondents raised broilers.  About 94 percent of producers raised hay either for on-farm 
use or to sell commercially.    
A total of 28 producers (53.8 percent) indicated that the primary source of information 
on new management strategies for beef production was the Louisiana Cooperative Extension 
Service.  However, 21.2 percent of producers indicated that magazines were the primary source 
for new information.  Farm organizations, other producers, and the Internet were the primary 
information sources for 13.5, 9.6, and 1.9 percent of producers, respectively.  Most producers 
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said that they used a combination of these information sources on a regular basis.  Knowing the 
primary sources of information is important for disseminating material related to livestock 
revenue insurance.  
Table 4.10:  Primary Source of Information on New Management Strategies for Beef 
Production. 
Source 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
County Extension Service 28 53.8% 
Other Producers 5 9.6% 
Farm Organizations 7 13.5% 
Magazines 11 21.2% 
The Internet 1 1.9% 
 
The average weaning weight for calves raised by all respondents was about 542 pounds.  
The minimum weaning weight reported was 400 pounds and the maximum reported was 700 
pounds.  The modal weaning weight for the sample was 500 pounds.  Producers were also asked 
to specify the average weight of calves marketed for 2001.  The average weight at which calves 
were marketed was 576 pounds.  The minimum weight at which calves were marketed was 400 
pounds and the maximum weight reported was 800 pounds.  The majority of producers fed 
calves for a short period of time after weaning before taking them to the market.  Some 
purebred producers indicated that they fed cattle longer because they marketed a large 
percentage of cattle as breeding stock. 
The method that producers currently use to market their cattle will be important in their 
decision to purchase livestock revenue insurance.  Producers currently using marketing 
strategies that can protect them from price risk will purchase livestock revenue insurance if the 
expected returns outweigh the returns that they currently receive or if it will further reduce the 
price risk they face.  Some producers may see livestock revenue insurance as a means of 
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diversifying risk management strategies.  Producers in the selected group utilized a wide range 
of marketing practices.  Table 4.11 gives a synopsis of the marketing practices used by 
producers according to herd size category.  The vast majority (88.5 percent) of producers 
utilized auction barns to market their cattle.  Regardless of herd size, producers used auction 
barns to market at least a portion of their cattle.  The second most popular method was private 
buyers, which was utilized to market cattle by 53.8 percent of respondents.      
In the smallest herd size category (50 to 99 cows) the majority of cattle were sold 
through auction barns.  These producers did not have the volume to use forward pricing 
strategies such as video auctions; however, a large percentage of smaller producers in the 
sample used private buyers and select sales as a means of diversifying their marketing 
strategies.  One producer in this category used retained ownership on calves through a calf-to-
carcass program.  Purebred producers represented a significant portion of the producers in the 
50 to 99 cow category.  Most purebred producers marketed breeding stock through either 
private treaty or select/purebred sales.         
Table 4.11: Marketing Practices Used for Beef Cattle by Herd Size 
Herd Size 
Marketing Practice 50 to 
99 
100 to 
199 
200 to 
499 
500 or 
more 
Total 
Producers 
Percent of 
Producers
Auction Barn 12 10 11 13 46 88.5% 
Video Auction 0 3 6 8 17 32.7% 
Private Buyer 8 6 8 6 28 53.8% 
Retained Ownership 1 2 3 5 12 23.1% 
Internet Sales 0 1 0 1 2 3.8% 
Select Sales 6 2 1 3 12 23.1% 
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As the herd size increased, there was more diversity in the types of marketing strategies 
used.  Producers in the 100 to 199 cow category marketed cattle through each of the specified 
channels.   Only producers with 100 or more cattle utilized video auctions to market cattle.  
Video auctions were used by 32.7 percent of all respondents.  The video auction is a forward 
pricing strategy that allows producers to lock in a price before calves are sent to the market.  
With this strategy, producers are required to have about 60 calves that are uniform in terms of 
age, weight and quality.  The calves are video taped about three months before they reach 
market age and the video is presented to buyers around the nation via satellite.  Buyers bid and 
the producer can either accept or reject the offer.  If the offer is rejected, another offer may be 
made or the cattle can be presented again on a different day.  This is an excellent method for 
producers to reduce price risk on their livestock. 
There were 12 producers (23.1 percent) who used retained ownership in their marketing 
scheme.  Most producers who used retained ownership sold only a small percentage of their 
calves through this marketing outlet.  With retained ownership, producers usually own calves 
until they leave the feedlot or sell them based upon carcass quality.  Some producers utilized 
retained ownership to gather information on how their calves performed after weaning.  This 
method was also used more frequently as herd size increased.  Only two producers interviewed 
indicated that they used the Internet as a means of marketing calves.      
Producers selected for the survey were typically larger and more progressive than the 
average beef cattle producer in Louisiana.  Consequently, a larger percentage of producers 
utilized a wide array of marketing channels.  In all of the specified marketing practices except 
auction barns, the quality of calves is very important for maintaining a marketing outlet.  Since 
a large portion of producers in this study utilized strategies other than auction barns, it suggests 
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that they produced high quality calves.  The majority of the producers in this study use a mix of 
marketing outlets, which commonly includes the auction barn.  Producers who market through 
channels where quality is a factor typically market lower quality cattle through the auction barn.  
This helps producers maintain a good reputation with buyers who are willing to pay a premium 
for quality.  Livestock revenue insurance will provide another marketing strategy for producers 
to use in order to reduce exposure to price risk. 
4.1.2 Record Keeping  
Accurate financial and production records are important to the overall success of 
livestock operations.  Producers can use records to evaluate the performance of their operation 
and make informed decisions for improvement.  Table 4.12 shows that all producers in the 
sample maintained some form of records on expenses and income from their cattle.  Several 
producers indicated that they maintained the records necessary for income tax purposes. Most 
producers maintain receipts from cattle sales as well as expense receipts for feed, equipment, 
veterinary and medical costs, labor, and transportation.  About 40 percent of producers 
evaluated the net worth of their operation on an annual basis.  Several of the producers did not 
keep up with the net worth of their operation because they have little or no debt.  Only eight 
operations (15 percent of producers) tracked monthly cash flow.  Cash flow records were 
maintained primarily by large operations with a considerable number of employees.  An annual 
performance summary was conducted by 61.5 percent of the respondents.  The performance 
summary involved producers comparing how different practices used each year affected 
revenue or profits.     
Producers were also asked to specify the method used to record the majority of their 
records.  Table 4.13 shows that the sample was equally divided between producers who 
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maintained records on handwritten ledgers and those who utilized computers to maintain 
records.  Almost all producers who maintained records on computer spreadsheets conducted 
annual performance summaries on their operations.  Producers utilized a wide variety of 
computer programs to maintain records.  Responses to this question suggest that a substantial 
number of producers are adopting the use of computer technology to assist with making 
production and financial decisions for their operations. 
Table 4.12:  Financial Records Maintained by Respondents. 
Record 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Feed Costs 52 100.0% 
Receipts from Sales 52 100.0% 
Costs of Equipment 50 96.2% 
Vet and Medical Costs 50 96.2% 
Labor Costs 35 67.3% 
Transportation Costs 37 71.2% 
Net Worth of Operation 21 40.4% 
Monthly Cash Flow 8 15.4% 
Annual Performance Summary 32 61.5% 
 
Table 4.13:  Method For Maintaining Financial and Production Records. 
Method Number of Respondents Percent of Respondents 
Handwritten Ledgers 26 50.0% 
Computer Spreadsheets 26 50.0% 
 
 
 The performance of breeding stock is also an important factor for the success of cow-
calf operations.  Fifty percent of producers indicated that they maintain individual records on 
cows to track the performance of their offspring.  Producers who keep these records commonly 
recorded the birth, weaning and market weights of calves for each cow in the herd.  The 
producers often made decisions to cull cows based upon these records.  Other producers who 
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did not maintain records on individual cows indicated that they were familiar with their 
breeding stock and visually observed and made mental notes about the performance of a cows 
offspring.  These producers commonly ear tagged all cows and calves for identification; 
however, information was not recorded for comparison from year to year.   
Producers who participate in seminars and other educational programs are usually 
interested in learning about new technology that can be used to improve their operations.  These 
educational programs provide an opportunity for producers to learn how various methods 
perform without having to resort to trial and error on their operations.  Producers were asked 
to indicate whether they had attended educational programs on production, marketing, risk 
management, or financial management for beef cattle in the past two years.  Forty producers 
(76.9 percent) had participated in some type of educational seminar in the past two years.   
Table 4.14 shows that producers most commonly attended production and marketing programs.  
A total of 15 producers (28.9 percent) had participated in educational programs in each of the 
four subject areas in the past two years.  Some producers indicated that they had received 
training through the Texas A&M University Master Cattlemans program.  A total of 16 
producers (30.8 percent) had attended educational programs on risk management in the past two 
years.  Producers stated that risk management seminars were not frequently offered; however, 
risk management strategies were sometimes addressed in marketing seminars.  
Table 4.14:  Educational Programs on Beef Cattle Attended in the Past Two Years. 
Subject Area 
Number of  
Respondents 
Percent of  
Respondents 
Production 36 69.2% 
Marketing 35 67.3% 
Risk Management 16 30.8% 
Financial Management 22 42.3% 
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4.1.3 Risk Management 
The risk management section of the survey evaluated producers experience and attitude 
toward risk management alternatives.  These factors may influence a producers understanding 
of and willingness to accept livestock revenue insurance.  Experience with risk management 
alternatives and risk attitude may also influence a producers preference for various insurance 
products. 
Producers were asked to indicate which of the risk management strategies listed in table 
4.15 that they had used in the past or currently use on their operations.  This question dealt with 
risk management strategies used for any enterprise and was not confined strictly to strategies 
used for beef cattle production.  Table 4.15 illustrates the risk management strategies used by 
producers in different herd size categories.  Observing strategies used among producers with 
different herd sizes provides insight on the category of producers who need additional risk 
management alternatives.  Information in this table also points out the types of producers who 
have knowledge and experience with risk management alternatives. 
Table 4.15:  Risk Management Strategies Used by Herd Size Category (Number of 
Producers). 
Herd Size 
Strategy 
50 to 99 
100 to 
199 
200 to 
499 
500 or 
more 
Total 
Percentage 
Cash and Other Forward Contracts 1 4 7 9 40.4% 
Marketing Cooperative 1 5 0 4 19.2% 
Crop Yield Insurance 0 2 3 6 21.2% 
Crop Revenue Insurance 0 1 3 3 13.5% 
Enterprise Diversification 2 3 5 9 36.5% 
Contract Production 1 1 4 1 13.5% 
Futures and Options 0 1 3 6 19.2% 
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The most frequently used risk management strategy was cash and other forward 
contracts, which was used by 40.4 percent of all respondents.  A total of 19 producers (36.5 
percent) used enterprise diversification as a risk management strategy.  Approximately 21 
percent of producers had used crop yield insurance and about 19 percent had used either 
marketing cooperatives or futures and options.  Contract production and crop revenue insurance 
were used by only 13.5 percent of producers.  The three broiler producers as well as some crop 
producers had experience with contract production.  A study by Knutson et al. found that 
enterprise diversification and forward contracting were popular strategies used by producers. 
The majority of the producers with 50 to 99 cows (58.3 percent) did not employ any of 
the specified risk management strategies.  Producers with between 100 to 199 cows utilized a 
wide array of strategies with marketing cooperatives and forward contracting being the most 
popular.  Producers in this category commonly coordinated breeding dates with other producers 
in order to assemble a uniform set of calves.  This allowed them to take advantage of forward 
contracting opportunities used more frequently by larger producers.  As herd size increased, the 
number of producers who used cash and other forward contracts increased.  Cash and other 
forward contracts and enterprise diversification were used by 56.2 percent of producers with 
500 or more cows.   
There were 19 respondents (36.5 percent) who indicated that they had never used any 
risk management strategies on their operations.  This suggests a need to provide education as 
well as additional risk management alternatives for beef cattle producers.  Many smaller 
producers have other sources of income, which may decrease the importance of risk 
management strategies.  Most large producers (200 cows and above) used some type of risk 
management strategy on their operation.  These producers depend more on the revenue from 
 119
livestock.  Producers with 500 or more cows have more experience with futures and options 
than producers with smaller herds.    
 Producers were also asked to indicate which of the risk management strategies never 
used would they be likely to use in the future.  The results reveal that most producers were not 
interested in using any of the specified strategies in the future.  Table 4.16 provides the 
percentage of respondents who would be likely to use each strategy in the future.  About 24 
percent of respondents who never used marketing cooperatives showed an interest in using them 
to reduce risk on their operation at some point in the future.   Thirty-one producers never used 
cash and other forward contracts and 22.6 percent of them indicated that they were likely to use 
this strategy in the future.   Of the 42 respondents who never used futures and options, 16.7 
percent indicated an interest in using them in the future.  Producers with small herd sizes (50 to 
99 cows) indicated an interest in marketing cooperatives and cash and forward contracts.  These 
producers were interested in coordinating with other producers to take advantage of the 
available risk management alternatives.    
 
Table 4.16:  Risk Management Strategies That May Be Used in the Future 
Strategy Number of Respondents Percent of Respondents 
Cash and Other Forward Contracts 7 22.6% 
Marketing Cooperative 10 23.8% 
Crop Yield Insurance 1 2.4% 
Crop Revenue Insurance 1 2.2% 
Enterprise Diversification 0 0.0% 
Contract Production 2 4.4% 
Futures and Options 7 16.7% 
 
 Producers were asked to give their opinions on risk management strategies for beef 
cattle production.  Producers were first asked to indicate whether they felt the risk management 
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tools available to beef cattle producers were adequate.  Only 32.7 percent of producers felt that 
the current risk management tools available were adequate.  A large percentage of producers 
with this opinion were purebred producers (41.2 percent) or currently used marketing strategies 
such as private buyers (64.7 percent) to reduce price risk.  The remaining 67.3 percent of 
producers felt that the current risk management tools were not adequate.  This suggests that a 
significant number of producers may be interested in additional risk management alternatives. 
 Producers were also asked to indicate how important they felt risk management 
strategies were to the success of their cattle operations.  Nearly 52 percent of respondents 
indicated that risk management strategies were very important to the success of their operation, 
and an additional 36 percent felt that risk management strategies were somewhat important.  
There were six producers (12 percent of respondents) who indicated that they feel risk 
management strategies are either not very important or not at all important to the success of 
their operations.  If producers do not feel that risk management strategies are important, they are 
less likely to purchase livestock revenue insurance regardless of how effectively the product is 
designed and marketed.  Overall, producers exhibited a remarkable interest in learning more 
about livestock revenue insurance and other risk management strategies.  There were 49 
producers (94.2 percent) who indicated that they would be willing to participate in an 
educational seminar to learn more about livestock revenue insurance.   
 Two questions were asked to elicit the risk preference of survey respondents.  The first 
question asked producers to characterize themselves in terms of risk preference, and the second 
question asked them to select between investment alternatives with different levels of risk.  
Table 4.17 provides the results of the self-rank elicitation question.  When comparing 
themselves to other investors, 55.8 percent of producers indicated that they tended to avoid risk 
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when possible in investment decisions.  Producers who tended to avoid risk were characterized 
as risk averse producers.   There were 13 producers (25 percent) who indicated that they tended 
to take on substantial risk in investment decisions, and about 19 percent said they neither sought 
nor avoided risk in investment decisions.  Risk averse producers were typically willing to 
forego a higher level of expected returns in order to reduce the variation in returns over time.   
Table 4.17: Producers' Perceived Risk Attitude. 
Statement 
Total 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
I tend to take on substantial risk in my investment 
decisions. 13 25.0% 
I neither seek nor avoid risk in my investment 
decisions. 10 19.2% 
I tend to avoid risk when possible in my 
investment decisions. 29 55.8% 
 
The results indicated that the producers age had some impact on their perceived risk 
attitude.  All producers interviewed between the ages of 20 and 35 indicated that they tend to 
take on substantial risk in investment decisions, and all respondents over the age of 65 indicated 
that they tend to avoid risk whenever possible in investment decisions.  The producers between 
the ages of 36 and 65 provided a broad array of responses to this question.  These results 
suggest that older producers were typically expected to take on less risk than younger ones, 
which was consistent with the findings of other economists, such as Vandeveer and Loehman.  
Younger producers are often concerned with gaining wealth, while older producers are 
concerned with maintaining wealth.     
Producers were presented a question to determine how they would invest money if given 
five different alternatives.  Producers were presented a hypothetical situation where they had 
$100,000 that they could invest in one of the five investment options listed in Table 4.18.  
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Producers were told that they had a 33 percent chance of receiving the lowest, average, or 
highest net return associated with each investment.  The producers choice indicated the degree 
of risk aversion.  The following risk attitudes were associated with producers who selected each 
of following investments:  Investment 1  Very Risk Averse; Investment 2  Moderately Risk 
Averse; Investment 3  Slightly Risk Averse; Investment 4  Slightly Risk Prone; and 
Investment 5  Moderately to Very Risk Prone.    
Table 4.18 shows the number of times producers selected each hypothetical investment 
option.  Investment three was selected most frequently (40.4 percent of the producers) followed 
by investment one (30.8 percent of the producers).  There were nine producers (17.3 percent) 
who selected investment two.  These figures suggest that 88.5 percent of the producers in the 
selected group were at least moderately risk averse.  Investments four and five were selected by 
ten and two percent of producers, respectively.  This suggests that only twelve percent of 
producers could be characterized as risk prone. 
Table 4.18:  Hypothetical Investment Options Presented to Producers. 
Investment 
Option 
Lowest Net 
Return 
(1/3 Chance) 
Average Net 
Return 
(1/3 Chance) 
Highest Net 
Return 
(1/3 Chance) Times Selected
Investment 1 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000 16 
Investment 2 $8,170 $10,600 $13,030 9 
Investment 3 $6,420 $11,200 $15,980 21 
Investment 4 $5,420 $11,200 $16,980 5 
Investment 5 $3,440 $10,600 $17,760 1 
 
 
4.1.4 Demographics 
Producers in the sample were diverse in terms of most demographic characteristics.  
Figure 4.2 shows a distribution of respondents according to age.  The average age of producers 
 123
in the sample was 53.9 years, which is very close to the Louisiana average age of 53.7 reported 
in the 1997 Census of Agriculture.  About 40 percent of the respondents were between 51 and 
65 years of age, and an additional 36.5 percent are between the ages of 36 and 50.  In the 
extreme categories, there were only two respondents between the ages of 20 and 35, and a total 
of 10 (about 19 percent) producers over the age of 65.  Figure 4-3 shows the distribution of 
respondents ages.  The majority of the producers interviewed were Caucasian males; however, 
there were two African-American males and two Caucasian females represented in the selected 
group.  
Respondents represented a proportionate distribution in terms of the number of years 
they had been operating a farm.  Table 4.19 shows that nearly 29 percent of respondents had 
been operating a farm between 21 and 30 years.   This category contained the largest number of 
producers.   A total of six producers (11.5 percent) had been operating a farm for less than 10 
years, and an equal number had been operating a farm more than 40 years.  About 19 and 21 
percent of respondents had been operating farms from 11 to 20 years and 31 to 40 years, 
respectively.   The average number of years operating a farm was 25.2 years with a range from 
three years to 54 years.  
 The employment status of respondents was fairly balanced between producers 
employed off-farm, farming only, and retired producers.  There were 36.5 percent of producers 
in the selected group who held off-farm employment.     All producers employed worked at 
least 40 hours per week off-farm.  There were 18 producers (34.6 percent) who worked only on 
the farm, while 28.8 percent were retired.  Income received from off-farm employment or 
retirement pensions often provided producers with a means of supplementing farm income in 
years when cattle prices were low or production costs were high.  The majority of producers 
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with less than 200 cows received income from sources other than beef cattle.  Although several 
respondents held off-farm employment, they considered beef cattle production a business rather 
than a hobby. 
Figure 4-3:  Age Distribution of Producers. 
 
 
Table 4.19: Years Producers Had Been Operating a Farm. 
 Years Farming 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Less than 10 Years 6 11.5% 
11  20 Years 10 19.2% 
21 30 Years 15 28.8% 
31  40 Years 11 21.2% 
More than 40 Years 6 11.5% 
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In general, the producers were well educated given that 55.8 percent of respondents had 
an educational background that included at least some college or technical school.   Figure 4.4 
shows that only four producers (about 7.7 percent) had less than a high school education.  The 
High School Graduate category contained the largest percentage of producers (36.5 percent).  
Eleven and one-half percent of producers had attended some college or received a technical 
school degree.   Nearly 31 percent of producers had earned a four-year college degree, and an 
additional 13.5 percent had completed graduate degrees. 
 Figure 4-4:  Education Levels of Respondents. 
  
Producers were also asked to indicate the total amount of agricultural product sales they 
had for 2001.  Table 4.20 shows the percentage of producers represented in each range of gross 
agricultural product sales.  There were no producers in the sample who sold less than $10,000 in 
agricultural products in 2001.  This was expected since the sample included producers with a 
minimum of 50 cows in their operations.  There were 14 respondents (26.9 percent) who 
grossed between $10,000 and $49,000 annually from agricultural product sales.   Producers in 
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this category produced mainly livestock and had relatively small herds.  There were 26.9 
percent of producers who sold between $100,000 and $249,000 in agricultural products 
annually.  The table also shows that over 30 percent of producers in the sample had gross sales 
of $250,000 or more.  Information about net income and total household income was not 
requested in this survey.  
Table 4.20:  Total Value of Agricultural Product Sales. 
Value 
Number of 
Respondents 
Percent of 
Respondents 
Less than $10,000 0 0.0% 
$10,000 to $49,999 14 26.9% 
$50,000 to $99,999 8 15.4% 
$100,000 to $249,999 14 26.9% 
$250,000 to $499,999 10 19.2% 
$500,000 or more 6 11.5% 
 
 
  
4.1.5 Revenue Insurance 
The information contained in this section of the survey provides producers opinions on 
livestock revenue insurance.  Currently, private insurance companies are responsible for the 
delivery of crop insurance.  The federal government provides subsidies and reinsurance to 
prevent private insurers from experiencing major losses.  Producers were asked to indicate who 
they would prefer to administer livestock revenue insurance.  There were 29 producers (56 
percent) who indicated that they would prefer the USDA to administer livestock revenue 
insurance.  Private insurance companies were preferred by 25 percent of the respondents, and 
more than 19 percent had no preference between the two choices.  Many producers stated that 
they worked with USDA employees regularly and would feel more comfortable if they were 
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responsible for administering livestock revenue insurance.  The entity chosen to administer the 
product may have some impact on producer participation.    
Whole-farm revenue insurance provides an opportunity for producers with multiple 
enterprises to guarantee a given level of revenue for their entire operation.  The advantage of a 
whole-farm policy is that the premium paid for two or more enterprises is less than the premium 
required to insure each enterprise individually.  The premium is lower as a result of risk being 
pooled for several enterprises.  Producers were asked if they would prefer a whole-farm policy 
to an individual livestock revenue insurance policy.  Only about 15 percent (8 respondents) 
indicated that they would prefer a whole-farm product.  This result was expected because most 
producers interviewed did not produce  additional enterprises that were insurable.  However, 
most producers who currently produce insurable crops preferred a whole-farm policy (57.1 
percent). 
Producers were presented five factors that could influence their decision to purchase or 
not purchase livestock revenue insurance.  Producers were asked to rank these factors from 1 
(most influential) to 5 (least influential).  Table 4.21 shows how respondents ranked each of the 
different factors.  Based on the overall average rating in table 4.21, the expected reduction in the 
variability of revenue from livestock was the most influential factor to producers.  Almost 62 
percent of producers indicated that this factor was the most influential on their decision to 
purchase insurance.  No producers ranked this factor as a four or five, which suggests that all 
producers were influenced by this factor to some degree.  If producers perceive that livestock 
revenue insurance will cause a significant reduction in the variability of revenue over time, it 
will have a positive impact on participation.   
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The fact that producers currently had other forms of risk protection was ranked second 
in terms of influence.  Any available means of reducing the price risk associated with beef cattle 
production was considered for this factor.  Some of the common methods of reducing risk 
considered were enterprise diversification, purebred production, and diverse marketing 
strategies.   Fourteen respondents (26.9 percent) indicated that this was the most influential 
factor, and an additional 30.8 percent said that it was the second most influential factor.  
Fourteen producers indicated that this factor would have little or no influence on their purchase 
decision.  When other risk management strategies exist, producers may be less likely to 
purchase revenue insurance.   
The amount of time and information required to purchase a policy was also a relatively 
influential factor in the decision to purchase livestock revenue insurance.  This factor addressed 
the influence of excessive amounts of paper work or records that may be required to purchase a 
policy.  There were 44.2 percent of producers who ranked this either the most or second most 
influential factor in their purchase decision.  All producers indicated that this factor would have 
at least some influence on their insurance purchase decision.  This result shows the importance 
of information and transaction costs in the producers purchase decision. 
The two least influential factors were the attitude of other cattle producers and the belief 
that the government would provide assistance.  Only one producer indicated that the attitude of 
other producers was the most influential factor, while 38.5 percent indicated that it was the least 
influential factor.   Fifty percent of respondents indicated that the least influential factor was 
their belief that the government would provide assistance in the event of a major decline in the 
price of beef cattle.  The knowledge of these factors provides insight into the positive features 
of the policy that should be stressed in order to increase participation.  
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Table 4.21:  Factors That Would Influence Livestock Revenue Insurance Purchase 
Decision (Number of Producers). 
Influence 
Most                          to                            Least Factors 
One Two Three Four Five 
Average 
Rating 
Attitude of Other Producers 1 5 9 17 20 3.96 
Time and Information Required 5 18 21 8 0 2.62 
Reduction in Revenue Variability 32 12 8 0 0 1.54 
Other Forms of Risk Protection 14 16 8 8 6 2.54 
Government Will Assist 0 1 6 19 26 4.35 
 
 
 The majority of producers involved in the study attempted to stay abreast of the market 
situation for beef cattle.  Sixteen respondents (30.8 percent) indicated that they checked beef 
cattle futures prices on a daily basis.  An additional 28.8 percent of producers checked futures 
prices on a weekly basis, and 25 percent monitored futures prices on a monthly basis.  A 
number of producers who normally checked futures prices on a weekly or monthly basis 
indicated that they checked cattle futures daily when it was close to time for them to market 
calves.  Only eight producers (15 percent) indicated that they never checked beef cattle futures 
prices.  Several producers interviewed had computer systems that provided constant updates on 
commodity market prices.  Producers who frequently track futures prices are more aware of the 
market outlook and can make informed decisions on the type of insurance product that should 
be purchased at a given point in time. 
Most survey participants felt that livestock revenue protection would be beneficial to 
beef cattle producers.  Eighteen producers (34.6 percent) said that they strongly agreed that the 
product would be beneficial to producers, and 53.8 percent responded that they agreed that the 
product would be beneficial to beef cattle producers (about 89 percent of producers at least 
agree).  There were three respondents who were indifferent or undecided about the benefits that 
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livestock revenue insurance would provide for beef cattle producers.  There were also three 
producers who indicated that they disagreed that the product would benefit beef cattle 
producers.  No producers in the sample had a strong negative opinion about the product.  
Producers who felt that the product would not be beneficial stated that crop insurance had 
caused crop price distortions due to over production and livestock revenue insurance may have 
a similar effect on livestock prices in the long run.  Producers also expressed concerns about the 
product not being able to provide much benefit when prices were relatively low.  If beef cattle 
prices reach an extremely low level, producers may not be able to earn a break-even income.   
In this situation, revenue insurance would possibly reduce the variability of income, but not 
necessarily increase total returns.    
Table 4.22 provides a synopsis of producers rating and purchase decisions for the 
eleven hypothetical revenue insurance products used for the conjoint analysis.  Producers were 
asked to rate each insurance product from 0 (least preferred) to 10 (most preferred) given four 
economic scenarios (See Table 3.4 for Economic Scenarios).  Producers were then asked if they 
would be willing to purchase the product if it were the only one available.  Table 4.22 provides 
the average rating of each product and the number of producers who indicated that they would 
purchase the product.  Most producers maintained the same product rating as the economic 
scenarios changed, but they altered their purchase decisions. Overall, Product 10 was the most 
preferred by respondents across all economic scenarios with an average rating of 8.24 across all 
economic scenarios.  Product 7 was the least preferred overall with an average rating of 2.64. 
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Table 4.22: Revenue Insurance Products Rating and Purchase Information 
 Product Attributes 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Prod. 
Premium| 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Avg. 
Rating 
Times 
Purchased 
Avg.  
Rating
Times 
Purchased
Avg. 
Rating
Times 
Purchased
Avg. 
Rating
Times 
Purchased
1 $2.24|$0.00 90 Days State In Person 7.52 27 7.42 27 7.15 16 7.38 22 
2 $1.25|$5.00 360 Days State Telephone 6.77 24 6.77 24 6.69 15 6.63 16 
3 $0.50|$10.00 180 Days State Internet 5.85 22 5.83 21 5.77 14 5.75 16 
4 $1.25|$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.46 24 6.42 22 6.35 7 6.33 17 
5 $0.50|$10.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 4.21 11 4.21 12 4.10 6 4.21 9 
6 $2.24|$0.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.88 16 4.77 14 4.65 8 4.88 12 
7 $0.50|$10.00 360 Days National In Person 2.73 3 2.67 1 2.52 0 2.67 3 
8 $2.24|$0.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.54 12 4.46 12 4.25 5 4.48 9 
9 $1.25|$5.00 90 Days National Internet 3.04 2 2.96 2 2.83 1 3.04 2 
10 $2.24|$0.00 180 Days State Telephone 8.40 34 8.29 32 8.12 19 8.17 26 
11 $1.25|$5.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.48 7 4.44 6 4.31 4 4.33 4 
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Eleven producers indicated that they would not purchase livestock revenue insurance, 
which means that there were 41 producers who would purchase insurance under at least one 
economic scenario.  Economic Scenario 1 presented producers with market conditions where 
the current cash market price for a 500-pound calf was $90/cwt and the futures price quoted at 
the time insurance was purchased was $100/cwt.  This depicted a situation when the market was 
up and was expected to increase.  The ratings and purchase decisions suggested that these 
conditions were the most favorable for producers to purchase insurance.  Under Scenario 1, the 
average rating for Product 10 was 8.40, which was the highest of all products.  A total of 34 
producers indicated that they would purchase this product.  This represents 65.4 percent of all 
producers and 82.9 percent of the producers who would purchase insurance.  In addition to 
Product 10, Products 1, 2, 3, and 4 all had an average rating above five, which was the median 
rating.  These products would be purchased by at least 53.7 percent of the producers who 
indicated that they would purchase insurance.  Although Products 5, 6, and 8 were rated 
relatively low on average, they were still purchased by 26.8, 39.0, and 29.3 percent of producers 
who would purchase insurance, respectively.  Products 7, 9, and 11 were purchased less 
frequently. 
For Economic Scenario 2, the current cash market price was $70/cwt and the futures 
price quoted was $80/cwt.  This situation showed market prices being relatively low, but 
projected to increase.  This situation was similar to Scenario 1 because the price was increasing 
and the difference in the current price and futures price was $10/cwt.  The average product 
ratings under this scenario were very similar but slightly lower than Economic Scenario 1.  The 
frequency with which products were purchased was only slightly lower than in Scenario 1.  This 
suggests that the price difference and projected direction of prices were more important to a 
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producers purchase decision than whether the market was up or down.  Economic 
Scenarios 1 and 2 suggest that conditions for purchasing insurance were most favorable when 
the futures price quoted was above the current cash market price for beef cattle. 
 Economic Scenario 3 was characterized by a current cash market price of $80/cwt and a 
futures price also quoted at $80/cwt.   This represented a situation where the current price was 
at a moderate level and projected to remain at the same level.  Under this scenario, the overall 
average rating of products was only slightly lower than in Economic Scenarios 1 and 2.  On the 
other hand, the number of producers who would purchase the products decreased considerably 
for each product.  Under this economic scenario, only 13 producers would purchase Product 10, 
the most popular product. This represents an approximate 41 percent decrease in the number of 
producers who would purchase the product.  Several producers indicated that they would prefer 
taking a chance on the market remaining constant or increasing as opposed to paying a premium 
for an insurance policy in this situation.  These results suggest that livestock revenue insurance 
will not be used extensively when the projected futures price is equivalent to the current cash 
market price for beef cattle.  If the premiums for the insurance were reduced significantly, the 
number of producers interested in purchasing a policy may increase under this scenario. 
 The last scenario presented, Economic Scenario 4, displayed a situation where the 
current cash market price was $100/cwt and the projected futures price was $90/cwt.  This 
situation showed prices near the top of the cycle and projected to decrease.  Again in this 
situation, the average product rating was not drastically different from other scenarios.  The 
number of producers who would purchase the product increased from Economic Scenario 3; 
however, producers would purchase products less frequently than in Economic Scenarios 1 and 
2.  It was observed that producers who utilized video auctions would not normally purchase 
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insurance in this situation.  They indicated that if the current price was $100/cwt and expected 
to decrease, they would market the calves via video auction.  Video auction buyers would be 
willing to purchase calves at or near the current price, which would be above the projected 
futures price.  Most producers favored products with no deductible in this situation.    
 Overall, the results shown in Table 4.16 indicate that the economic scenario will have an 
impact on producers purchase decisions for revenue insurance products.  In situations where 
the price is projected to increase, producers may be more willing to purchase insurance.  When 
the current market price was equivalent to the projected price, producers were more willing to 
take the risk that the price would increase or remain unchanged.        
As previously mentioned, there were a total of eleven producers (about 21 percent) who 
indicated that they would not purchase any of the given revenue insurance products regardless 
of the economic scenario.  Table 4.23 provides some interesting insight into the characteristics 
of producers who would not purchase revenue insurance.  Seven of these producers (63.6 
percent) were over 60 years of age, and six of them (54.5 percent) raised purebred cattle.  
Producers over 60 years of age accounted for 21.9 percent of producers who indicated that they 
would purchase insurance, and 26.8 percent of this group were purebred producers.  When these 
factors were observed in conjunction with each other, it showed that 90.9 percent of non-buyers 
and 43.9 percent of buyers raised purebred cattle and/or were over the age of 60.  Eight 
producers (72.7 percent) who would not purchase insurance indicated that they felt the current 
risk management strategies available to producers were adequate, while only 34.1 percent of 
producers who would purchase insurance had the same response.  Almost 73 percent of 
producers who would not purchase insurance and 70.8 percent of producers who would 
purchase insurance had debt-to-asset ratios of 20 percent or less.  The table shows that 54.5 
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percent of non-buyers and 48.8 percent of buyers indicated that farming was not their primary 
source of income.  There were 45.5 percent of non-buyers who indicated that they never 
checked futures prices for beef cattle, which was compared to only 0.7% of buyers who had the 
same response.   The producers education level tended to have little impact on the purchase 
decision. 
Table 4.23:  Characteristics of Producers Who Would Not Purchase Insurance. 
Characteristic 
Non-Buyers 
(11 Total) 
Buyers 
(41 Total) 
More Than 60 Years of Age 63.6% 21.9% 
Raise Purebred Cattle 54.5% 26.8% 
Either over 60 or Raise Purebred Cattle 90.9% 43.9% 
High School Graduate or Less 54.5% 41.5% 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio of 20% or Less 72.8% 70.8% 
Tend to Avoid Risk in Investment Decisions 63.6% 53.7% 
Less Than Half of Income from Farming 54.5% 48.8% 
Feel That Current Risk Management Tools are Adequate 72.7% 34.1% 
Never Check Futures Prices for Beef Cattle 45.5% 0.73% 
 
 
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Producers rated each of the eleven hypothetical revenue insurance products from 0 (least 
preferred to 10 (most preferred).  The conjoint model was estimated using a two-limit tobit 
procedure with the ratings as the dependent variable.  Since producers evaluated the products 
under four economic scenarios, four separate two-limit tobit models were estimated.  The four 
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scenarios were designed to determine if market conditions would impact producers preferences 
for livestock revenue insurance products.  For each model there were 52 respondents who rated 
10 products yielding 520 observations for the model.  The general specification for the model to 
be estimated for the four economic scenarios follows: 
[19] Rij = β0 + β1 PRE224 + β2PRE125 + β3PL90 + β4PL180 + β5PSST + β6 PSRG 
             +β7 MMIP + β8 MMTP  
In equation 19, Rij is the rating given by the ith individual for the jth product profile, β0 is a 
constant term, and βi represents the part worth estimates for each of the given attributes.  The 
right-hand side variables in the model are explained as follows: PRE224 and PRE125 represent 
the Premium|Deductible combinations of $2.24|$0.00 and $1.25|$5.00, respectively; PL90 and 
PL180 represent the 90 and 180 day Policy Lengths, respectively; PSST and PSRG denote the 
state and regional Price Series, respectively; and MMIP and MMTP represent the in-person and 
telephone Methods of Marketing, respectively.  Mean deviation coding was used to input all 
explanatory variables in the model.  This procedure assigned a value of 1 to the attribute level 
present in the product and a 0 to all other levels.  If the base attribute level was in the product, a 
1 was entered for each of the other attribute levels for that attribute. For this model, the base 
product had a $0.50/$10.00 per hundredweight Premium/Deductible, a 360 day Policy Length, a 
national Price Series, and was marketed via the Internet.   
4.2.1.  Conjoint Model Results 
Tables 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27 present the results of the two-limit tobit model for 
Economic Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  All economic scenarios were based on the 
market price for a 500-pound calf.  Economic Scenario 1 presented producers with a situation 
where the current cash price for a 500-pound calf was $90/cwt and the futures price was 
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$100/cwt.    In Economic Scenario 1, the market was nearing the top of the cycle.  In Economic 
Scenario 2, the market was also predicted to increase, but the cash market prices were at a lower 
level.  For this scenario, the cash price was $70/cwt and the futures price was $80/cwt.  The 
predicted direction of the market and the difference between the cash and futures prices were 
the same for Scenarios 1 and 2.   Economic Scenario 3 described a situation where the market 
was predicted to stay at the current level.  The cash price was $80/cwt and the futures price was 
$80/cwt.  Economic Scenario 4 showed the market at a high point on the cycle, but it was 
predicted to decrease.  The cash price was $100/cwt and the futures price was $90/cwt.  The 
results for the models from the four economic scenarios were compared in the discussion to 
determine if preferences for insurance products would change under different economic 
conditions.      
The coefficients of the explanatory variables denote the part worth utility, which relates 
the preference rating to the combinations of various attribute levels.  The coefficient for the 
constant term represents the overall mean preference rating for the model.  The value of the 
constant term is the starting point for calculating the total utility for a given product.  The part 
worth values for the attribute levels of a given product are added to the overall mean to 
determine the total utility for the product.  The results in Tables 4.24  4.27 provide the part 
worth estimates and levels of significance for all three levels of each attribute.  To obtain this 
information, the models were estimated twice with a different base attribute level for each of the 
four attributes.  The values of σ, the standard deviation from the mean, and the log likelihood 
function are also reported in the table.  The actual estimates instead of marginal effects are used 
to determine the part worth utilities for the attributes.  In this situation, the marginal effects are 
equal to the actual estimates multiplied by a constant, which would result in the same relative 
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rating of products when the marginal effects are used (Gillespie et al).  This practice is 
acceptable since utility has no units. 
Tables 4.24 - 4.27 show that the estimated coefficients were very similar for the models 
estimated for the four economic scenarios.  The signs were the same for the part worth utilities 
and the values of the estimates varied slightly in the four models.    The part worth utilities 
estimated for PRE224, PRE50, PL180, PL360, PSST, PSNTMMIP, and MMIT were 
statistically significant at the 1% level in each economic scenario.  The estimated coefficient for 
PRE125 was statistically significant at the 5% level in Economic Scenarios 1, 2, and 3, and it 
was significant at the 10% level in Economic Scenario 4.  The coefficients for PL90, PSRG, and 
MMTP, were not statistically significant in any of the four models.   
 For the Premium|Deductible attribute, the level with a premium of $2.24/cwt and no 
deductible (PRE224) was the most preferred by producers. The PRE224 attribute level had a 
positive effect on producer preference with a part worth utility value that ranged from 0.5789 in 
Economic Scenario 3 to 0.6956 in Economic Scenario 1.  The part worth utility for PRE125 
(Premium|Deductible = $1.25|$5.00) was also positive with a value ranging from 0.2655 in 
Economic Scenario 4 to 0.3517 in Economic Scenario 3.  The PRE50 (Premium|Deductible = 
$0.50|$10.00) attribute level decreased a producers preference for livestock revenue insurance 
products.  The part worth utility estimates ranged from 0.9820 to 0.9306 in Economic 
Scenarios 1 and 3, respectively.  The results suggest that producers preference for a lower 
premium (higher deductible) increases in Economic Scenario 3.  Although PRE224 was the 
preferred attribute level in each scenario, the preference for this attribute level decreased in 
Economic Scenario 3.  The results also indicate that as premium price increases (deductible 
decreases), the preference for the product increases.  While this positive relationship between 
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the premium price and preference may at first seem inconsistent with economic theory, the 
deductible associated with the premium price also influences preference.  In this situation, the 
value derived from the deductible appears to suppress the influence of the premium.  The results 
suggest that producers prefer paying a higher premium for a full price guarantee to paying a 
lower premium for a partial guarantee. 
 The results showed that a 180-day policy length had a positive impact on producer 
preferences, and it was clearly preferred over a 90-day or 360-day policy. The part worth utility 
value for PL180 ranged from 0.5242 in Economic Scenario 4 to 0.5930 in Economic Scenario 
3.   The 90-day and 360-day policy lengths had negative impacts on producer preferences.  The 
90-day policy length was not statistically significant in the model, but the part worth utility 
value ranged from 0.2157 to 0.1438 in Economic Scenarios 3 and 4, respectively.  The 360-
day policy length was the least preferred with part worth values that ranged from 0.3855 in 
Economic Scenario 1 to 0.3774 in Economic Scenario 3.  It was expected that the 180-day 
policy length would be the most popular for cow-calf producers, since it, in general, reflects the 
amount of time needed from birth to get a calf to a weaning weight of around 500 pounds.  
Several producers stated that in the given economic conditions they would prefer taking the risk 
that the market prices would not change a great deal rather than paying a premium for a 90-day 
insurance policy.  Many producers indicated that the planning horizon for a 360-day policy was 
too long, and that they would not want to wait 360 days to recover the cost of the insurance 
premium.  The 90 and 360-day policies represent the extreme values for policy length.  
Producers will likely be able to select policies that extend for periods closer to the 180-day 
length when the insurance is actually available.            
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The results indicated that the producers surveyed had a relatively strong preference for a 
State Price Series. The coefficient for PSST ranged from 1.7334 in Economic Scenario 4 to 
1.8114 in Economic Scenario 2.  The part worth for the Regional Price Series was not 
significant, but it was positive with a range from 0.2638 to 0.0362 in Economic Scenarios 1 and 
2, respectively.  The results showed that an insurance product based on a National Price Series 
had a relatively strong negative impact on Louisiana producer preferences.  The coefficient for 
PSNT ranged from 1.8476 to 1.783 in Economic Scenarios 2 and 4, respectively.  The levels 
of the price series attribute had an ordered preference structure since the state, regional, and 
national prices could be ranked from highest to lowest.  The Price Series denotes the price that 
is compared to the futures price when the insurance policy expires, so a producer will prefer the 
price series that is associated with the lowest average market prices.  If the price associated with 
a given price series is lower than the guaranteed futures price, the producer receives an 
indemnity payment for the difference.  Louisiana producers were expected to prefer a state price 
series since they generally market cattle at prices below the national average.   In states where 
prices are commonly above the national average, producers are expected to prefer a regional or 
national price series.  Experts in the insurance industry suggest that a regional price series is 
anticipated in order for some of the disparity between prices in different states to be reduced.  
The results suggest that Louisiana livestock producers will have a considerably lower 
preference for the product if it is based on a National Price Series. 
For Method of Marketing, producers preferred that the product be marketed in-person, 
which requires the producer to visit an agent each time he purchases a policy.  The part worth 
value for the MMIP attribute was positive and ranged from 0.3731 to 0.4136 in Economic 
Scenarios 3 and 1, respectively.  The coefficient for the Internet Method of Marketing had a 
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negative coefficient, and the part worth value ranged from 0.5895 to 0.5523 in Economic 
Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively.  These results indicate that marketing livestock revenue 
insurance through the Internet was not attractive to most producers.  The producers surveyed 
preferred more personal contact when purchasing an insurance product.  For insurers, the 
Internet would be the least expensive method for marketing insurance and marketing products 
in person would possibly be the most expensive due to the transactions costs involved with 
selling the product.    
The results indicated that producer preferences for certain products did not change 
drastically because of different market conditions. The constant term, which provides the 
average rating of all products, ranges from 4.9675 in Economic Scenario 3 to 5.1681 in 
Economic Scenario 1.  The majority of the producers surveyed indicated that they would not 
change their preference rating for the products because of the economic situation; however, 
their purchase decision did change in many cases.   
A two-limit tobit model that included the ratings for the four economic scenarios was 
estimated to determine whether the economic scenario had a significant impact on the 
producers preference rating.  The combined model (all four economic scenarios) was estimated 
similarly to the models for separate economic scenarios.  In the combined model, dummy 
variables were included in the model to represent each of the four economic scenarios.  The 
dummy variable for Economic Scenario 4 was used as the base in the model.  If the coefficient 
representing a particular economic scenario is statistically significant, then the economic 
scenario has a significant influence on producer preference ratings.  Each economic scenario 
consisted of 520 observations, which resulted in 2,080 observations for the combined model 
(520  4 = 2,080).  The results of the combined model are presented in Table 4.28. 
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Table 4.24:   Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Economic Scenario 1. 
(Current Cash Price = $90/cwt and Futures Price = $100/cwt) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 5.1681*** 0.0978 52.8500 0.0000 
PRE224 0.6956*** 0.1344 5.1780 0.0000 
PRE125 0.2863** 0.1402 2.0430 0.0411 
PRE50 -0.9820*** 0.1402 -7.0060 0.0000 
PL90 -0.1816 0.1406 -1.2920 0.1963 
PL180 0.5671*** 0.1340 4.2330 0.0000 
PL360 -0.3855*** 0.1405 -2.7430 0.0061 
PSST 1.8020*** 0.1344 13.4030 0.0000 
PSRG 0.2638 1.1398 0.1890 0.8503 
PSNT -1.8283*** 0.1402 -13.0410 0.0000 
MMIP 0.4136*** 0.1408 2.9380 0.0033 
MMTP 0.1649 0.1341 1.2290 0.2190 
MMIT -0.5785*** 0.1399 -4.1350 0.0000 
σ 2.1577*** 0.0727 29.6680 0.0000 
Log Likelihood -1079.852    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.25: Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Economic Scenario 2. 
        (Current Cash Price = $70/cwt and Futures Price = $80/cwt) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 5.1069*** 0.0995 51.3510 0.0000 
PRE224 0.6406*** 0.1366 4.6910 0.0000 
PRE125 0.3028** 0.1425 2.1240 0.0336 
PRE50 -0.9434*** 0.1426 -6.6180 0.0000 
PL90 -0.1930 0.1429 -1.3510 0.1767 
PL180 0.5762*** 0.1362 4.2310 0.0000 
PL360 -0.3832*** 0.1429 -2.6820 0.0073 
PSST 1.8114*** 0.1367 13.2530 0.0000 
PSRG 0.0362 0.1422 0.2550 0.7989 
PSNT -1.8476*** 0.1426 -12.9550 0.0000 
MMIP 0.4009*** 0.1431 2.8020 0.0051 
MMTP 0.1886 0.1363 1.3830 0.1665 
MMIT -0.5895*** 0.1423 -4.1420 0.0000 
σ 2.1939*** 0.0741 29.6150 0.0000 
Log Likelihood -1086.819    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.26:  Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Economic Scenario 3. 
           (Current Cash Price = $80/cwt and Futures Price = $80/cwt) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 4.9675*** 0.1011 49.1530 0.0000 
PRE224 0.5789*** 0.1387 4.1740 0.0000 
PRE125 0.3517** 0.1448 2.4290 0.0151 
PRE50 -0.9306*** 0.1449 -6.4230 0.0000 
PL90 -0.2157 0.1452 -1.4850 0.1374 
PL180 0.5930*** 0.1384 4.2860 0.0000 
PL360 -0.3774*** 0.1452 -2.5980 0.0094 
PSST 1.8022*** 0.1388 12.9880 0.0000 
PSRG 0.0788 0.1445 0.5450 0.5856 
PSNT -1.8810*** 0.1450 -12.9770 0.0000 
MMIP 0.3731** 0.1455 2.5640 0.0103 
MMTP 0.1792 0.1384 1.2940 0.1955 
MMIT -0.5523*** 0.1446 -3.8200 0.0001 
σ 2.2292*** 0.07505 29.705 0.0000 
Log Likelihood -1096.753    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.27: Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Economic Scenario 4. 
(Current Cash Price = $100/cwt and Futures Price = $90/cwt) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 5.0924*** 0.1020 49.9310 0.0000 
PRE224 0.6908*** 0.1401 4.9300 0.0000 
PRE125 0.2655* 0.1462 1.8170 0.0693 
PRE50 -0.9563*** 0.1461 -6.5450 0.0000 
PL90 -0.1438 0.1467 -0.9800 0.3269 
PL180 0.5242*** 0.1397 3.7530 0.0002 
PL360 -0.3803*** 0.1465 -2.5960 0.0094 
PSST 1.7334*** 0.1401 12.3710 0.0000 
PSRG 0.0634 0.1459 0.4340 0.6640 
PSNT -1.7967*** 0.1462 -12.2890 0.0000 
MMIP 0.3996*** 0.1469 2.7210 0.0065 
MMTP 0.1527 0.1398 1.0930 0.2746 
MMIT -0.5524*** 0.1459 -3.7850 0.0002 
σ 2.2499*** 0.7587 29.6560 0.00000 
Log Likelihood -1100.191    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.28:  Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Model Including All Economic 
Scenarios. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 5.0838*** 0.0984 51.6760 0.0000 
PRE224 0.6515*** 0.0687 9.4770 0.0000 
PRE125 0.3016*** 0.0717 4.2050 0.0000 
PL90 -0.1836** 0.0719 -2.5520 0.0107 
PL180 0.5651*** 0.0686 8.2440 0.0000 
PSST 1.7874*** 0.0688 25.9870 0.0000 
PSRG 0.0511 0.0716 0.7140 0.4753 
MMIP 0.3966*** 0.0721 5.5050 0.0000 
MMTP 0.1715** 0.0686 2.4990 0.0125 
D1 0.0909 0.1383 0.6570 0.5112 
D2 0.0274 0.1383 0.1980 0.8428 
D3 -0.1184 0.1383 -0.8560 0.3917 
σ 2.2086*** 0.0372 59.3220 0.0000 
Log Likelihood -4364.638    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
In the combined model, all part worth estimates were statistically significant at the 5% 
level except for the Regional Price Series (PSRG) and the dummy variables for Economic 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (D1, D2, and D3).  The signs for coefficients were the same as the models 
estimated for individual economic scenarios.  The part worth estimates for the 90-day Policy 
Length (PL90) and the dummy variable representing Economic Scenario 3 (D3) were negative 
and all other part worth estimates in the model were positive.  Although D3 had a negative sign, 
the estimate was not statistically significant.  These results suggest that the economic scenario 
does not have a significant impact on the producers preference rating for a product.     
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4.2.1.1. Total Utility 
The total utility for any product can be determined by summing the value of the constant 
term and the part worth utility values for the attributes in the given product.  Appendix Tables 
G.1  G.4 provide the ranking, estimated utility, and the estimated number of times purchased 
for the 81 possible products under each of the four economic scenarios.  Excel spreadsheets 
were used to calculate the total utility and rank the products in descending order.  The total 
utility for each product was calculated by summing the part worth utility values for the 
attributes associated with the product.  The ranking of some products differed somewhat across 
economic scenarios due to variations in the part worth utility values across scenarios.  The 
highest and lowest ranked products were the same for all four scenarios, but the estimated 
utility and the number of times purchased differed for each scenario.  
To determine the number of products purchased, OLS estimates from individual 
conjoint models were used to calculate each individuals total utility for the 81 products.  Once 
the total utility was calculated, the lowest product rating at which each producer would purchase 
insurance was observed and compared to the total utility rating for each product.  If the 
individuals total utility for the product was greater than the lowest rating at which purchasing 
began, then the respondent would purchase the product.  The total utility was rounded to the 
nearest whole number to determine whether the product would be purchased.  For example, if 
the lowest rating at which the producer would purchase was six, a total utility value of 5.5 or 
greater would mean that the product would be purchased.  The individual purchase decisions 
were then summed for each product.  This process was duplicated for each economic scenario.  
Some products that were ranked higher were purchased less frequently as a result of the ratings 
provided by producers who would not purchase insurance under any conditions.     
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The highest-ranked product had a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt, a 180-day 
policy length, a state price series, and an in person method of marketing.  This product had 
estimated total utilities of 8.65, 8.54, 8.31, and 8.44 in Economic Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively.   Thirty-four respondents (65.4 percent) indicated that they would purchase the 
highest-ranked product in Economic Scenario 1.  The product would be purchased less 
frequently in other economic conditions.  The product would be purchased by 31, 17, and 25 
respondents in Economic Scenarios 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  The least favorite product 
consisted of a Premium|Deductible of $0.50|$10.00/cwt, a 360-day policy length, a national 
price series, and an Internet method of marketing.   This product had estimated utilities of 1.39, 
1.37, 1.23, and 1.41 in Economic Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.   One producer would 
purchase the product for Economic Scenarios 1 and 4, and no producers indicated that they 
would purchase the product in Economic Scenarios 2 and 3.   The results suggest that the 
market conditions associated with Economic Scenario 3 are the least favorable for producer 
preferences for livestock revenue insurance.  
4.2.1.2 Relative Importance of Attributes 
The relative importance of product attributes was calculated using the part worth utility 
values from the two-limit tobit models.  To determine the relative importance of a given 
attribute, one must first identify the levels of each attributes highest and lowest part-worth 
utility values.  The difference between the highest and lowest values establishes the utility range 
for the given attribute.  Once the utility range for all attributes is determined, the relative 
importance for a particular attribute is calculated by dividing the utility range for the attribute 
by the sum of utility ranges for all attributes (Hair et al.).  Tables 4.29  4.32 provide the 
relative importance for each attribute for Economic Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.  
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The ranking of attributes in terms of relative importance was the same for Economic 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 4.  However, for Economic Scenario 3, the relative importance of the least 
important attribute was different from the other scenarios.  The tables show that the percentage 
that each attribute adds to preference ratings was very similar for all economic scenarios.  The 
most important attribute was the Price Series followed by the Premium, Method of Marketing, 
and Policy Length.  The results of the relative importance evaluation for the Price Series and 
Premium attributes were consistent with a priori expectations.  The Price Series and Premium 
attributes were expected to be the most important because they are directly related to the cost of 
purchasing the policy and the revenue received from an insurance policy.  However, it was 
expected that the policy length attribute would be relatively more important than the method of 
marketing attribute.    
The Price Series attribute contributed in excess of 50 percent to the preference rating for 
a product in all four economic scenarios.  This attribute accounted for between 50.06 percent 
and 51.96 percent of the preference rating in Economic Scenarios 1 and 3, respectively.  In 
producer interviews, most producers would first group the insurance products according to the 
state, regional, and national price series attribute levels.  These results suggest that the price 
series selected for livestock revenue insurance products will have a large impact on producer 
preferences and the overall success of marketing efforts.  
Premium|Deductible was the second most important attribute in the conjoint analysis.  
This attribute contributed between 21.30 and 23.42 percent to the preference rating in Economic 
Scenarios 3 and 4, respectively.  The Policy Length and Method of Marketing attributes 
contributed similar amounts to the preference rating of products.  In three scenarios, the Method 
of Marketing attribute contributed more to the preferences than the Policy Length.  The 
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contribution that Method of Marketing made to ratings ranged from 13.05 percent in Economic 
Scenario 3 to 13.77 percent in Economic Scenario 2.  The relative importance for Policy Length 
ranged from 12.86 percent in Economic Scenario 4 to 13.69 in Economic Scenario 3.  The 
relative importance of Method of Marketing and Policy Length were very similar in all 
economic scenarios.   
Table 4.29: Relative Importance of Attributes for Economic Scenario 1.  
 
Range of 
Part Worths Factor Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.6776 23.13% 
Policy Length 0.9526 13.13% 
Price Series 3.6303 50.06% 
Method of Marketing 0.9921 13.68% 
Sum of Ranges 7.2526  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.30:  Relative Importance of Attributes for Economic Scenario 2.  
 
Range of 
Part Worths Factor Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.5839 22.02% 
Policy Length 0.9595 13.34% 
Price Series 3.6590 50.87% 
Method of Marketing 0.9904 13.77% 
Sum of Ranges 7.1928  
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Table 4.31: Relative Importance of Attributes for Economic Scenario 3.  
 
Range of 
Part Worths Factor Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.5095 21.30% 
Policy Length 0.9704 13.69% 
Price Series 3.6832 51.96% 
Method of Marketing 0.9254 13.05% 
Sum of Ranges 7.0885  
 
 
Table 4.32: Relative Importance of Attributes for Economic Scenario 4. 
 
Range of 
Part Worths Factor Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.6471 23.42% 
Policy Length 0.9045 12.86% 
Price Series 3.5301 50.19% 
Method of Marketing 0.9520 13.54% 
Sum of Ranges 7.0337  
 
 
4.2.1 Cluster Analysis 
One of the primary objectives of this study was to identify the types of producers who 
prefer certain livestock revenue insurance products.  For this study, cluster analysis was used to 
classify producers into relatively homogeneous groups according to their individual part worth 
utility values for insurance products.  The overall goal of cluster analysis is to maximize the 
homogeneity within clusters while maximizing the heterogeneity between clusters.  The 
conjoint model was estimated on the individual level to determine the part worth utility values 
for each of the 52 producers in the sample.  When the model was estimated using the two-limit 
tobit procedure, the model did not converge for 21 of the 52 respondents (40.4 percent).  Upon 
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inspecting the actual data for the 20 respondents whose models had convergence problems, it 
was discovered that these producers did not rate products at the limit values of 0 and 10.  This 
combined with the fact that the individual models had only one degree of freedom provided an 
explanation for the convergence problem.  The fact that about 40 percent of respondents did not 
rate products using the limit values provided justification for estimating the part worth values 
for each individual producer using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression.  The OLS models 
were estimated with actual rating as the dependent variable, and PRE224, PRE125, PL90, 
PL180, PSST, PSRG, MMIP, and MMTP used as explanatory variables. 
Appendix H provides the results for the test for internal model validity using Pearson 
Correlation coefficients.  The test was conducted based upon the actual and predicted values of 
the holdout card (Product 11).  The predicted total utility for the holdout card was calculated 
and compared to the actual rating for each producer.  The internal validity was tested for each of 
the four economic scenarios.  The Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Economic Scenarios 1, 
2, 3, and 4 were 0.6650, 0.6481, 0.6499, and 0.7408, respectively.  These results suggest that 
there was a relatively strong correlation between the actual and predicted utility values for the 
holdout card.   
The part worth estimates for the 52 respondents were used as variables for the cluster 
analysis.  The data were analyzed in SPSS using a hierarchical agglomerative procedure known 
as Wards Method.  Wards method is designed to optimize the minimum variance within 
clusters using squared Euclidean distance measures (Aldenderfer and Blashfield).  Appendix 
Table I.1 shows the results of Wards Method for grouping producers into as many as five 
clusters.   
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There is no statistical test that has been designed to determine the number of clusters 
present in a data set, but there are some basic approaches used to select the number of clusters.  
A starting point for identifying clusters is observing the number of cases in each cluster as the 
number of clusters increases.  In Appendix Table I.1, the move from a four to a five-cluster 
solution results in only two producers moving to the fifth cluster.  This result suggests that the 
solution should be less than a five-cluster solution.  Another process that was used as a guide in 
selecting the number of clusters was observing changes in the value of fusion coefficients.  
Small fusion coefficients indicate that fairly homogeneous clusters are being combined, while 
large coefficients indicate that quite dissimilar clusters are being combined.  As a rule of thumb, 
a significant jump in the value of the coefficients indicates a stopping point for the number of 
clusters that should be defined (Norusis).   Appendix Table I.2 shows the agglomerative 
schedule for Wards Method.  The table provides the cases being combined at each stage, the 
stage a cluster is first formed, and the fusion coefficients.  According to the stopping rule, a 
significant jump was recognized between stages 49 and 50, the four-cluster and three-cluster 
solutions.  The coefficients showed a 50-unit difference between stages 49 and 50 compared to 
a 26-unit change between stages 48 and 49.  The sizeable difference in coefficients implies that 
the three-cluster solution will exhibit the greatest degree of heterogeneity between groups. 
Based on these findings, the three-cluster solution was selected for this analysis. 
Wards Method grouped a total of 13 producers into Cluster 1, 17 producers into Cluster 
2, and 22 producers into Cluster 3.  Descriptive statistics, difference-in-means tests, and two-
limit tobit models for each cluster were used to further compare and investigate the 
heterogeneity between clusters.   Several external variables (variables not used in the cluster 
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analysis) were compared through descriptive statistics and difference-in-means tests to validate 
the clusters identified.   
4.2.2.1 Two-Limit Tobit Models 
Two-limit tobit models were estimated for each cluster to determine differences in part 
worth utilities and the relative importance of attributes.  Some distinct differences were 
expected between models for each cluster because the part worth estimates were used to 
identify the clusters.  These results provide valuable insight into the preference structure and 
type of producers who make up each cluster.   The results of the two-limit tobit models for the 
three clusters are provided in Tables 4.33  4.35. 
There were 13 producers in Cluster 1, which produced a total of 130 observations for the 
model (13 producers  10 products).  The part worth estimates for PRE125, PRE50, PL90, 
PL180, PSST, PSNT, and MMIT are all statistically significant at the 1% level, and the part 
worth for MMTP is significant at the 10% level.  The constant term indicates that producers in 
Cluster 1 provided an overall average rating of 4.9973 for all products. 
Respondents in Cluster 1 indicated a strong preference for a Premium|Deductible 
combination of $1.25|$5.00/cwt (See Table 4.33).   The PRE125 attribute level showed a 
positive impact with a part worth utility value of 1.1090.  The part worth values for PRE224 and 
PRE50 indicated that these attribute levels had a negative impact on producers preferences for 
insurance products.  Although the coefficient for PRE224 was insignificant, the part worth 
value was -0.3436, and the coefficient for PRE50 was 0.7037.  These results are not consistent 
with findings in the overall model where PRE224 was the most preferred level of the 
Premium|Deductible attribute.  This suggests that producers in Cluster 1 were less concerned 
about a full price guarantee. 
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For the Policy Length attribute, a 180-day policy made the highest positive contribution 
with a part worth of 1.3025.  Producers in this cluster had a relatively strong aversion to 
products with a 90-day policy length.  The part worth utility value for a 90-day policy length 
was 1.2265.  The coefficient for a 360-day was insignificant; however, it indicated a negative 
contribution of  0.1140 to the overall utility for the product. 
The State Price Series had a strong positive effect on the producers preference for an 
insurance product.  The part worth utility value for the State attribute level was 1.3559, which 
represents the largest contribution to preferences made by any attribute level.  The Regional 
Price Series was insignificant, but it showed a positive effect of 0.2225.  The National Price 
Series had a strong negative effect on the producers preference with a part worth utility value 
of 1.4729. 
Table 4.33: Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Cluster 1. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 4.9973*** 0.1810 27.6040 0.0000 
PRE224 -0.3436 0.2480 -1.3850 0.1659 
PRE125 1.1090*** 0.2608 4.2520 0.0000 
PRE50 -0.7037*** 0.2458 -2.8630 0.0042 
PL90 -1.2265*** 0.2590 -4.7360 0.0000 
PL180 1.3025*** 0.2480 5.2530 0.0000 
PL360 -0.1140 0.2458 -0.4640 0.6429 
PSST 1.3559*** 0.2486 5.4530 0.0000 
PSRG 0.2225 0.2589 0.8600 0.3899 
PSNT -1.4729*** 0.2458 -5.9930 0.0000 
MMIP 0.2148 0.2594 0.8280 0.4077 
MMTP 0.4643* 0.2485 1.8680 0.0617 
MMIT -0.6781*** 0.2458 -2.7590 0.0058 
σ 1.9995*** 0.1337 14.9580 0.0000 
Log likelihood -263.7424    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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For the Method of Marketing attribute, producers in Cluster 1 indicated that the 
telephone was the most preferred method.  The MMTP attribute indicated a positive 
contribution of 0.4643 to the producers preference for insurance products.  The coefficient for 
the In Person attribute level was insignificant but showed a positive contribution.  The Internet 
Method of Marketing had a negative effect on the producers preference with a part worth value 
of 0.6781.  The most preferred method of marketing in the overall model was In Person.     
Table 4.34 provides the results of the two-limit tobit model for Cluster 2.  Cluster 2 
contained 17 producers, so there were 170 observations in the two-limit tobit model.  The part 
worth utility estimates for PRE224, PRE50, PL260, PSST, and PSNT were all statistically 
significant at the 1% level, and the part worth estimate for MMIT was significant at the 5% 
level.  The constant term shows that the overall mean rating of products was 5.65 for producers 
in Cluster 2, which was higher than the overall mean for Cluster 1. 
Producers in Cluster 2 showed that a premium of $2.24/cwt and a $0.00/cwt deductible 
would greatly increase their preference for an insurance product.  The PRE224 attribute level 
had a part worth utility value of 1.4092.  This part worth utility value represented the largest 
contribution of any attribute to the preference rating of the product.  Producers in this cluster 
indicated that a product with a premium of $1.25/cwt and a deductible of $5.00/cwt had a 
relatively strong negative effect on preferences for an insurance product.  The PRE50 attribute 
level had a part worth utility 1.2663.   
For the Policy Length attribute, the part worth utility values for the 90-day and 180-day 
policies were positive with similar values, but they were insignificant in this model.  A product 
with a 360-day policy length had a negative effect of 0.6760 on the producers preference.   
This suggests that producers were fairly indifferent between the 90 and 180-day policies, but 
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were not interested in a 360-day policy.  In the overall model and in Cluster 1, the 180-day 
policy was clearly favored over other policy lengths. 
The Price Series attribute showed that the State Price Series had a positive effect of 
0.8026 on the respondents preferences.  The National Price Series had a part worth value of 
0.9004, indicating a negative impact on the respondents preference for an insurance product.   
The part worth utility value for the Regional Price Series was positive, but it was not significant 
in this model.  Although the State Price Series had a positive impact, the contribution to 
preferences was much lower for producers in Cluster 2 than for the overall model.  
Table 4.34:  Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Cluster 2.  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error β/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 5.6478*** 0.1614 34.9870 0.0000 
PRE224 1.4092*** 0.2229 6.3210 0.0000 
PRE125 -0.1429 0.2309 -0.6190 0.5360 
PRE50 -1.2663*** 0.2310 -5.4810 0.0000 
PL90 0.3391 0.2327 1.4570 0.1451 
PL180 0.3369 0.2216 1.5200 0.1285 
PL360 -0.6760*** 0.2315 -2.9200 0.0035 
PSST 0.8026*** 0.2224 3.6090 0.0003 
PSRG 0.0978 0.2313 0.4230 0.6724 
PSNT -0.9004*** 0.2309 -3.8990 0.0001 
MMIP 0.3545 0.2327 1.5230 0.1277 
MMTP 0.2013 0.2218 0.9080 0.3640 
MMIT -0.5558** 0.2312 -2.4040 0.0162 
σ 2.0393*** 0.1204 16.9420 0.0000 
Log likelihood -344.9693    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Producers in Cluster 2 preferred the In Person Method of Marketing; however, the part 
worth utility value for this attribute (0.3545) was not statistically significant in this model.  The 
Telephone Method of Marketing also indicated a positive contribution to preferences, but it was 
not significant in the model.  Producers in Cluster 2 indicated that the Internet Method of 
Marketing would have a negative effect of 0.5558 on preferences for a product. 
 Cluster 3 was the largest cluster with 22 producers yielding 220 observations for the 
two-limit tobit model.  The results of the two-limit tobit model for Cluster 3 are provided in 
Table 4.35.  The model for Cluster 3 showed that the part worth utility estimates for PRE224, 
PRE50, PSST, PSNT, MMIP, and MMIT were all statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
the coefficient for PL180 was significant at the 10% level.  The coefficient for the constant term 
indicates that the average overall rating by respondents in Cluster 3 was 4.9091. 
 For the Premium|Deductible attribute, the $2.24|$0.00/cwt level provided the largest 
positive effect on producer preferences with a part worth utility value of 0.7519.  The part worth 
utility value for the $1.25|$5.00/cwt level was also positive but not significant in this model.  
Respondents indicated a relatively strong aversion to the $0.50|$10.00/cwt level of the attribute.  
The part worth utility value of PRE50 was 0.9152.  The order of preference for these attribute 
levels was consistent with the overall model.  
 The 180-day Policy Length was the preferred attribute level for producers in Cluster 3.  
The 180-day attribute made a positive contribution to producer preferences with a part worth 
utility value of 0.3025.  Neither the 90-day nor 360-day Policy Lengths were significant in this 
model, but they both indicated a negative contribution to preferences with part worth utility 
values of 0.0429 and 0.2596, respectively. 
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 In Cluster 3, the State Price Series level shows the highest positive contribution to 
producer preferences with a part worth utility value of 2.7884.  The Regional Price Series level 
had a negative effect on producer preferences, but the coefficient is insignificant in the model 
for this cluster.  The results also show that the National Price Series level had a large negative 
impact on producer preferences for an insurance product.  The PSNT attribute level exhibits a 
part worth utility value of 2.6570.  These results suggest that producers in Cluster 3 would 
receive a low level of satisfaction from products with a National Price Series.    
Table 4.35:  Two-Limit Tobit Part Worth Estimates for Cluster 3.  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] 
Constant 4.9091*** 0.1224 40.1090 0.0000 
PRE224 0.7519*** 0.1679 4.4770 0.0000 
PRE125 0.1633 0.1752 0.9320 0.3511 
PRE50 -0.9152*** 0.1754 -5.2170 0.0000 
PL90 -0.0429 0.1763 -0.2430 0.8078 
PL180 0.3025* 0.1674 1.8080 0.0707 
PL360 -0.2596 0.1758 -1.4770 0.1396 
PSST 2.7884*** 0.1682 16.5780 0.0000 
PSRG -0.1313 0.1745 -0.7530 0.4517 
PSNT -2.6570*** 0.1757 -15.1220 0.0000 
MMIP 0.5659*** 0.1768 3.2020 0.0014 
MMTP -0.0578 0.1675 -0.3450 0.7300 
MMIT -0.5081*** 0.1747 -2.9080 0.0036 
σ 1.7104*** 0.0911 18.7800 0.0000 
Log likelihood -388.6409    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Producers in Cluster 3 preferred that the products be marketed In Person.  The MMIP 
shows a positive contribution to preferences with a part worth utility value of 0.5659.  The 
Telephone Method of Marketing showed a negative part worth value of 0.0578, but the 
parameter was insignificant in the model for this cluster.  The results indicate the Internet 
Method of Marketing would have a negative effect on producer preferences with a part worth 
utility value of 0.5081. 
The results of the two-limit tobit models for the three clusters point out some distinct 
differences in preference for livestock revenue insurance products.  Appendix Tables I.3  I.6 
show the average rating and the number of times each of the products would be purchased by 
producers for each cluster under the four economic scenarios. 
4.2.2.2 Relative Importance 
The relative importance of attributes was calculated based on the models for the three 
clusters.  The results were compared to determine whether the relative importance of attributes 
differs for producers in different clusters.  Tables 4.36 to 4.38 provide the results of the relative 
importance calculations for the three clusters.  
 Table 4.36 indicates that Price Series was the most important attribute for producers in 
Cluster 1.  Price Series contributed 34.0 percent to the preference rating of the product.  
Following Price Series, the second most important attribute was Policy Length, which 
contributed 30.4 percent to the preference rating of the product.  Producers in Cluster 1 ranked 
Premium third in terms of importance.  The premium|deductible contributed 21.8 percent to the 
preference for the product.   The least important attribute for producers in Cluster 1 was the 
Method of Marketing, with a contribution of 13.7 percent.  In the overall model, Price Series 
was the most important attribute, but Policy Length was the least important attribute.  In the 
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overall model, producers ranked premium|deductible second in terms of relative importance. 
The results indicate that   producers in Cluster 1 place relatively more emphasis on the policy 
length than producers in other clusters.         
Table 4.36: Relative Importance of Attributes for Cluster 1.  
 
Range of 
Part Worths 
Factor 
Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.8127 21.81% 
Policy Length 2.5289 30.42% 
Price Series 2.8288 34.03% 
Method of Marketing 1.1424 13.74% 
Sum of Ranges 8.3128  
 
 
 
Table 4.37 presents the relative importance of attributes for producers in Cluster 2.  In 
this cluster, the most important attribute was Premium|Deductible, accounting for 42.4 percent 
of the preference rating.  The Price Series was the second most important attribute, with a 
contribution of 27.0 percent to the preference rating.  The least important attributes for 
producers in this cluster were Policy Length, followed by the Method of Marketing.  The 
contribution to the preference rating made by Policy Length and Method of Marketing were 
16.1 percent and 14.4 percent, respectively.  Cluster 2 represents the only group of producers 
who placed relatively more emphasis on the premium|deductible than the price series.  The 
results indicate that producers in Cluster 2 were most concerned about the premium|deductible 
when evaluating a revenue insurance product.  Producers in Cluster 2 showed a strong 
preference for products with zero deductible. Producers in this cluster may be willing to accept 
products with either a Regional or a National Price Series. 
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Table 4.37: Relative Importance of Attributes for Cluster 2. 
 
Range of 
Part Worths 
Factor 
Importance 
Premium|Deductible 2.6756 42.44% 
Policy Length 1.0151 16.10% 
Price Series 1.7029 27.01% 
Method of Marketing 0.9103 14.44% 
Sum of Ranges 6.3039  
 
 
Table 4.38 provides the evaluation of relative attribute importance for producers in 
Cluster 3.  The results show that the Price Series provides a tremendous contribution to relative 
importance for producers in Cluster 3.  The Price Series contributed 62.2 percent to the 
preference rating of the products.  The second most important attribute was premium|deductible, 
which accounted for 19.1 percent of the preference rating.     The Method of Marketing was the 
third most important attribute with a contribution of 12.3 percent to the preference rating.  The 
least important attribute was the policy length, which accounted for 6.4 percent of the 
preference rating.  The results suggest that producers in this cluster are greatly influenced by the 
price series for the product.   These producers are less likely to purchase products unless the 
State Price Series is available.  Producers in this cluster showed diversity in terms of the 
attribute combinations preferred in a product, but all producers would prefer the State Price 
Series.  
Table 4.38: Relative Importance of Attributes for Cluster 3.  
 
Range of 
Part Worths 
Factor 
Importance 
Premium|Deductible 1.6670 19.05% 
Policy Length 0.5621 6.43% 
Price Series 5.4454 62.24% 
Method of Marketing 1.0740 12.28% 
Sum of Ranges 8.7486  
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The above tables show that producers in each cluster place emphasis on different 
product attributes when rating the insurance products.  The cluster analysis provides valuable 
information that can be used to further segment the market, and identify producers who are 
interested in certain products.  Insurers can use the information from the cluster analysis to 
assist with product design and target market identification.  The descriptive statistics helped to 
validate the heterogeneity that existed between the three clusters.    
4.2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Clusters   
Descriptive statistics were used to provide insight on the characteristics of producers 
grouped in each cluster.  Difference-in-means tests were performed to determine whether there 
were significant differences between variables representing characteristics of operations in the 
different clusters.  The difference-in-means test uses a t-test to determine the significance of the 
difference in two population means when the variances are unknown and unequal (Kanji).  The 
results for difference-in-means tests performed on variables used to describe producer 
characteristics are provided.     
The majority of the producers (75 percent) in the overall sample were sole proprietors.  
Sole proprietors bear all of the risk and receive all of the benefits associated with livestock 
production.  In other business structures, such as partnerships, cooperatives, and corporations, 
the amount of risk associated with production is spread across more than one individual.  
Consequently, it is possible for preference for insurance products to be different for sole 
proprietors as compared to other business structures. Table 4.39 shows the results of the 
difference-in-means test to determine whether there were significant differences between 
clusters for sole proprietorships versus other business structures.   The test indicated that the 
differences in business structures between Clusters 2 and 3 and Clusters 1 and 3 were 
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significant at the 10% level.  There was no significant difference found between Clusters 1 and 
2.  Sole proprietors represented 84.6 percent and 82.4 percent of producers in Clusters 1 and 2, 
respectively, while 63.6 percent of producers in Cluster 3 were sole proprietors. 
When compared to Clusters 1 and 2, Cluster 3 showed the greatest amount of diversity 
among producers in terms of business structure.  In general, farms operated under alternative 
business structures, such as partnerships, corporations, or cooperatives, are larger than average.  
Producers in Cluster 3 focus primarily on the price series when rating an insurance product.  
These results suggest that producers who operate under alternative business structures may have 
a greater preference for products with a State Price Series than sole proprietors.   
Table 4.39: Comparison of Means for Business Structure. 
SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP VS OTHER BUSINESS STRUCTURES
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.846154 0.823529 0.636364 
Standard Deviation 0.130178 0.145329 0.231405 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.166058 1.35545* 1.464094* 
v=d.f. 28.70303 38.98553 33.21064 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.40 shows that 30.8 percent of producers in Cluster 1 indicated that farming was 
their primary source of income, while 47.1 percent and 63.6 percent of producers indicated that 
the majority of their income came from farming in Clusters 2 and 3, respectively.  The 
difference-in-means tests concluded that there were no significant differences in the primary 
source of income between Clusters 1 and 2 or Clusters 2 and 3; however, table 4.41 shows that 
the difference between Clusters 1 and 3 was significant at the 5% level. 
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Most producers in Cluster 1 (69.2 percent) had off-farm employment or received the 
majority of their income from a source other than farming.  Producers in this cluster showed a 
strong preference for products that had a Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt.  Producers in 
Cluster 3 preferred products with a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt.  Most producers in 
Cluster 3 (63.6 percent) received the majority of their income from farming.  Producers in 
Cluster 3 showed a strong preference for the product attributes that would provide higher 
indemnity payments in the event of a price decline.  These results suggest that producers who 
do not depend primarily on farm income are less concerned about obtaining the maximum price 
guarantee for their cattle.   Producers who receive the majority of their income from farming 
strongly prefer products with a State Price Series and a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt.  
The preference for a higher premium and lower deductible indicates a greater concern about 
income variability, which is expected given the greater dependence upon farm income.  
Producers in Cluster 1 preferred a Telephone Method of Marketing, while producers in Clusters 
2 and 3 preferred products to be marketed In Person.  This result was expected since livestock 
revenue insurance can be purchased more conveniently by telephone for producers with off-
farm employment.  Producers who work primarily on the farm may have more flexibility to 
purchase insurance in person. 
Table 4.40: Primary Source of Producers Income   
Primary Source 
Farm Other 
 No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 4 30.8% 9 69.2% 
Cluster 2 8 47.1% 9 52.9% 
Cluster 3 14 63.6% 8 36.4% 
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Table 4.41: Comparison of Means for Primary Source of Income. 
Primary Source Of Income 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.307692 0.470588 0.636364 
Variance 0.213018 0.249135 0.231405 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -0.92458 -1.04484 -2.00378** 
v=d.f. 28.9719 35.85114 28.17421 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.42 shows that the producers in Cluster 1 were, on average, older and had been 
operating farms longer than producers in Clusters 2 and 3.  Producers in Cluster 1 had an 
average age of 57.69 years, while producers in Clusters 2 and 3 had average ages of 53.94 and 
51.55 years, respectively.  The average number of years operating a farm ranged from 21.59 in 
Cluster 2 to 29.38 in Cluster 1.  Although the average age of producers was higher for Cluster 2 
than Cluster 3, producers in Cluster 3 had been operating farms an average of four years longer 
than producers in Cluster 2.  The difference-in-means tests concluded that the difference in age 
for producers in Clusters 1 and 3 was significant at the 10% level.  Table 4.43 showed that there 
were no significant differences in age between Clusters 1 and 2 or Clusters 2 and 3. 
Table 4.42:  Average Age and Years Farming by Cluster 
Producer Characteristics 
Average Standard Deviation
Cluster 1   
   Age 57.69 13.51 
   Years Farming 29.38 15.44 
Cluster 2   
   Age 53.94 12.90 
   Years Farming 21.59 14.19 
Cluster 3   
   Age 51.55 9.11 
   Years Farming 25.55 10.57 
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Producers in Cluster 1 were significantly older than producers in Cluster 3.   The results 
of the two-limit tobit models show that producers in Cluster 1 prefer products with a $1.25/cwt 
premium and a $5.00/cwt deductible.  Producers in Cluster 3 prefer a full price guarantee.  
Older producers were, in general, expected to have more wealth than younger producers.  These 
results imply that older producers may be more willing to purchase products with a deductible.  
This may be a result of income from beef cattle being less important to producers in Cluster 1.  
Older producers were expected to prefer the In Person Method of Marketing; however, the 
results showed that producers in Cluster 1 (highest average age) preferred the Telephone 
Method of Marketing.  Producers in Cluster 3 (lowest average age) preferred the In Person 
Method of Marketing.  The fact that more producers in Cluster 1 have off-farm employment 
may have a larger influence than the age of the producer on the preferred method of marketing.  
Table 4.43: Comparison of Means for Producer Age. 
Producer Age 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  57.69231 53.94118 51.54545 
Variance 168.5207 156.6436 79.15702 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t - statistic 0.796538 0.669301 1.510453* 
v=d.f. 27.41636 29.09182 19.8267 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 The education levels of producers in each cluster are presented in Table 4.44.  The 
results show that producers in Cluster 3 have a higher education level than producers in Clusters 
1 and 2.  There were 54.5 percent of producers in Cluster 3 with at least a four-year college 
degree.  Clusters 1 and 2 contained 46.2 percent and 29.4 percent of producers with at least a 
four-year college degree, respectively.  In Cluster 2, the majority (58.8 percent) of producers 
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had a high school diploma or less.  The results of the difference-in-means test presented in table 
4.45 revealed that the difference in education between Clusters 2 and 3 was significant at the 
5% level, and there were no significant differences between Clusters 1 and 2 or Clusters 1 and 
3.    
 Producers in Cluster 2 had the lowest overall level of education.  The two-limit tobit 
results indicated that producers in this cluster had a strong preference for products with a 
Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt.  Producers in Cluster 2 indicated that the premium had 
a greater impact than the price series on their preference rating.  Nearly 50 percent of the 
producers in this cluster indicated that farming was their primary source of income.  The price 
series was important to these producers, but they were more concerned about getting a full price 
guarantee.  Cluster 3 represented producers with the highest education level, and they indicated 
that the price series had, by far, the most impact on their preference rating.  Although producers 
in Cluster 3 had the highest education level, most (63.6 percent) indicated that farming was their 
primary source of income.  It was expected a priori that more educated producers would be less 
dependent upon farm income.  Consequently, more educated producers were expected to prefer 
products with lower premiums and higher deductibles because they would be better able to 
absorb the risk of price declines.  The results suggest that less educated producers prefer 
products with no deductible, which is consistent with a priori expectations.   It was also 
expected a priori that more educated producers would prefer the Telephone or Internet Method 
of Marketing; however, the results indicated that In Person was preferred by producers in 
Cluster 3.  This was likely due to the high proportion in the cluster who depended upon farming 
as their primary source of income.          
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Table 4.44: Education Level of Producers by Cluster. 
Less Than 
High School 
High School 
Graduate 
Some College 
or Technical 
School 
Four-Year 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Cluster 1 2 15.4% 3 23.1% 2 15.4% 5 38.5% 1 7.7% 
Cluster 2 1 5.9% 9 52.9% 2 11.8% 4 23.5% 1 5.9% 
Cluster 3 1 4.5% 7 31.8% 2 9.1% 7 31.8% 5 22.7%
 
 
Table 4.45: Comparison of Means for Producer Education Level. 
Producer Education Level 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  3 2.705882 3.363636 
Standard Deviation 1.538462 1.148789 1.595041 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.682117 -1.75743** -0.83239 
v=d.f. 25.5632 38.68892 27.63753 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Table 4.46 provides the average acreage used for beef cattle production for operations in 
each cluster.  The average acreage of operations in Cluster 3 greatly exceeded that of Clusters 1 
and 2.  Producers in Cluster 3 operated an average of 3,062 acres for beef cattle production.  
The large variance suggests that the average in Cluster 3 may be influenced by a few large 
operations.  The average sizes of operations in Clusters 1 and 2 were 1,215 and 1,180 acres, 
respectively.   
 Producers in Cluster 3 have, on average, the largest operations of the three clusters.  
From the two-limit tobit models, producers in Cluster 3 had the strongest preference for 
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products with a State Price Series.  Although the State Price Series had a positive influence on 
the preference rating for producers in Cluster 2 (smallest average acreage), it was less important 
to producers in Cluster 2 as compared to Clusters 1 and 3.  These results suggest that larger 
operations are more concerned about the price series than smaller operations.   The price series 
determines the size of the indemnity payment received by the producer.  Since larger producers 
depend more on farm income, the price series was expected to be more important to larger 
operations.    
Table 4.46: Comparison of Means for Acreage for Beef Production. 
Acreage For Beef Production 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  1214.769 1180.176 3061.818 
Variance 2339820 1275265 23960835 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.068504 -1.74395** -1.639565* 
v=d.f. 22.75706 24.11911 27.88894 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Another factor related to the size of operations in each cluster is herd size.  Table 4.47 
gives the number and percentage of producers in each herd size category.   Table 4.47 indicates 
that 61.5 percent of producers in Cluster 1 have less than 200 cows.  On the other hand, there 
were 53 percent and 68.2 percent of producers with 200 or more cows in Clusters 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Table 4.48 shows that the average herd size for Cluster 1 was 263.5 cows, while 
the average herd size for Cluster 2 was 251.4 cows.  Producers in Cluster 1 had either relatively 
small herds or large herds, and Cluster 2 consisted of a more balanced group of producers in 
terms of herd size.  The average herd size for Cluster 3 was 546.9 cows, which was 
 171
substantially larger than the other clusters.  The difference in means for herd size was found to 
be statistically significant at the 5% level for Clusters 2 and 3, as well as for Clusters 1 and 3.  
Table 4.47: Herd Size for Each Cluster. 
Herd Size 
 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+ 
 No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 6 46.1% 2 15.4% 0 0.0% 5 38.5% 
Cluster 2 4 23.5% 4 23.5% 6 35.3% 3 17.7% 
Cluster 3 2 9.1% 5 22.7% 7 31.8% 8 36.4% 
 
Table 4.48: Comparison of Means for Herd Size. 
Herd Size 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  263.4615 251.3529 546.9091 
Variance 56358.56 37927.52 479877 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3 
t  statistic 0.149428 -1.90608** -1.75289** 
v=d.f. 24.63149 25.57694 29.03692 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Producers who have multiple enterprises on their operations are expected to be less 
likely to purchase insurance, because risk is usually reduced by enterprise diversification.  Table 
4.49 shows the operations in each cluster that have multiple agricultural enterprises.  Most 
producers who have multiple enterprises have only one other enterprise in addition to beef 
cattle.  A total of 53.8, 35.3, and 59.1 percent of respondents produced more than one 
enterprise, in Clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  The difference-in-means tests shown in table 
4.50 indicated that there were no significant differences in enterprise diversification between 
any of the clusters.  Therefore, enterprise diversification did not have a substantial affect on the 
preference for various product attributes between clusters.  
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Table 4.49:  Enterprise Diversification by Cluster. 
Additional Enterprises 
 1 2 or more 
 No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 6 46.1% 1 7.7% 
Cluster 2 3 17.6% 3 17.6% 
Cluster 3 10 45.5% 3 13.6% 
 
 
Table 4.50: Comparison of Means for Enterprise Diversification. 
Enterprise Diversification 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.307692 0.294118 0.454545 
Variance 0.213018 0.207612 0.247934 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.080271 -1.04691 -0.88306 
v=d.f. 27.77935 37.93482 28.96431 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.51 provides an overview of the various marketing strategies employed by 
producers in each cluster.   The majority of producers in each cluster use the auction barn to 
market at least a portion of their cattle.   Cluster 1 had 53.9 and 46.1 percent of producers who 
marketed cattle through Private Buyers and Select Sales, respectively.  A small percentage (7.7 
percent) of producers in Cluster 1 used Video Auction and 23.1 percent used Retained 
Ownership.  In Cluster 2, 35.3 and 41.2 percent of producers marketed cattle via Video Auction 
and Private Buyers, respectively.  In Cluster 2, 17.6 and 5.9 percent of producers used Retained 
Ownership and Select Sales, respectively.  There were a considerable number of producers in 
Cluster 3 who used each of the different marketing strategies specified.  The most popular 
marketing strategies (excluding Auction Barn) for producers in Cluster 3 were Private Buyer 
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(68.2 percent) and Video Auction (45.5 percent).  In Cluster 3, 27.3, 22.7, and 9.1 percent of 
producers marketed cattle through Retained Ownership, Select Sales, and the Internet, 
respectively.   Producers who use diverse marketing strategies are able to reduce price-related 
risk considerably.  The knowledge of these strategies may have a positive impact on producers 
decisions to purchase livestock revenue insurance. The marketing strategy used is a reflection 
on the quality of cattle and also the management skills of the farm operator.  
Table 4.51:  Marketing Strategies Used by Cluster. 
 Auction Barn 
Video 
Auction 
Private 
Buyer 
Retained 
Ownership Internet 
Select 
Sales 
 No.  % No.  % No. % No. % No.  % No. % 
Cluster 1 12 92.3% 1 7.7% 7 53.9% 3 23.1% 0 0.0% 6 46.1%
Cluster 2 15 88.2% 6 35.3% 7 41.2% 3 17.6% 0 0.0% 1 5.9%
Cluster 3 19 86.4% 10 45.5% 15 68.2% 6 27.3% 2 9.1% 5 22.7%
 
Difference-in-means tests were performed on separate marketing strategies for each 
cluster.    Table 4.52 indicated that the difference in producers who marketed cattle through the 
Auction Barn was statistically significant at the 10% level for Clusters 1 and 2, and the 
difference between Clusters 1 and 3 was statistically significant at the 5% level.  In table 4.53, 
the number of producers who marketed cattle by Video Auction showed a statistically 
significant difference at the 1% level between Clusters 1 and 2 and Clusters 1 and 3.  Table 4.54 
showed that the number of producers marketing cattle through Private Buyers was found to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level for Clusters 1 and 3 and Clusters 2 and 3.  There was no 
significant difference found between Clusters 1 and 2.  The use of Select Sales to market cattle 
exhibited a statistically significant difference for each cluster combination (See Table 4.55).  
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The difference in use of Select Sales was statistically significant at the 1% level for Clusters 1 
and 2 and statistically significant at the 5% level for Clusters 2 and 3 and Clusters 1 and 3.    
Table 4.52: Comparison of Means for Marketing via Auction Barn. 
Marketing Via Auction Barn 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.9230 0.882353 0.863636 
Variance 0 0.103806 0.117769 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 1.505545* 0.174842 1.863782** 
v=d.f. 16 37.58473 21 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.53: Comparison of Means for Marketing via Video Auction. 
Marketing Via Video Auction 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.076923 0.470588 0.5 
Variance 0.071006 0.249135 0.25 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -2.77553*** -0.18234 -3.26162*** 
v=d.f. 26.77806 36.58243 34.55096 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Table 4.54: Comparison of Means for Marketing via Private Treaty. 
Marketing Via Private Treaty 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.538462 0.529412 0.772727 
Variance 0.248521 0.249135 0.17562 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.049245 -1.61716* -1.42307* 
v=d.f. 27.98612 32.85641 23.43372 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.55: Comparison of Means for Marketing via Select Sales. 
Marketing Via Select Sales 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.461538 0.058824 0.227273 
Variance 0.248521 0.055363 0.17562 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 2.692337*** -1.5889* 1.423071* 
v=d.f. 16.75294 35.59843 23.43372 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Although five producers in Cluster 1 had large herd sizes, only one producer utilized 
video auctions to market cattle.  The primary alternative marketing strategies used by producers 
in Cluster 1 were Private Buyers and Select Sales, which was a result of the large percentage 
(46.1 percent) of purebred producers in the cluster.  Producers in Cluster 1 typically used more 
conventional marketing techniques, while producers in Clusters 2 and 3 employed a wide array 
of marketing strategies.  The 180-day Policy Length contributed as much as the State Price 
Series to the preference rating of producers in Cluster 1.  Producers in this cluster were strongly 
against 90-day policies.  This group of producers preferred policies with a Premium|Deductible 
of $1.25|$5.00/cwt.  It was expected a priori that producers would prefer a product with no 
deductible when they were typically limited to using the auction barn to market cattle.  These 
results suggested that producers who were more familiar with alternative strategies preferred 
paying the higher premium so that the product would have no deductible.  Producers in Cluster 
1 were generally older and less dependent on income from beef cattle, which may explain why 
they prefer traditional marketing strategies.  Producers in Clusters 2 and 3 seemed more 
concerned about identifying strategies to reduce price risk.  
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 The debt-to-asset ratio for producers in each cluster is presented in Table 4.56.   The 
majority of producers in each cluster had debt-to-asset ratios of 20 percent or less.  There were 
77 percent, 58.8 percent, and 77.3 percent of producers in Clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively, 
who had debt-to-asset ratios of 20 percent or less.  Cluster 2 had the largest percentage of 
producers with debt-to-asset ratios of more than 20 percent.  The difference-in-means test 
presented in table 4.57 concluded that there were no significant differences in debt-to-asset ratio 
between the clusters.   
Table 4.56:  Debt-to-Asset Ratio by Cluster. 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
 Zero 1% to 20% 21% to 40% 41% or More 
 No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 4 30.8% 6 46.2% 2 15.4% 1 7.7% 
Cluster 2 7 41.2% 3 17.6% 4 23.5% 3 17.6% 
Cluster 3 7 31.8% 10 45.5% 2 9.1% 3 13.6% 
  
 
Table 4.57: Comparison of Means for Debt-to-Asset Ratio. 
Debt-To-Asset Ratio 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  2 2.176471 2.045455 
Variance 0.769231 1.321799 0.952479 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -0.4769 0.376571 -0.142 
v=d.f. 29.99628 33.10768 29.66374 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Producers were asked to characterize themselves in terms of risk attitude (Table 4.58).  
A large percentage (76.9 percent) of producers in Cluster 1 characterized themselves as risk 
averse.  Cluster 2 displayed the largest percentage (47.1 percent) of producers who 
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characterized themselves as risk prone.   In Cluster 2, 35.3 percent of the producers 
characterized themselves as risk averse, and 17.6 percent characterized themselves as risk 
neutral.  In Cluster 3, 59.1 percent of producers characterized themselves as risk averse, while 
27.3 percent characterized themselves as risk prone and 13.6 percent characterized themselves 
as risk neutral.  The results of the difference-in-means test presented in table 4.59 indicated that 
the difference in risk attitude between Clusters 1 and 2 was statistically significant at the 1% 
level, and the difference was significant at the 5% level between Clusters 2 and 3.   
Producers in Clusters 1 and 3 were typically more risk averse, while producers in 
Cluster 2 were more risk prone.  Economic theory indicates that producers who are more risk 
averse would be willing to pay a higher premium in order to further reduce risk.  This suggests 
that risk averse producers should prefer products with a Premium|Deductible of 
$2.24|$0.00/cwt.  However, the results were inconsistent with theory.  The two-limit tobit 
model showed that producers in Cluster 2, risk prone producers, had a strong preference for 
products with no deductible.  A Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt provided the largest 
positive contribution to the preference rating of products for producers in Cluster 2.  Producers 
in Cluster 1, risk averse producers, showed a strong preference for products with a 
Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt.  These results suggest that the more risk prone 
producers will be more likely to select products with the highest premium and no deductible.  
With all other attributes held constant, producers in Cluster 2 were also relatively indifferent 
between products with 90-day and 180-day policy lengths.  This result suggests that most risk 
prone producers would rather purchase livestock revenue insurance when cattle are closer to 
market weight.  This result is consistent with economic theory, since producers are taking on 
more risk by waiting until 90 days before marketing cattle.           
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Table 4.58:  Self-Characterization of Risk Attitude by Cluster.  
 Self-Characterization 
Risk Prone Risk Neutral Risk Averse 
 No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 2 15.4% 1 7.7% 10 76.9% 
Cluster 2 8 47.1% 3 17.6% 6 35.3% 
Cluster 3 3 13.6% 6 27.3% 13 59.1% 
 
 
Table 4.59: Comparison of Means for Risk Self-Characterization. 
Risk Self-Characterization 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  2.615385 1.882353 2.454545 
Variance 0.544379 0.809689 0.520661 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 2.4502*** -2.14295** 0.628251 
v=d.f. 29.8806 31.80109 26.71372 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Producers who frequently check beef-cattle futures prices are expected to be better 
managers and more knowledgeable of market cycles for beef cattle.  Table 4.60 presents the 
frequency in which producers in each cluster check beef cattle futures prices.  The majority of 
producers in Cluster 1 (77 percent) either never check beef cattle futures or check them on a 
monthly basis.   In Clusters 2 and 3, more producers check futures prices on either a daily or 
weekly basis.   The difference-in-means test results shown in table 4.61 revealed that the 
difference in frequency of monitoring beef cattle futures prices was significant at the 1% level 
for Clusters 1 and 2 as well as Clusters 1 and 3.   
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 Producers in Cluster 1 are less concerned about checking beef-cattle futures prices, 
which suggests that they are less concerned about the cash market price for cattle.  This could 
be a result of the availability of other methods for reducing risk, such as private buyers, select 
sales, or other sources of income.  Producers in Cluster 1 preferred products with a 
Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt.   Producers in Clusters 2 and 3 monitored beef-cattle 
futures prices frequently and had strong preferences for products with no deductible and a State 
Price Series.  Frequent monitoring reflects their level of interest and concern about cash market 
prices for making marketing decisions for their cattle.   
Table 4.60: Frequency That Beef Cattle Futures Are Monitored.   
Frequency 
 Daily Weekly Monthly Never 
 No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Cluster 1 0 0.0% 3 23.1% 5 38.5% 5 38.5% 
Cluster 2 8 47.1% 5 29.4% 1 5.9% 3 17.6% 
Cluster 3 8 36.4% 7 31.8% 7 31.8% 0 0.0% 
 
 
Table 4.61:Comparison of Means for Frequency of Monitoring Beef Cattle Futures Prices.  
Monitoring Beef Cattle Futures Prices 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  3.153846 1.941176 1.954545 
Variance 0.591716 1.231834 0.679752 
Comparison    
Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 3.530556*** -0.04158 4.338508*** 
v=d.f. 29.65628 30.06128 28.81506 
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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4.2.2.4 Purchase Decision 
In addition to the preference rating for the product, each producers purchase decision 
was also evaluated.  After rating all products for a given economic scenario, the product with 
the median rating was selected and producers were asked if they would be willing to purchase 
the product if it were the only one available.  If they would purchase the product, the product 
with the next lowest rating was selected and the question repeated.  The process was repeated 
until the lowest rated product that the producer would purchase was identified.  All producers 
agreed that all products rated the same or higher than this product would also be purchased.  
Producers made their purchase decisions based upon evaluation of the complete insurance 
product with the premium price included as an attribute. 
To evaluate the purchase decision of producers, univariate probit models were estimated 
in LIMDEP, where the dependent variable was a binary choice for purchasing the insurance 
product (1) or not purchasing the product (0).  There were a total of twelve explanatory 
variables used to define the characteristics of producers that would influence their decision to 
purchase livestock revenue insurance (See Table 3.5 for explanatory variables).  Since there 
were four economic scenarios, dummy variables representing each economic scenario were 
developed.  The data for each individual were duplicated four times, and the dependent variable 
changed to reflect the producers purchase decision under the given scenario.  This specification 
was used to determine the effect of the economic scenario on a producers purchase decision.  
Duplicating the data four times created a data set with a total of 208 observations (52 producers 
 4 economic scenarios).  
Nine products were used to evaluate the purchase decision (See Table 3.6 for a list of 
products).  These products were selected by varying the levels of one attribute, while holding 
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the level of all other attributes constant at the midpoint.  This method was expected to show the 
impact on the purchase decision that results from changing the level of an individual attribute.  
The nine products were ranked from four to 55 on the list of 81 products.  The rankings for the 
products varied slightly for the different economic scenarios (See Appendix Table J6). 
Individuals were able to select several products that they would be willing to purchase; 
therefore, separate probit models were estimated for each of the nine products.  The marginal 
effects for the probit models were reported in the tables for each product.  
The probit models estimated for each product were tested for multicollinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, and goodness-of-fit.  The explanatory variables were tested for 
multicollinearity using Pearson Correlation coefficients, and condition indexes.  The 
collinearity diagnostics are presented in Appendix Tables J.1 and J.2.  The SAS procedure 
determined the eigenvalue, condition index, and proportion of variation for each variable.  
Pearson Correlation coefficients were also evaluated to identify relationships among the 
explanatory variables.  The collinearity analysis indicated that there were no collinearity 
problems associated with explanatory variables.  The highest condition index value was 9.94 for 
the dummy variable associated with Economic Scenario 4 - the rule-of-thumb is condition index 
values over 30 indicate collinearity problems (Judge et al.).   Pearson Correlation coefficients 
support these results with the highest amount of correlation being 38.5 percent for the FPRICE1 
and PRIVATE variables.  This value does not suggest a collinearity problem. 
The presence of heteroskedasticity and uncertainty regarding the properties of the 
stochastic disturbance term can affect the efficiency of the estimated coefficients.  A Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) statistic was calculated in LIMDEP to test for heteroskedasticity in each model.  
The following general formulation was used for the probit model: 
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[19] y* = β΄x + ε     where, Var[ε] = [exp(γ΄z)]2  
 
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity was tested by assuming that γ=0.  The specification for 
the LM test statistic was LM = g΄Vg, where g was the first derivative of the unrestricted model 
evaluated at the restricted parameter vector and V was an estimator of the asymptotic variance 
matrix of the maximum likelihood estimator.  The critical value for the LM-statistic from the 
chi-squared distribution was 36.42.   
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity held for all products except Products 4 and 7 
with LM-statistics of 58.84 and 106.07, respectively.  The heteroskedasticity problems 
associated with Products 4 and 7 were a result of there being an insufficient mix of 1s and 0s 
among the values of the dependent variable.  Greene indicates that there should be at least K 
of each value, where K is the number of right-hand-side variables.  In the probit models there 
were twelve independent variables, and ten and seven producers indicated that they would 
purchase Products 4 and 7, respectively.  These two models were re-estimated using a 
covariance consistent estimator to correct for heteroskedasticity, but the models did not 
converge using this specification.  As a result, the results of these two models were not included 
in the discussion.   
A chi-squared statistic was reported which tested the overall significance of the model.  
The results of this statistic were reported in the tables for each model.  To assess the goodness-
of-fit, Maddalas R2 and McFaddens R2 were computed for each model.  The value of the 
restricted (L0) and unrestricted [L(  )] log likelihood functions were used to compute both R2 
values.  Maddalas R2 (R2Md) and McFaddens R2 (R2Mf) were calculated using the following 
formulas: R2Md= 1- exp{2[L0 - L(  )]/n} and  R2Mf = 1   [L(  )/L0].  The results of these 
 183
measures are reported in the tables for each model.  The predictive accuracy of each probit 
model is reported in Appendix Table J.5. 
Product 1 was based on a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 
180 days, a Regional Price Series, and Telephone Method of Marketing.  The marginal effects 
results of the probit model for Product 1 are presented in Table 4.62.  The chi-squared statistic 
indicated that the overall model was statistically significant at the 1% level.  The values of 
Maddalas and McFaddens R2 suggested that the model was a reasonably good fit.  Appendix 
Table J.5 shows that the model accurately predicts 69.23 percent of the results.  The coefficients 
for D1 and D2 were positive and significant at the 1% level, and the coefficients for D4 and 
EDUC1 were positive and significant at the 5% level.   
   The results suggest that having less than a college education increases the probability 
of purchasing Product 1 by 16 percent.  Producers with a higher education level were, therefore, 
less likely to purchase Product 1.  The education level of the producer can impact his ability to 
provide self-insurance against the risk associated with livestock production.  Producers with 
higher education levels commonly have off-farm employment opportunities and are, in general, 
better able to provide self-insurance.  Product 1 provides producers with a full price guarantee 
with the highest premium ($2.24/cwt).  This type of product would be more attractive to a 
producer who has limited opportunities for self-insurance.   Therefore, producers with a higher 
education level can absorb some of the risk and may prefer a product with a higher deductible 
(lower premium).  The results indicated that being in Economic Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 increased 
the probability of purchasing livestock revenue insurance by 38 percent, 32 percent, and 22 
percent, respectively.   
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Table 4.62: Probit Results of Purchase Decision for Product 1.  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT -1.8404*** 0.6727 0.0062 -0.6600 
HERD 0.0002 0.0002 0.4043 0.0001 
VIDEO 0.3200 0.2261 0.1570 0.1148 
PRIVATE 0.3068 0.2394 0.1999 0.1100 
RISK1 0.1400 0.2360 0.5530 0.0502 
EDUC1 0.4473** 0.2281 0.0499 0.1604 
DEBT1 -0.1040 0.2396 0.6642 -0.0373 
DIVRSE 0.0413 0.2377 0.8619 0.0148 
FPRICE1 0.3508 0.2309 0.1286 0.1258 
AGE -0.0017 0.0106 0.8750 -0.0006 
D1 1.0565*** 0.2864 0.0002 0.3789 
D2 0.8990*** 0.2857 0.0017 0.3224 
D4 0.6246** 0.2881 0.0302 0.2240 
χ2  Statistic 31.7845***    
Maddalas R2 0.1417    
McFaddens R2 0.1185    
LM Statistic 30.4096    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 Product 2 had all attributes represented at their midpoints.  The product consisted of a 
Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 180 days, a Regional Price Series, 
and Telephone Method of Marketing.  Table 4.63 provides the results of the probit model for 
Product 2.  For this model, the chi-square test for the overall model was 13.06, which was not 
statistically significant. The Maddala and McFadden R2 values were also low, which suggest 
that the model was not a good fit.  Although the model was not a good fit, 71.63 percent of the 
purchase decisions were predicted correctly (See Appendix Table J.5).  This result was 
somewhat misleading because the model predicted that only one individual would purchase 
Product 2.  Therefore, the predictive accuracy basically represented the percentage of producers 
who would not purchase Product 2.  The only coefficients that were statistically significant were 
the dummy variables for the economic scenarios.   
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Table 4.63:   Probit Results of Purchase Decision for Product 2. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT -0.6336 0.6564 0.3344 -0.2077 
HERD -0.0002 0.0002 0.4844 -0.0001 
VIDEO -0.0407 0.2324 0.8611 -0.0133 
PRIVATE -0.0495 0.2404 0.8367 -0.0162 
RISK1 0.2700 0.2353 0.2510 0.0885 
EDUC1 -0.0112 0.2169 0.9587 -0.0037 
DEBT1 -0.0152 0.2411 0.9498 -0.0050 
DIVRSE -0.1992 0.2462 0.4184 -0.0653 
FPRICE1 0.0800 0.2345 0.7330 0.0262 
AGE -0.0078 0.0105 0.4565 -0.0026 
D1 0.7779*** 0.2850 0.0063 0.2550 
D2 0.7243** 0.2859 0.0113 0.2374 
D4 0.5109* 0.2901 0.0783 0.1675 
χ2 - Statistic 13.0571    
Maddalas R2 .06084    
McFaddens R2 .05303    
LM - Statistic 11.8853    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 Product 3 contained a Premium|Deductible of $0.50|$10.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 180 
days, a Regional Price Series, and Telephone Method of Marketing.  The results in Table 4.64 
indicated that the chi-squared statistic for the overall model was statistically significant, and the 
Maddala and McFadden R2 values indicated that the model had a reasonable goodness-of-fit.  
Appendix Table J.5 shows that the model predicts 82.69 percent of the purchase decisions 
correctly.  The coefficients for PRIVATE, RISK1, DIVRSE, and FPRICE1 were all statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  VIDEO, AGE, D1 and D2 were statistically significant at the 5% 
level, and EDUC1 was significant at the 10% level. 
 The coefficient for the variable representing producers who used video auctions 
(VIDEO) was negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient indicates 
that the probability of purchasing Product 3 was decreased by 14.7 percent when the producer 
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utilized video auctions.  In Product 3, the Premium|Deductible was $0.50|$10.00, which was the 
least preferred level of the attribute.  Producers who sell cattle through video auction can often 
lock in prices at higher levels than the guarantee for this product.  Therefore, purchasing 
Product 3 would not be advantageous.  These producers would prefer paying a higher premium 
and receiving a higher price guarantee. 
 The model indicated that marketing cattle through private buyers would decrease the 
probability of purchasing Product 3 by 22.1 percent.  Again, this variable has a negative impact 
on the purchase decision likely as a result of the low price guarantee provided by Product 3.  
Producers who market cattle via private treaty generally sell at prices above the cash market 
price.  These producers are able to reduce price risk by marketing cattle to private buyers, and 
consequently, they would be less interested in purchasing a product with a low price guarantee. 
 The coefficient for RISK1 indicated that risk aversion would have a positive effect on 
the producers decision to purchase Product 3.  This result suggests that the probability of 
purchasing Product 3 increased by 18.5 percent when the producer was risk averse.  This result 
is consistent with economic theory since risk averse producers are expected to be more likely to 
purchase insurance.   
 For Product 3 the coefficient for the EDUC1 variable was negative.  The probability of 
purchasing Product 3 was reduced by 11.0 percent when the producer had less than a college 
education.  Producers with more education are willing to take lower price guarantees because 
they commonly have more available alternatives for self-insurance.   Producers who are less 
educated would prefer a higher guarantee.   
 The coefficient that indicated whether the producer had other enterprises on the farm in 
addition to beef cattle (DIVRSE) indicated a negative effect on the decision to purchase Product 
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3.  The model indicated that being diversified decreased the probability of purchasing insurance 
by 19.5 percent.  This result was consistent with a priori expectations.  Enterprise 
diversification serves as a method of reducing price risk, and therefore, it reduces the need for 
livestock revenue insurance. 
 The FPRICE1 variable represents producers who monitor beef cattle futures prices on at 
least a weekly basis.  The model finds that this variable will increase the probability of 
purchasing Product 3 by 21.4 percent.  This result was expected because producers who 
regularly monitor futures prices were expected to be better able to understand the benefits of 
livestock revenue insurance and incorporate it as a risk management strategy.  
Table 4.64:  Purchase Decision for Product 3. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT -2.3206*** 0.8531 0.0065 -0.5190 
HERD 0.0001 0.0003 0.6868 0.0000 
VIDEO -0.6563** 0.3026 0.0301 -0.1468 
PRIVATE -0.9881*** 0.3361 0.0033 -0.2210 
RISK1 0.8312*** 0.2843 0.0035 0.1859 
EDUC1 -0.4925* 0.2605 0.0586 -0.1102 
DEBT1 -0.1645 0.3212 0.6085 -0.0368 
DIVRSE -0.8708*** 0.3305 0.0084 -0.1948 
FPRICE1 0.9584*** 0.3245 0.0031 0.2144 
AGE 0.0278** 0.0141 0.0475 0.0062 
D1 0.6575** 0.3321 0.0477 0.1470 
D2 0.6662** 0.3316 0.0445 0.1490 
D4 0.4849 0.3373 0.1506 0.1084 
χ2 - Statistic 42.2234***    
Maddalas R2 .1837    
McFaddens R2 .1992    
LM - Statistic 27.1534    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
This model indicated that as the producers age increased, the probability of purchasing 
Product 3 increased by about 0.6 percent for each year.  This result suggests that older 
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producers are more risk averse, and therefore, more willing to purchase insurance.  In this 
model, the low premium price may be more attractive to older producers than younger ones.  
Since older producers are commonly wealthier, the positive sign for the product with a 
$10.00/cwt deductible may reflect the producers ability to provide self-insurance.   
 The coefficients for Economic Scenarios 1 and 2 were positive in this model.  These 
coefficients indicated being in either Economic Scenarios 1 or 2 would increase the probability 
of purchasing insurance by 14.7 percent and 14.9 percent, respectively. 
 Product 5 was defined by a Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 
360 days, a Regional Price Series, and Telephone Method of Marketing.  The chi-square 
statistic indicated that the overall model was statistically significant at the 1% level.  The 
Maddala and McFadden R2 values of .1268 and .1364, respectively, indicated that the model 
was a reasonably good fit for the data.  The model was able to correctly predict the purchase 
decision 79.33 percent of the time (See Appendix Table J.5).   The estimated coefficients from 
the probit model for Product 5 are presented in Table 4.65.   The coefficients for D1 and D2 
were statistically significant at the 1% level, coefficients for VIDEO, RISK, and D4 were 
significant at the 5% level and FPRICE1 was significant at the 10% level. 
  The use of video auction to market cattle was found to have a positive impact on the 
producers decision to purchase Product 5.  The probability of purchasing insurance was 
increased by 14.2 percent for producers who utilized video auctions.  This result was consistent 
with a priori expectations.  Producers who market cattle through video auction were expected to 
have a better knowledge of the need for risk management strategies and a higher level of 
comfort with using an insurance policy to guarantee a price for cattle.  This product allowed 
producers to guarantee prices for 360 days, which is not an option for video auction. Therefore, 
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livestock revenue insurance may be used to diversify the risk management strategies of 
producers who use video auction.   
 The coefficient for RISK1 indicated that producers who were risk averse were more 
likely to purchase Product 5.  Being risk averse increased the probability of purchasing Product 
5 by 13.1 percent.  This result was in line with a priori expectations and economic theory for 
the RISK1 variable.   Product 5 presented the opportunity to lock in prices one year in advance.  
This long policy length was expected to be attractive to risk averse producers.     
Table 4.65:  Purchase Decision for Product 5. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT -2.4281*** 0.8172 0.0030 -0.6231 
HERD 0.0001 0.0002 0.5664 0.0000 
VIDEO 0.5524** 0.2520 0.0284 0.1417 
PRIVATE -0.1727 0.2653 0.5150 -0.0443 
RISK1 0.5096** 0.2527 0.0438 0.1308 
EDUC1 0.1698 0.2389 0.4774 0.0436 
DEBT1 0.0515 0.2651 0.8460 0.0132 
DIVRSE -0.2341 0.2682 0.3827 -0.0601 
FPRICE1 0.5242* 0.2728 0.0547 0.1345 
AGE 0.0032 0.0119 0.7890 0.0008 
D1 0.9835*** 0.3400 0.0038 0.2524 
D2 0.8607*** 0.3424 0.0119 0.2209 
D4 0.7920** 0.3437 0.0212 0.2032 
χ2 - Statistic 28.2048***    
Maddalas R2 0.1268    
McFaddens R2 0.1314    
LM - Statistic 34.3573    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Monitoring beef cattle futures prices on at least a weekly basis had a positive effect on 
the producers decision to purchase Product 5.  The coefficient for FPRICE1 indicated that the 
probability of purchasing Product 5 increased by 13.5 percent for producers who monitored 
futures prices on at least a weekly basis.   This result was consistent with a priori expectations.  
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Producers who frequently monitor prices are aware of market conditions and able to more 
effectively use livestock revenue insurance as a risk management strategy. 
 The economic conditions were found to have a significant influence on the producers 
decision to purchase Product 5.  Being in Economic Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 had positive 
influences on the probability of purchasing Product 5.  The probability of purchasing Product 5 
increased by 25.2 percent, 22.1 percent, and 20.3 percent when conditions associated with 
Economic Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 were present, respectively.  This result was expected for the 
economic scenarios with Economic Scenario 3 as the base.   
 Product 6 was the most popular product included in the nine purchase decision analyses 
because it had a State Price Series.  The product consisted of a Premium|Deductible of 
$1.25|$5.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 180 days, a State Price Series, and Telephone Method of 
Marketing.  Appendix Table J.1 shows that 71.2 percent of all producers would purchase 
Product 6 in Economic Scenario 1.  Given that there were 11 producers who indicated that they 
would not purchase livestock revenue insurance under any conditions, Product 6 would be 
purchased by 92.3 percent of producers who would purchase insurance.  Table 4.66 provides the 
estimated coefficients of the probit model for Product 6.  The overall model was found to be 
statistically significant and the Maddala and McFadden R2 values of 21.4 percent and 17.5 
percent, respectively, indicated that the model had a good fit.  The model was able to accurately 
predict 71.63 percent of the purchase decisions (See Appendix Table J.5).   The coefficients for 
VIDEO, DIVRSE, D1, D2, and D4 were significant at the 1% level.  EDUC1 and FPRICE1 
were significant at the 5% level and RISK1 and D4 were significant at the 10 percent level. 
 The model indicated that the probability of purchasing Product 6 increased by 26.1 
percent for producers who utilized video auctions to market their cattle.  Producers who used 
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video auctions found that the State Price Series provided a favorable guarantee, so they could 
include livestock revenue insurance to diversify their risk management strategy.  This result was 
consistent with a priori expectations. 
 The coefficient for RISK1 indicated that being risk averse had a negative relationship 
with the producers decision to purchase Product 6.  This result was inconsistent with a priori 
expectations and economic theory.  Risk averse producers were expected to be more likely to 
purchase insurance.  The negative sign for the RISK1 coefficient may be a result of the fact that 
some producers who would not purchase insurance under any conditions were categorized as 
risk averse.   These producers represented a large portion of the producers who did not purchase 
insurance in each economic scenario for Product 6.   
     Having less than a college education decreased the probability of purchasing Product 
6 by 20 percent.  This product was very attractive to producers in both education level 
categories.  This result may reflect the strong preference that producers with less than a college 
education have for a full price guarantee.  If the product had a $0.00/cwt deductible, the impact 
of producers having less than a college education would be expected to be positive.  Producers 
with higher education levels seemed to prefer products with a $1.25/cwt premium.  This may be 
a reflection of their ability to self-insure.  In addition to this, the majority of producers who 
would not purchase insurance had less than a college education, which could influence the 
negative relationship.  
 The coefficient for DIVRSE indicated that there was a negative relationship between 
having a diversified operation and purchasing Product 6.  The probability of purchasing Product 
6 was reduced by 25.6 percent when the producer had multiple enterprises in his operation.  
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This result was consistent with a priori expectations.  Enterprise diversification can be used to 
reduce price risk, which decreases the need to purchase insurance as a risk reduction tool.   
Table 4.66:   Purchase Decision for Product 6. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT -0.0783 0.6427 0.9030 -0.0309 
HERD -0.0002 0.0002 0.3871 -0.0001 
VIDEO 0.6603*** 0.2417 0.0063 0.2607 
PRIVATE -0.0346 0.2362 0.8835 -0.0137 
RISK1 -0.4275* 0.2411 0.0762 -0.1688 
EDUC1 -0.5070** 0.2258 0.0247 -0.2002 
DEBT1 0.2571 0.2420 0.2881 0.1015 
DIVRSE -0.6488*** 0.2469 0.0086 -0.2562 
FPRICE1 0.4745** 0.2305 0.0396 0.1873 
AGE -0.0086 0.0103 0.4028 -0.0034 
D1 1.1429*** 0.2745 0.0000 0.4513 
D2 0.9653*** 0.2704 0.0004 0.3812 
D4 0.5073* 0.2665 0.0570 0.2003 
χ2 - Statistic 50.0914***    
Maddalas R2 .2140    
McFaddens R2 .17489    
LM - Statistic 23.9375    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
Producers who monitored beef cattle futures prices on a least a weekly basis were more 
likely to purchase Product 6.  The coefficient for FPRICE1 indicated that the probability of 
purchasing insurance was increased by 18.7 percent when producers frequently monitored beef 
cattle futures prices.  This result was consistent with a priori expectations. 
 The model indicated that the economic scenarios had positive impacts on the producers 
decision to purchase Product 6.   Being in Economic Scenarios 1, 2 and 4 increased the 
probability of the producer purchasing Product 6 by 45.1 percent, 38.1 percent, and 20.0 
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percent, respectively.  These results show that the economic conditions in Economic Scenario 1 
were the most favorable for purchasing Product 6.    
 Product 8 was made up of a Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt, a Policy Length of 
180 days, a Regional Price Series, and In Person Method of Marketing.  The results of the 
probit model for Product 8 are presented in Table 4.67.  The chi-squared statistic showed that 
the overall model was statistically significant at the 1% level.  The model was able to predict 
72.6 percent of the purchase decisions correctly (See Appendix Table J.5).  The coefficients for 
D1 and D2 were statistically significant at the 1% level, while AGE and D4 were both 
significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4.67:   Purchase Decision for Product 8. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects 
CONSTANT 0.0125 0.6609 0.9849 0.0043 
HERD -0.0001 0.0002 0.5829 0.0000 
VIDEO -0.0134 0.2291 0.9533 -0.0046 
PRIVATE -0.0853 0.2395 0.7218 -0.0294 
RISK1 0.2695 0.2350 0.2513 0.0929 
EDUC1 -0.0638 0.2193 0.7710 -0.0220 
DEBT1 -0.0817 0.2390 0.7325 -0.0282 
DIVRSE -0.1349 0.2476 0.5859 -0.0465 
FPRICE1 0.0926 0.2317 0.6892 0.0319 
AGE -0.0209** 0.0106 0.0483 -0.0072 
D1 1.0824*** 0.2924 0.0002 0.3731 
D2 0.9793*** 0.2931 0.0008 0.3376 
D4 0.7195** 0.2962 0.0151 0.2480 
χ2 - Statistic 27.1827***    
Maddalas R2 .1225    
McFaddens R2 .1046    
LM - Statistic 18.4712    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
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The coefficient for AGE had a small but significant negative effect on the producers 
decision to purchase Product 8.  The results indicated that the probability of purchasing Product 
8 was reduced by 0.72 percent as the producers age increased one year.  These results were 
inconsistent with a priori expectations.  The Method of Marketing in Product 8 was In Person, 
which was expected to be preferred by older producers.  However, older producers often have 
more wealth and are able to either absorb risk or mitigate it through other income sources.  This 
could explain the negative sign for the AGE variable. 
 The market conditions were found to have a significant impact on the producers 
decision to purchase Product 8.   The market conditions associated with Economic Scenarios 1, 
2, and 4 increased the probability of purchasing Product 8 by 37.3 percent, 33.8 percent, and 
24.8 percent, respectively.  These results were consistent with a priori expectations. 
 The features in Product 9 were a Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt, a Policy 
Length of 180 days, a Regional Price Series, and Internet Method of Marketing.  Table 4.68 
provides the estimated coefficients of the probit model for Product 9.  The chi-squared statistic 
showed that the overall model was statistically significant at the 10% level.  The Maddala and 
McFadden R2 values indicated that approximately nine percent of the uncertainty was explained 
by the model.  The model was able to accurately predict 78.37 percent of the results correctly.  
The coefficient for D1 was statistically significant at the 1% level, D2 was significant at the 5% 
level, and DEBT1 and D4 were significant at the 10% level.  
 The coefficient for DEBT1 indicated that there was a negative relationship between 
having a debt-to-asset ratio of less than 20 percent and the decision to purchase Product 9.  This 
result was consistent with a priori expectations for this variable.  Producers with lower debt-to-
asset ratios are generally wealthier and are able to reduce risk through other sources.  Producers 
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with higher debt-to-asset ratios were expected to be more likely to purchase insurance to 
guarantee that their financial obligations would be met.    
Table 4.68:   Purchase Decision for Product 9 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P[|Z|>z] Marginal Effects
CONSTANT -0.8031 0.7173 0.2628 -0.2241 
HERD 0.0000 0.0002 0.9584 0.0000 
VIDEO 0.0175 0.2448 0.9430 0.0049 
PRIVATE 0.0311 0.2571 0.9036 0.0087 
RISK1 0.0933 0.2485 0.7072 0.0260 
EDUC1 -0.3266 0.2293 0.1543 -0.0911 
DEBT1* -0.4484 0.2539 0.0773 -0.1251 
DIVRSE -0.3100 0.2661 0.2441 -0.0865 
FPRICE1 0.3715 0.2566 0.1476 0.1037 
AGE -0.0043 0.0115 0.7059 -0.0012 
D1*** 0.8341 0.3101 0.0071 0.2328 
D2** 0.7175 0.3125 0.0217 0.2002 
D4* 0.5302 0.3179 0.0954 0.1480 
χ2  Statistic 19.5497*    
Maddalas R2 0.0897    
McFaddens R2 0.0889    
LM  Statistic 20.8071    
* = Significant at the 10% level  **=Significant at the 5% level  *** = Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
The economic conditions had a positive impact on the producers decision to purchase 
Product 9.  When the producer faced the economic conditions associated with Economic 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 4 the probability of purchasing insurance was increased by 23.2 percent, 
20.0 percent, and 14.8 percent, respectively.  This result was consistent with a priori 
expectations.    
 The results of this analysis show the impact of different producer characteristics on the 
purchase decisions for products.  Varying the level of one attribute showed differences in the 
types of producers who preferred products with certain attributes.  The market conditions were 
consistently found to have an impact on the producers decision to purchase an insurance 
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product.  This information can be used to identify the target market for insurance.  Product 
design may also be affected by knowledge of these characteristics.  Insurers can use this 
information to project the acceptance of a product with certain characteristics. 
4.3 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 The results of the conjoint analysis indicated that producers preferred products with a 
$2.24|$0.00/cwt Premium|Deductible, a 180-day policy length, state price series, and an in-
person method of marketing.  The economic scenarios did not have a significant impact on 
producers preferences for insurance products.  The price series contributed approximately 50 
percent to the overall product rating in each economic scenario.  The premium|deductible was 
the second most important attribute with a contribution of about 22 percent to the preference 
rating of products.  The policy length and method of marketing made fairly equal contributions 
of about 13 percent to preference ratings.  
The results of the cluster analysis and purchase decision analysis reveal similar facts 
about the characteristics of producers who prefer certain product attributes.  The results of the 
cluster analysis revealed that producers who were older and less dependent on income from 
beef cattle preferred products with a lower premium (higher deductible).  Producers who 
depended more on income from small-scale beef cattle production strongly preferred products 
that had no deductible in order to have a full price guarantee.  Producers with the largest 
operations, on average, indicated the strongest preference for products with a state price series.  
These producers currently employ different marketing strategies to reduce risk and they would 
purchase insurance to diversify the risk management strategies used. The purchase decision 
analysis showed that older producers were more likely to purchase products with a $5.00/cwt or 
$10.00/cwt deductible.  Producers who were younger and/or less educated were more likely to 
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purchase products with no deductible (the highest premium) in order to guarantee the maximum 
price.  Producers who used video auctions would purchase policies with features, such as 90 or 
360-day policy lengths, to provide options not available with currently available strategies.  The 
use of private buyers reduced the probability of purchasing products.  Risk aversion and debt-
to-asset ratios greater than 20 percent increased the probability of a producer purchasing 
insurance.  Enterprise diversification decreased the likelihood of a producer purchasing 
insurance.      
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 SUMMARY 
 In the past decade, the federal government has invested significant resources to develop 
a variety of insurance products for crop producers.  Although livestock products account for 
about one-half of farm cash receipts, federally-backed livestock insurance was prohibited by 
law until the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000.  Currently, the USDA has the goal of 
providing insurance products to livestock producers that will effectively reduce the price or 
revenue risk associated with livestock production.  The current risk management strategies 
available to beef cattle producers (cash forward contracting and futures and options) are not 
widely used.  Many producers lack the training, experience, and expertise necessary to 
successfully employ these strategies.   The USDA, private insurers, and other experts face the 
challenge of developing affordable, user-friendly insurance products for beef cattle producers.  
Determining the insurance product attributes and attribute levels that are most desired by 
producers is imperative for developing an effective product.  The effectiveness of a livestock 
revenue insurance product is determined by its acceptance among producers and the products 
ability to reduce the producers exposure to price risk.  
Livestock revenue insurance products will provide an opportunity for producers to 
protect themselves from market price declines without preventing them from taking advantage 
of price increases.  Producers who own at least 50 cows are expected to be the targeted audience 
for the product.  The herd size requirement reduces the targeted group of producers to 19.9 
percent and 21.1 percent of the beef cattle producers in Louisiana and the U.S., respectively.  
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However, this relatively small percentage of producers controls 64.8 and 69.3 percent of the 
beef cattle in Louisiana and the U.S., respectively (1997 Census of Agriculture).  The federal 
government will likely subsidize the premiums paid by producers to encourage participation.  
Futures and options contracts will be used as reinsurance for livestock revenue insurance 
policies.   
The overall goal of this study was to determine the relative importance of various 
attributes of livestock revenue insurance products and identify the characteristics of producers 
who prefer certain levels of a given livestock revenue insurance product attribute.  Conjoint 
methodology was used to evaluate producers preferences for specific product attributes.  
Conjoint analysis is based upon the theoretical framework developed by Lancaster, which 
suggests that goods are not the direct object of utility; rather utility is derived from the 
characteristics of the goods.  For the conjoint analysis, respondents provided a preference rating 
for hypothetical insurance products, and their overall preference rating was decomposed into 
part worth utility values for each attribute of the product.  Producers were to provide the highest 
rating for the product with the combination of attributes that would maximize their utility 
subject to their individual objectives.  This study represents the first illustration in the 
agricultural economics literature of the use of conjoint analysis to evaluate producer preferences 
for agricultural insurance product attributes.   
The relevant insurance product attributes evaluated were selected based upon the 
opinions of Risk Management Agency employees, private insurance consultants, university 
experts, and beef cattle producers.  The product attributes selected and evaluated were the 
Premium|Deductible, Policy Length, Price Series, and Method of Marketing.  Each product 
attribute consisted of three levels.  A separate part worth relationship with an additive functional 
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form was assumed to analyze the preference for attributes.  Full product profiles were 
developed from all possible combinations of the selected attributes. The full factorial design 
yielded 81 products, which was reduced to nine products using a fractional factorial design.  
Two products were randomly selected and added to the set of products evaluated by producers.  
One product was included to increase the degrees of freedom in the econometric analysis and 
the other product was used as a holdout card to test the internal validity of the model.  In all, 
each respondent provided ratings from 0 (least preferred) to 10 (most preferred) for eleven 
hypothetical revenue insurance products. 
 Fifty-two personal interviews were conducted with cow-calf producers from fifteen 
Louisiana parishes to gather the data necessary for the conjoint analysis.  The County Extension 
Agent in each parish was given information on the types of producers needed from the parish, 
and they were requested to identify producers in their areas to participate in the study.  The 
parishes included were located in all regions of Louisiana.  Respondents exhibited diversity in 
terms of age, herd size, wealth, employment status, and marketing practices.  Respondents 
completed the survey questionnaire and rated each product under four different economic 
scenarios.  The economic scenarios were used to determine whether producers preferences for 
products or their purchase decisions would change given different market conditions.  A two-
limit tobit model was used to estimate the part worth utility values for the product attributes for 
each economic scenario.  The part worth utility estimates from the two-limit tobit models were 
used to calculate the total utility for the 81 possible products.  The products were then ranked 
from most to least preferred.  The relative importance of each attribute was also calculated 
using the part worth utility values.  The relative importance of an attribute indicates its 
contribution to the total utility of the product.   
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Cluster analysis was used to segment producers and compare the characteristics of 
producers according to their preference for insurance products.  The objective of cluster 
analysis is to maximize the homogeneity of the objects within a cluster while maximizing the 
heterogeneity between clusters.  Part worth utility estimates from individual conjoint models 
were used to determine the clusters.   Wards method was used to identify clusters in SPSS.  
Wards method is an agglomerative procedure that optimizes the minimum variance within 
clusters.  Three clusters of producers were identified using this procedure.  Clusters 1, 2, and 3 
contained 13, 17, and 22 producers, respectively.  A separate conjoint analysis using a two-limit 
tobit model was performed for each cluster to examine the preference structure of individuals in 
each cluster and to determine differences in the preference structure between clusters.  The 
relative importance of attributes was also calculated for each cluster from the results of the two-
limit tobit models. 
Descriptive statistics were analyzed to identify important characteristics of producers in 
each cluster.  Difference-in-means tests were performed on variables from the descriptive 
statistics analysis to point out the differences and similarities that exist between clusters.  The 
results of the cluster analysis showed relationships between preferences for product attributes 
and individual specific variables.      
  The aggregate two-limit tobit models and the cluster analysis results provided valuable 
information about producers preferences for products; however, these results did not indicate 
the products that would actually be purchased by respondents.  Once producers rated all 
products, they were asked to indicate which products they would actually purchase, if available.   
Since there were a total of 81 possible products, a subset of nine products was selected to 
evaluate the purchase decision.  The nine products were selected by varying the levels of one 
 202
attribute at a time, while holding all other attributes constant at the midpoint.  The midpoint 
levels of each attribute provide a starting point for determining how varying the level of one 
product attribute may change the purchase decision. 
To evaluate the purchase decision, univariate probit models were estimated for each 
product.  In this analysis, the data for each individual was duplicated four times (208 
observations) to account for the producers purchase decision under the four economic 
scenarios.  There were twelve explanatory variables that represented producer characteristics 
and the economic scenarios.  The probit models indicated how each explanatory variable would 
influence the probability of purchasing the given product.  This analysis provided valuable 
information about the acceptance of livestock revenue insurance among producers. 
The aggregate conjoint analysis, the cluster analysis, and the purchase decision analysis 
combine to explain the types of products preferred by producers and the characteristics of 
producers who prefer certain products.  The aggregate conjoint analysis uses producer ratings to 
evaluate preferences for livestock insurance product attributes.  Producer preferences for 
product attributes were examined on an individual basis and used to group producers into 
clusters.  The cluster analysis segments the market of producers according to their preferences 
for different attributes.  A descriptive statistical analysis shows the characteristics of producers 
who comprise the different clusters or market segments.  Many of the same variables used to 
describe producers in each cluster were also used as explanatory variables in the purchase 
decision analysis.  The purchase decision analysis indicates the factors that have a significant 
impact on the probability of producers purchasing products.  These analyses provided insight 
into livestock insurance product development and marketing strategies. 
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5.2 CONCLUSIONS 
5.2.1 Conjoint Analysis 
The results of the conjoint analysis showed that the average overall rating for products 
was lowest when the futures price equaled the current price and highest when the futures prices 
was greater than the current price.  This suggests that periods of price change will affect the 
purchase decision.  However, two-limit tobit model results indicated that the economic 
scenarios did not have a significant impact on the producers preference ratings for the 
insurance products.  This suggests that producers place relatively the same value on the attribute 
levels regardless of the existing market conditions.   
When livestock revenue insurance products are marketed, producers will have several 
options available for the Premium and Policy Length attribute levels.  On the other hand, 
insurance professionals will determine the level of the Price Series and Method of Marketing 
attributes before the products are offered to producers.  The two-limit tobit analysis showed the 
most preferred levels of each of these attributes.  The results showed that the Price Series 
attribute provided the largest contribution to the overall preference rating of products.  The 
Price Series was expected to be the most important attribute since it greatly influences the 
likelihood of receiving an indemnity payment.  For all economic scenarios, the Price Series 
contributed more than 50 percent to the preference rating of products.  Producers indicated a 
strong preference for products with a state price series and a strong aversion to products with a 
national price series.  This result was expected for Louisiana producers since using a state price 
series increases their chances of receiving an indemnity payment.  The part worth utility value 
for a regional price series was positive but insignificant.   
 204
A July 2000 report by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) indicated that 
the average price received for calves by Louisiana producers was consistently below the 
national average.  The difference in prices received by Louisiana producers ranged from 
$1.50/cwt in 1998 to $10.60/cwt in 1995.  In 2000, the average price received for Louisiana 
calves was $5.50/cwt below the national average.  The study also showed that Louisiana 
producers consistently received about $2.00/cwt less than the Southeastern Regional9 average 
for calves.   
If a national price series had been used for insurance products in 1995, producers in 
Louisiana would have had very little incentive to purchase insurance.  In this case, Louisiana 
producers would have actually received $10.00/cwt less than the national average for calves, but 
they would not have received an indemnity payment if the average national price at the end of 
the insurance policy was equivalent or above their price guarantee.  On the other hand, if a state 
price series had been used, Louisiana producers would have received an indemnity payment for 
the difference between the average state price and the price guarantee.   
It is expected that producers in some states would prefer that the insurance products be 
based on a national price series because their state prices are consistently above the national 
average.  The NASS report indicated that Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Colorado, Kansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming reported prices for calves that were consistently 
above the national average.  These states would benefit most from insurance policies with a 
national price series.  Basing livestock revenue insurance on a national price series would not be 
very effective because producers in states where prices are currently high would benefit the 
most and producers in states where prices are currently low would benefit the least.  Indications 
                                                 
9 Southeastern Region includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, 
Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.   
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from industry professionals suggest that livestock revenue insurance policies will probably be 
based on a regional price series.  The regional price series helps to reduce the disparity in cash 
market beef cattle prices that exists between regions.   
The Premium|Deductible was the second most important attribute, and it contributed 
between 21.3 and 23.4 percent to the preference rating of products in the four economic 
scenarios.  This attribute was expected to be relatively important since it is directly related to 
the cost of purchasing a policy and the expected revenue received through participation.  The 
Premium|Deductible attribute required producers to make a tradeoff between their initial capital 
outlay and the price guarantee.  Producers preferred products with a premium of $2.24/cwt and 
no deductible (PRE224).  When a premium of $1.25/cwt and a $5.00/cwt deductible was 
present, it provided a positive contribution to producer preferences.  However, a premium of 
$0.50/cwt and a deductible of $10.00/cwt decreased a producers preference for the product.   
The results suggest that producers prefer paying a higher premium for a full price 
guarantee to paying a lower premium for a partial guarantee.  When the actual livestock revenue 
insurance products are available, producers will be able to choose from several premium and 
deductible combinations.  The value of the deductible is expected to range from $0.00/cwt to 
$10.00/cwt, and producers will be able to select deductibles that increase in $1.00/cwt to 
$2.00/cwt increments (compared to $5.00/cwt increments in this study).  With more options 
available, producers are expected to most frequently select products with a deductible that 
ranges between $0.00/cwt and $5.00/cwt.  A prospective livestock revenue insurance provider 
calculated the premiums for this study, and a 30 percent subsidy was assumed.  Risk 
Management Agency officials indicated that a federal premium subsidy is almost certain in 
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order to encourage participation.  The amount of the premium subsidy is expected to range 
between 30 and 50 percent. 
The policy length and method of marketing were very similar in terms of relative 
importance.  These attributes each contributed approximately 13 percent to the producers 
preference rating for insurance products.  One hundred eighty days was the most preferred 
policy length for producers in the study.  This result was expected since most cow-calf 
producers market cattle at around six months of age.  The 360-day policy length was the least 
preferred by producers in the study.   Although the part worth value for the 90-day policy length 
was not statistically significant, it showed a negative impact on producer preferences.    
There will be several policy length options available when livestock revenue insurance 
products are marketed.  The options are expected to range from 90 days to 360 days and 
increase in 30-day increments.  When the actual insurance products are marketed, it is 
recognized that the policy length will have an impact on the premium associated with the 
policy.  If all other features of the policy are held constant, an increase in the policy length will 
also increase the premium.  This is because a longer policy is associated with a larger reduction 
in risk, and producers are expected to pay a higher premium for the larger reduction in risk.  
Since the 360-day policy was the least preferred, policies that extend for more than 180 days 
may be less attractive, especially if a higher premium is attached.  Insurance products with 
policy lengths close to 180 days are expected to be the most attractive to cow-calf producers.  
In person was the most attractive method of marketing for producers in this study, and 
the least preferred method of marketing was the Internet.  The part worth utility estimate for 
telephone method of marketing (MMTP) was positive but not statistically significant.   
Marketing insurance products in person is the most expensive method for insurers because of 
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the time and personnel required.  The Internet provides the least expensive method for 
marketing insurance policies.  Insurance providers would prefer being able to market insurance 
products through the Internet; however, if this is the only method used it may have a negative 
impact on participation, at least in the short run.  Producers indicated that they would prefer 
being able to speak with an individual to establish each policy rather than using the Internet.  It 
is likely that marketing policies will require an initial consultation with an insurance provider, 
but transactions after the initial consultation will likely be carried out by a combination of 
telephone and Internet communication. 
Given the most and least preferred levels of each attribute, the highest ranked (most 
preferred) product had a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt, a 180-day policy length, state 
price series, and an in-person method of marketing.   The product least preferred by producers 
in the study contained a Premium|Deductible of $0.50|$10.00/cwt, a 360-day policy length, 
national price series, and an Internet method of marketing.  The highest ranked product is not 
likely to be available since the state price series and the in-person method of marketing may not 
be used.  The national price series in the lowest ranked product make it unlikely to be available.  
Given that a regional price series and telephone and/or Internet method of marketing are likely, 
the most realistic product with the highest rank (ranked 18 in Economic Scenario 1) would have 
a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt, a 180-day policy length, regional price series, and an 
Internet method of marketing.  Nearly 50 percent of producers indicated that they would 
purchase a product with these attributes.  The most realistic product with the lowest rank 
(ranked 67 in Economic Scenario 1) would have a Premium|Deductible of $0.50|$10.00/cwt, a 
360-day policy length, regional price series, and an Internet method of marketing.  Only 13.5 
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percent of producers indicated that they would purchase this product if it were the only one 
available. 
5.2.2 Market Segments  
The results of the cluster analysis separated producers into three market segments.  The 
market segment associated with Cluster 1 was comprised of relatively small producers who had 
other sources of income that could be used to protect them against beef cattle price fluctuations.  
They were typically older and less concerned about reducing price risk through innovative 
marketing techniques such as video auctions.  Because producers in this market segment were 
not very dependent on income from beef cattle, their preferences for the price-related attributes 
were different from other producers.   They indicated that having a product with a state price 
series was most important; however, it was less important to them as compared to other 
producers.  Producers in this market segment were more concerned about the policy length than 
the premium associated with the policy.  These producers favored products with a 
Premium|Deductible of $1.25|$5.00/cwt, a 180-day policy length, and a telephone method of 
marketing.  Since these producers had other sources of risk protection, they did not prefer 
investing in a policy that provided a full price guarantee.  They would purchase an insurance 
policy only to protect against a drastic price decline.  Producers in this cluster were considered 
the least likely to purchase livestock revenue insurance.   
The second market segment (Cluster 2) contained producers who were relatively small; 
however, these producers were very concerned about beef cattle prices.  Producers in this 
market segment had the lowest overall education level, and the revenue from beef cattle 
represented a substantial portion of their income.  They utilized innovative marketing strategies 
similar to larger farms, and they were generally more risk prone than other producers.  
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Producers in this cluster indicated that the premium|deductible was the most important attribute, 
followed by the price series.  They strongly preferred products with a $2.24/cwt premium and 
no deductible.  These producers were more concerned about securing a full price guarantee than 
other producers.  Since products with a deductible require the producer to assume more risk, it 
was expected a priori that risk-taking producers would be more likely to select products with a 
deductible.  However, their dependence upon small-scale beef cattle production as a substantial 
portion of their income provided greater incentive to utilize risk-reduction strategies.  Producers 
in this market segment preferred policies based on a state price series that had an in-person 
method of marketing, but they were relatively indifferent between policies with a 90-day and a 
180-day policy length.  Since these producers were risk prone, they were expected to be 
attracted to a 90-day policy.  With the 90-day policy, they produce for a longer period with 
cattle uninsured and take the risk that market conditions will change in their favor.   
The market segment associated with Cluster 3 was comprised primarily of producers 
with large operations where farming was the primary source of income.  This cluster 
represented the youngest, most educated group of producers.  Producers in this segment utilized 
a wide variety of marketing strategies to reduce exposure to price risk, and they closely 
monitored trends in beef cattle market prices.  The results indicated that the preferences of 
producers in this market segment were affected by the price series substantially more than other 
producers. These producers strongly preferred products with a state price series.  As a result of 
their knowledge of beef cattle price trends, these producers were aware of the value of a state 
price series for Louisiana producers.  Producers in this market segment were more likely to 
choose products with a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt, a 180-day policy length, and an 
in-person method of marketing.  Producers in this market segment currently used a variety of 
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marketing strategies to reduce price risk, and they were likely to purchase insurance to further 
diversify their risk management strategies.  
5.2.3 Purchase Decision Analysis 
Nine hypothetical products were used for the purchase decision analysis.  The results 
indicated that several factors had a significant influence on a producers decision to purchase 
livestock revenue insurance.  For all products, the economic scenarios had a significant impact 
on the probability of purchasing insurance.  Producers were more likely to purchase insurance 
when the current cash market price was below the futures price and when the current cash price 
was above the futures price.  It was expected a priori that producers would be more inclined to 
purchase insurance when prices were high and expected to decline, given that revenue was 
expected to decline in this situation.  The results suggest that producers may view livestock 
revenue insurance as a means of revenue enhancement rather than revenue protection.  
The producers age and education level had a significant impact on their decision to 
purchase insurance.  Overall, older producers were found to be less likely to purchase insurance.  
However, when the premium was $0.50/cwt ($10.00/cwt deductible), the probability of 
purchasing insurance increased with age.  This suggests that older producers are commonly able 
to use other sources of income to self-insure against losses from beef cattle production.  When 
they do purchase insurance, they are willing to pay a small premium in order to protect against 
an extreme drop in prices.  Producers who were less educated were found to prefer products that 
had a premium of $2.24 and no deductible.  A higher education level was found to increase the 
probability that a producer would purchase products with higher deductibles (lower price 
guarantees).    Producers who frequently monitored beef cattle futures prices were found to have 
a higher probability of purchasing all types of products.  These producers were usually more 
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concerned about the revenue they received from beef cattle, and, as a result, they were 
interested in livestock insurance as a method of protecting their revenue. 
Producers who were risk averse had a higher probability of purchasing insurance, which 
was consistent with economic theory.  Many risk averse producers showed a preference for 
products with $5.00/cwt and $10.00 deductibles, while producers who characterized themselves 
as risk prone often preferred products with $0.00 deductible.  In such cases, the price guarantee 
may reflect the producers desired or break-even price.   Producers who had a debt-to-asset ratio 
of less than 20 percent were less likely to purchase insurance.   Producers with lower debt-to-
asset ratios have more wealth relative to debt, and therefore, have less need for insurance.  
Producers who had multiple enterprises were also less likely to purchase insurance.  Enterprise 
diversification serves as a strategy for reducing revenue risk; consequently, it reduces the 
producers need to purchase livestock revenue insurance.    
The type of marketing strategy used by producers influenced their probability of 
purchasing insurance.  When cattle were marketed through video auctions or private buyers, the 
probability of purchasing insurance normally decreased.  However, when the product had 
features that were attractive to producers who used video auctions, the probability of purchasing 
insurance increased.  For example, the probability of purchasing a product with a 360-day 
policy length and/or a state price series increased for producers who used video auctions.  
Products based on a state price series were attractive to all producers, and the 360-day price 
guarantee provides an opportunity not available through video auctions.  The use of private 
buyers consistently reduced the probability of a producer purchasing a product.  Producers who 
used private buyers commonly received prices above the cash market price, which decreased 
their desire to purchase insurance.      
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Products with a state price series and/or a Premium|Deductible of $2.24|$0.00/cwt were 
the most popular among producers.  However, a wide array of products will be purchased by a 
diverse group of producers because producers have limited opportunities for protecting 
themselves against losses.  Products that had a 360-day policy length or a national price series 
were the least likely to be purchased. 
5.2.4 Concerns About Livestock Revenue Insurance 
Overall, the results show significant interest in livestock revenue insurance among cow-
calf producers in Louisiana.  Cow-calf producers in Louisiana possess similar characteristics 
and face economic conditions similar to other producers in the southeastern region of the U.S.  
Consequently, cow-calf producers throughout the region are expected to be attracted to 
livestock revenue insurance as a tool for mitigating price risk.  In this study, eleven producers 
(21.2 percent) indicated that they would not purchase livestock revenue insurance under any 
circumstances.  Most of these producers (54.5 percent) indicated that they preferred using other 
methods of risk protection.  Other producers articulated concerns that government intervention 
would negatively affect beef cattle prices in the long run. 
Although livestock revenue insurance provides several benefits to beef cattle producers, 
there are some issues and concerns that may impact the long-term success of the product.  One 
major concern is with premium subsidies, which the federal government is expected to provide 
to encourage participation.  However, premium subsidies could lead to over-production in the 
long run.  The premiums paid for an insurance product are expected to be at least as high as the 
returns received from indemnity payments over time.  Therefore, when the premium is 
actuarially fair, producers will decide to purchase based upon their risk exposure and risk 
preference.  If the premiums are subsidized, the true risk may not be internalized into the 
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decision-making process.  Consequently, producers will be inclined to take on more risk than 
they would if the product had an actuarially fair premium.  This would result in producers 
raising more beef or producing beef under more risky conditions (Skees).  A study by Coffey et 
al. indicated that producers would expand their operations to the level that results in their being 
exposed to a level of risk equivalent to the level that they were exposed to prior to the subsidy.  
If premium subsidies lead to increased production, it will cause beef cattle prices to decrease 
over time, ceteris paribus.    
Another concern is that livestock revenue insurance products assist producers only with 
reducing price risk within a one-year period.  The insurance is able to help stabilize the revenue 
a producer receives from beef cattle each year, but it does not provide support in years when 
prices are uncommonly low.  If prices are extremely low for an extended period of time, 
insurance only allows producers to guarantee prices that are also low.   If the price guarantee is 
below the producers break-even price, then he will not be willing to purchase insurance.  As a 
result of this problem, some producers expressed interest in products that provided multi-year 
guarantees.   With a multi-year guarantee, producers would agree to pay an annual premium to 
guarantee a certain level of income over several years.  The evaluation of economic conditions 
in this study suggests that when prices are relatively low and expected to increase, producers 
will continue to purchase insurance.    
Livestock revenue insurance allows all producers to pay the same premium and get the 
same price guarantee for a particular product.  It does not take the quality of the calves being 
sold into account.  This could lead to an adverse selection problem.  Adverse selection exists 
when it is not possible to differentiate producers according to risk types, and as a result, it is not 
possible to set appropriate premiums.  Adverse selection leads to individuals who have a low 
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risk of loss being less likely to purchase insurance, while high risk individuals are more likely 
to purchase insurance.  The pooling of high risk and low risk individuals is likely to 
indirectly subsidize high-risk producers.  With livestock production, producers with lower 
quality calves10 or poor management skills have a greater chance of receiving prices below the 
average cash market price.  These producers can be considered high risk producers.  
Livestock revenue insurance allows these producers to pay the same premium and guarantee the 
same price as producers with high quality cattle.  Therefore, producers with lower quality cattle 
benefit the most from livestock revenue insurance since the difference in the price they 
commonly receive and the guaranteed price is larger than that of producers of higher quality 
cattle.  This problem may be reduced to a degree by requiring producers to maintain and supply 
production-related records on cattle.  If this issue is not addressed, it could lead to increased 
production of low quality calves. 
5.2.5  Limitations of the Study 
Conjoint analysis provides an attractive methodology for analyzing new product 
acceptance.  It allows producers to make tradeoffs between the attributes of different products 
similar to an actual purchase decision.  One disadvantage of conjoint analysis is that the number 
of attribute levels that can be evaluated is limited.  In this study, the premium and policy length 
attributes were limited to three levels so that producers would have a reasonable number of 
product profiles to evaluate.  The attributes were confined to being evaluated based upon two 
extreme levels and a midpoint level.  The researcher is required to make judgments about the 
most appropriate attribute levels to include in the study.  When products are marketed, there 
will be between six and ten different premium and deductible combinations available, as well as 
                                                 
10 Low-quality calves refers to animals that have low average daily gains and/or those that will produce low quality 
grades of meat.  
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about ten policy length options.  It is likely that producers would have exhibited a stronger 
preference for attribute levels that were not presented in the study.      
The data for this study were collected through personal interviews with beef cattle 
producers throughout Louisiana.  Collecting data via personal interview had obvious advantages 
and disadvantages.  The primary advantage of personal interviews is that the quality of the data 
collected is superior to mail survey or telephone interview techniques.  Conjoint questions can 
be difficult to understand and personal interviews allow producers to interact and ask questions 
to the interviewer to insure a clear understanding of the question.   
On the other hand, personal interviews can be costly when a large sample of producers 
is needed.  Because personal interviews were used in this study, the number of producers 
interviewed and the geographical region surveyed was limited.   Personal interviews also 
required a considerable amount of time as a result of the length of interviews and the travel 
necessary to reach each producer.  Mail surveys could be used to increase the number of 
respondents and the geographical region surveyed, but the quality of the data would be 
sacrificed.   
5.2.6  Future Research 
The empirical analysis in this study has exhibited the attractiveness of conjoint analysis 
for analyzing the acceptance of livestock revenue insurance among cow-calf producers. 
Livestock revenue insurance products are broken down into multiple attributes and each 
attributes contribution to total utility can be determined. This study represents the first 
application in agricultural economics literature of conjoint analysis for evaluating insurance 
product attributes.   
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This study focused on evaluating the preference structure of cow-calf producers; 
however, further research should be conducted to evaluate the preferences of producers 
involved in other phases of production such as stockers and feedlots.  Producers involved in 
other phases of production are likely to place emphasis on different product attributes than cow-
calf producers.  Their decision to purchase livestock revenue insurance may also differ because 
they generally have an established relationship with buyers, which results in higher prices.   
Livestock revenue insurance products are currently being pilot tested on Iowa hog 
producers, and pilot projects are expected to extend to cattle producers by the first quarter of 
2003.  The methodology used to evaluate livestock revenue insurance products in this research 
can be employed to evaluate producers preferences for other products as more information 
becomes available about product design.  Pilot projects can only be conducted with a limited 
number of producers due to the associated cost.  Conjoint analysis allows the researcher to 
gather information on product preferences from a larger group. 
5.2.7  Final Comments   
Currently, most beef cattle producers do not take advantage of the risk management tools 
available.  This is primarily a result of the level of understanding and expertise required, as well 
as the volume of cattle needed to participate in risk-reducing activities.  Beef cattle producers 
need an affordable, user-friendly tool for reducing price risk.  Determining the importance of 
various attributes will provide valuable insight to policy-makers for the development of new 
revenue insurance products. Identifying the characteristics of producers who prefer certain 
attributes will provide useful product marketing information to insurance companies.  In 
addition, observing producers reactions to insurance products in different economic situations 
will provide valuable information on how products will perform.  Insurance providers may gain 
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information on how to change premium prices or other product features to make the products 
more attractive in certain economic situations.  Insurance providers can use the information 
from the cluster and purchase decision analyses to target potential clientele with policies that 
have the specific bundles of attributes preferred by similar producers.  The results of this study 
can assist policy makers and private insurance providers in properly allocating resources for 
product development and marketing.  Livestock producers will also be better informed about 
possible products available and, as a result, they will be able to make better decisions in 
selecting a policy for their particular operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218
REFERENCES 
 
 
Aldenderfer, Mark S. and Roger K. Blashfield. (1984) Cluster Analysis.  Sage University Paper 
Series on Quantitative Applications in Social Sciences.  Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications. 
 
American Agrisurance Inc. (2000) Definitions and Explanation of Various Types of Insurance.  
Website. www.amag.com/html/instypes 
 
Babcock, B.A. and D. Hayes. (1999) Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance for Crop and Livestock 
Producers.  Center for Agricultural and Rural Development.  Briefing Paper 99-BP 22.  
 
Baker, G. A. and P. J. Crosbie. (1993) Measuring Food Safety Preferences:  Identifying 
Consumer Segments.  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 18(2):277-287. 
 
Barnett, B.J. and K. Coble. (1999) Understanding Crop Insurance Principles:  A Primer For  
Farm Leaders.  Mississippi State University, Research Report No. 209. 
 
Black, D.L. and J.H. Dorfman. (2000) Identifying Farmer Characteristics Related to Crop 
Insurance Purchase Decesions.  Selected Paper. American Agricultural Economics 
Association, Summer Meeting. Tampa, Florida.  2000. 
          
Boyle, Kevin, Thomas P. Holmes,  Mario Teisl, and Brian Roe.  (2001) A Comparison of 
Conjoint Analysis Response Formats. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
83(2):441-54. 
 
Bossman, D. A. (1999) The Federal Crop Insurance Program:  The Need for Livestock Revenue 
Protection.  American Feed Industry Association.  Statement to the House Sub 
Committee on Risk Management and Specialty Crops.  House Committee on 
Agriculture. 
 
Cattin, Phillippe and D. R. Wittink.  (1982) Commercial Use of Conjoint Analysis:  A Survey.  
Journal of Marketing, 46: 44 53. 
  
Coble, K., T.O. Knight, G.F. Patrick, and A.E. Baquet. (1999) Crop Producer Risk Management 
Survey:  A Preliminary Summary of Selected Data.  Mississippi State University, 
Information Report No. 99-001. 
 
Coble, K. T.O. Knight, R. D. Pope, and J.R. Williams. (1996) Modeling Farm-Level Crop 
Insurance Demand with Panel Data.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  
78:439-447. 
 
 
 219
Coffey, B.K., J.R. Skees, C.R. Dillon, and J.D. Anderson. (2001) Potential Effects of 
Subsidized Livestock Insurance on Livestock Production.  Selected Paper at the 
American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting.  Chicago, IL, August, 
2001. 
 
Dennis, D. F.  (1998) Analyzing Public Inputs to Multiple Objective Decisions on National 
Forests Using Conjoint Analysis. Forest Science.  44(3): 421-429. 
 
Foltz, J. C., J. G. Lee, M.A. Martin, and P. V. Preckel.  (1995) Multiattribute Assessment of 
Alternative Cropping Systems.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  77: 408-
420. 
 
Fraser, R. (1992) An Analysis of Willingness-To-Pay for Crop Insurance.  Australian Journal 
of Agricultural Economics.  36(1):  83-95.  
 
Gan, C. and E. J. Luzar.  (1993) A Conjoint Analysis of Waterfowl Hunting in Louisiana.  
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 25(2):36-45. 
 
Gillespie, J. and Scott Fausti. (2000) A Comparative Analysis of Risk Preference Elicitation 
Procedures Using Mail Survey Results.  Selected paper presented at the annual meetings 
of SERA-IEG-31, Economics and Management of Risk in Agriculture and Natural 
Resources.  Gulf Shores, Alabama, March, 2000. 
 
Gillespie, J., Gary Taylor, A. Schupp, and F. Wirth. (1998) Opinions of Professional Buyers 
Toward a New, Alternative Red Meat:  Ostrich.  Agribusiness: An International Journal.  
14(3): 247-256. 
 
Gillespie, J. and V. Eidman.  (1998) The Effect of Risk and Autonomy on Independent Hog 
Producers Contracting Decisions.  Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics.  
30(1): 175-188. 
 
Gineo, Wayne M.  (1990) A Conjoint/Logit Analysis of Nursery Stock Purchases. Northeastern 
Journal of Agricultural Resource Economics.  19(1): 49. 
 
Goodman, Allen C. (1989).  Identifying Willingness-To-Pay for Heterogeneous Goods with 
Factorial Survey Methods.  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.  
(16):58-79. 
 
Green, P.E. (1990) Conjoint Analysis in Marketing Research:  New Developments and 
Directions.  Journal of Marketing.  54(4): 3-19. 
 
Greene, W.H. (2000). Econometric Analysis.  4th Edition. New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall, Inc.   
 
Halbrendt, C.K., R.J. Bacon, and J. Pesek. (1992) Weighted Least Squares Analysis for 
Conjoint Studies: The Case of Hybrid Striped Bass.  Agribusiness: An International 
Journal.  8(2):187 -198. 
 220
 
 Halbrendt, C.K., F.F. Wirth, and G.F. Vaughn.  (1991) Conjoint Analysis of the Mid-Atlantic 
Food-Fish Market for Farm-Raised Hybrid Striped Bass.  Southern Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 23:155-63. 
 
Harrison, R. W., A. Ozayan, and S. P. Meyers. (1998) A Conjoint Analysis of New Food 
Products Processed from Underutilized Small Crawfish.  Journal of Agriculture and 
Applied Economics. 30 (2):257-265. 
 
Hobbs, J. E. (1996) Transaction Costs and Slaughter Cattle Procurement:  Processors Selection 
of Supply Channels.  Agribusiness: An International Journal. 12 (6):509-523.  
 
Holland, Daniel and Cathy R. Wessells.  (1998) Predicting Consumer Preferences for Fresh 
Salmon:  The Influence of Safety Inspection and Production Method Attributes.  
Agricultral and Resource Economics Review, 27:1-14. 
 
Judge, G., C. Hill, W. Griffiths, T. Lee, and H. Lutkepol.  (1982) An Introduction to the Theory 
and Practice of Econometrics.  New York:  John Wiley and Sons.  
 
Kanji, Gopal K.  (1993) 100 Statistical Tests.  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc. 
    
Keeney, Ralph L. and Howard Raiffa. (1993) Decisions with Multiple Objectives:  Preferences 
and Value Tradeoffs.  Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Knox, L. and T. J. Richards. (1999) A Two-Stage Model of the Demand for Specialty Crop 
Insurance.  American Agricultural Economics Association, Summer Meeting. Nashville, 
Tennessee 1999. 
 
Knutson, R.D., E.G. Smith, D.P. Anderson, and J.W. Richardson.  (1998) Southern Farmers 
Exposure to Income Risk Under the 1996 Farm Bill.  Journal of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, 30(1):35-46. 
 
Lancaster, Kevin. (1971) Consumer Demand; A New Approach.  New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
Louviere, Jordan J. (1988) Analyzing Decision Making  Metric Conjoint Analysis.  Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Lin, Biing-Hwan, Steven Payson, and Jane Wertz. (1996)  Opinions of Professional Buyers 
Toward Organic  Produce:  A Case Study of  Mid-Atlantic Market for Fresh Tomatoes.  
Agribusiness: An International Journal.  12 (1): 89-97. 
 
Mackenzie, John. (1993) A Comparison of Contingent Preference Models.  American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics.  75:593-603. 
 
 221
Mackenzie, John.  (1990) Conjoint Analysis of Deer Hunting.  Northeastern Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics. 19 (2):109-117. 
 
Maddala, G.S. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.  New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mathews, Kenneth, William F. Hahn, Kenneth E. Nelson, Lawrence A. Duewer, and Ronald 
Gustafson.  (1999) U.S. Beef Industry:  Cattle Cycles, Price Spreads, and Packer 
Concentration.  Market and Trade Economics Division, USDA Economic Research 
Service.  Technical Bulletin No. 1874. 
 
Miquel, F.S., M. Ryan, and E. McIntosh.  (2000) Applying Conjoint Analysis in Economic 
Evaluation: An Application to Menorrhagia.  Applied Economics.  32(7): 823.  
 
Norusis, Marija.  (1990)  SPSS Base System Users Guide.  Chicago:SPSS Inc. 
 
Pennings, Joost M.E. and Raymond M. Leuthold.  (2000) The Role of Farmers Behavioral 
Attitudes and Heterogeneity in Futures Contracts Usage.  American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics.  82(4): 908-919. 
   
 
Prentice, B. E. and D. Benell. (1992) Determinants of Empty Returns by U.S. Refrigerated 
Trucks:  Conjoint Analysis Approach. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics,  40 
(1):109-127. 
 
Reddy, V. S. and R. J. Bush.  (1998) Measuring Softwood Lumber Value: A Conjoint Analysis 
Approach.  Forest Science. 44 (1):145-157. 
 
Roberts, M. C., B.K. Goodwin, and K. Coble. (1998). Measurement of Price Risk in Revenue 
Insurance:  Implications of Distributional Assumptions.  American Agricultural 
Economics Association, Summer Meeting. Salt Lake City, Utah.  1998. 
 
Roe, B., K. J. Boyle, and M. F. Teisl.  (1996) Using Conjoint Analysis to Derive Estimates of 
Compensating Variation.  Journal of Environmental Management. 31(2):145-159. 
 
Schnepf, R., R. Heifner, and R. Dismukes. (1999) Insurance and Hedging:  Two Ingredients for 
a Risk Management Recipe.  Agricultural Outlook. April, 1999: 27-33. 
 
Skees, J.R. (1999) Policy Implications of Income Insurance:  Lessons Learned from US and 
Canada.  Principle Paper, European Agricultural Economics Association, Warsaw, 
Poland, 1999.  
 
Skees, J.R., J. Harwood, A. Somwaru, and Janet Perry. (1998)  The Potential for Revenue 
Insurance in the South.  Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 30 (1): 47-61.   
 
 222
Smith, Vincent and Alan E. Baquet. (1996) The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance:  
Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics.  
78(1): 189-201.  
 
Stevens, T. H., C. Barrett, and C. E. Willis. (1997) Conjoint Analysis of Groundwater 
Protection Programs.  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review. 26 (2): 229-236. 
  
Stevens, T.H., D. Dennis, D. Kittredge, and M. Rickenbach.  (1999) Attitudes and Preferences 
Toward Co-operative Agreements for Management of Private Forestlands in the North-
eastern United States.  Journal of Environmental Management. 55(2): 81-90. 
 
Sy, H. A., M. D. Faminow, G. V. Johnson, and G. Crow. (1997) Estimating the Values of Cattle 
Characteristics Using an Ordered Probit Model.  American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 79(2): 463-476. 
 
Sylvia, Gilbert, and Sherry L. Larkin.  (1995) Firm-level Intermediate Demand for Pacific 
Whiting Products:  A Multi-attribute, Multi-sector Analysis.  Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics.  43: 501-518. 
 
US House of Representatives. House Bill 2559 Section 132. 
 
USDA.  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.  (1998) Marketing Practices in Beef Cow-
Calf Operations.  http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cahm.  
 
USDA.  National Agricultural Statistics Service.  1997 U.S. Census of Agriculture. 
 
USDA.  Risk Management Agency.  Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. Strengthening the 
Farm Safety Net.   USDA Office of the Secretary.  Released February 1, 1999. 
 
Vandeveer, M. L. and E. T. Loehman.  (1994) Farmer Response to Modified Crop Insurance:  A 
Case Study of Corn in Indiana.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
76(2):128-140. 
 
Varian, H. A. (1992) Microeconomic Analysis.  New York:  W.W. Norton and Company. 
 
Wang, H.H., S.D. Hanson, R.J. Myers, and J.R. Black.  (1998) The Effects of Crop Yield 
Insurance Designs on Farmer Participation and Welfare.  American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 80(2):806-820. 
 
Yoo, Dong-il and Hiroshi Ohta. (1995)  Optimal Pricing and Product-Planning for New 
Multiattribute Products Based on Conjoint Analysis.  International Journal of 
Production Economics.  38: 245-253. 
 
 
 
 
 223
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: HYPOTHETICAL REVENUE INSURANCE PRODUCTS
 224
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product 1 
 
Premium:  $2.24/cwt 
Deductible:  $0.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  90 days 
Price Series:  State 
Method of Marketing: In Person 
 
 
               Product Rating 
Product 2 
 
Premium:  $1.25/cwt 
Deductible:  $5.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  360 days 
Price Series:  State 
Method of Marketing: Telephone 
 
 
               Product Rating 
Product 3 
 
Premium:  $0.50/cwt 
Deductible:  $10.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  180 days 
Price Series:  State 
Method of Marketing: Internet 
 
 
                Product Rating 
Product 4 
 
Premium:  $1.25/cwt 
Deductible:  $5.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  180 days 
Price Series:  Regional 
Method of Marketing: In Person 
 
 
               Product Rating 
Product 5 
 
Premium:  $0.50/cwt 
Deductible:  $10.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  90 days 
Price Series:  Regional 
Method of Marketing: Telephone 
 
 
           Product Rating 
Product 6 
 
Premium:  $2.24/cwt 
Deductible:  $0.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  360 days 
Price Series:  Regional 
Method of Marketing: Internet 
 
 
               Product Rating 
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Product 7 
 
Premium:  $0.50/cwt 
Deductible:  $10.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  360 days 
Price Series:  National 
Method of Marketing: In Person 
 
 
               Product Rating 
Product 8 
 
Premium:  $2.24/cwt 
Deductible:  $0.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  180 days 
Price Series:  National 
Method of Marketing: Telephone 
 
 
               Product Rating 
Product 9 
 
Premium:  $1.25/cwt 
Deductible:  $5.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  90 days 
Price Series:  National 
Method of Marketing: Internet 
 
 
            Product Rating 
Product 10 
 
Premium:  $2.24/cwt 
Deductible:  $0.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  180 days 
Price Series:  State 
Method of Marketing: Telephone 
 
 
            Product Rating 
Product 11 
 
Premium:  $1.25/cwt 
Deductible:  $5.00/cwt 
Policy Length:  90 days 
Price Series:  Regional 
Method of Marketing: Internet 
 
 
            Product Rating 
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APPENDIX B:  AGENT LETTER
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December 14, 2001 
 
 
Dear County Extension Agent: 
 
As you know, livestock producers are exposed to a significant amount of price risk, which has a negative 
impact on the financial stability of their operation. Traditionally, relatively few mechanisms for reducing 
price risk have been available to U.S. livestock producers.  Although futures and options are available, 
they are not user-friendly and a very limited number of beef cattle producers use them.  As a result, the 
U.S. Congress appropriated funds in the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act with the specific purpose 
of developing revenue insurance products for livestock producers.     
 
Currently, emphasis is being placed on product development and identifying the set of products that are 
most suitable for livestock producers.  We are conducting a study designed to determine beef cattle 
producer preferences for livestock revenue protection products, as well as their willingness to pay for 
various revenue insurance products.  The results of this study will be of national interest to the USDA 
Risk Management Agency, private insurers, and cattle producers.   
 
Your parish has been selected as an area to gather farm-level data in Louisiana because of its significant 
contribution to Louisianas total beef production.  Consequently, we are requesting your assistance in 
identifying beef cattle producers within your parish to participate in a survey that focuses on livestock 
revenue protection.  We will administer the survey in a personal interview setting at a time and place 
convenient for the producer.  Survey participants are assured that all individual responses will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your assistance with identifying producers to participate from your parish will play 
an integral role in the success of this study.  
 
This study is an important part of the dissertation research for a Ph.D. candidate in the department of 
Agricultural Economics at Louisiana State University.  Therefore, your assistance will help him gather the 
data needed to complete his dissertation and requirements for graduation. A summary of the survey 
results will be provided to you and all other interested individuals. 
 
We will be contacting you within the next month to further discuss your participation and the type of beef 
cattle producers we are interested in surveying from your parish.  If you have any questions, please feel 
free to contact me (Jeffrey Gillespie) at (225) 578-2759. Thank you for your assistance with this study. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
 
Jeffrey M. Gillespie, Ph.D.      Deacue Fields  
Associate Professor      Graduate Student 
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Section I: FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
1. How would you characterize your farm business structure (Circle one)? 
 
a) Sole proprietorship  c) Family corporation  e) Cooperative 
b) Partnership   d) Non-family corporation 
 
2. Does more than half of your income come from farming? 
 
a) yes  b)  no 
 
3. How many total acres of land do you operate (own, lease, or use free)? 
 
            (acres) 
 
4. How many acres of land do you rent or lease for production? 
 
                         (acres) 
 
5. How many acres of land are used for beef cattle and allied production? 
 
                         (acres) 
 
6. In what phases of production are you involved? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Purebred production   % of herd c) Stocker  % of herd 
b) Cow/calf production   % of herd d) Feedlot  % of herd 
 
7. Specify the number of each of the following types of animals you ran in your beef cattle operation during 
2001.  
 
Cows and calving heifers  Replacement heifers  Stockers 
Bulls     Calves for sale   Feeders 
 
8. Including yourself, how many family members work on your farm in the typical year? 
  
(number) 
 
9. How many non-family, part-time (1 to 39 hours per week) employees do you hire for your cattle operation 
annually? 
  
(number) 
 
10. How many non-family, full-time (40 or more hours per week) permanent employees work on your cattle 
operation? 
  
(number) 
 
11. Are you a member of the Louisiana Cattlemans Association? 
 
a) yes  b) no 
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12. What is the estimated market value of your farm including land, buildings, machinery, animals etc.? 
 
a) Less than $100,000  d) $500,000 to $750,000 
b) $100,000 to $249,999  e) $750,000 to $999,999 
c) $250,000 to $499,999  f) $1,000,000 or more 
 
13. In the next five years, I plan to: (Circle one) 
 
a) Expand the size of my cattle operation            c) Maintain the current size of my cattle operation 
b) Reduce the size of my cattle operation 
 
14. Which of the following marketing practices do you use for your beef cattle operation? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Auction barn c) Private buyer   e) Internet cattle marketing 
b) Video auction d) Retained ownership  f) Other (please specify) 
 
15. What is the average weaning weight of your calves? 
 
  lbs/calf 
 
16. What is the average weight of calves that you take to market? 
 
  lbs/calf 
 
17. Please circle any other livestock and/or crops you raise in your operation. (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Hogs  f) Corn   k) Oats    p) Other (please list)  
b) Sheep  g) Cotton  l) Sorghum     
c) Goats  h) Soybeans  m) Vegetables/Fruits    
d) Broilers  i) Wheat  n) Hay 
e) Dairy  j) Sugarcane  o) Forestry 
 
18. What is your debt/asset ratio? (Circle one) 
 
a) Zero   c) 21to 40 percent  e) 61 to 80 percent 
b) 1 to 20 percent  d) 41 to 60 percent  f) Over 80 percent 
 
19. What is your primary source of information on new management strategies for beef production? (Circle one) 
 
a) County Extension Service   d) Media: radio, TV, or magazines 
b) Other producers     e) The Internet 
c) Farm organizations    f) I am not interested in new strategies 
 
 
Section II:  RECORD KEEPING 
1. Which of the following written financial records do you maintain on your beef cattle? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Feed costs   d) Vet and medical costs  g) Net worth of operation 
b) Receipts from cattle sales  e) Labor costs   h) Monthly cash flow 
c) Costs of equipment used  f) Transportation costs  i) Annual performance summary 
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2. How are the majority of your financial and production records kept? 
 
a) Handwritten ledgers   c) I do not maintain records 
b) Computer spreadsheets 
 
3. Do you maintain individual records on your cows to track the performance of offspring? 
 
a) yes  b) no 
 
4. On which of the following subject areas have you attended educational programs for beef cattle in the past 
two years? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Production  c) Risk management 
b) Marketing  d) Financial management 
 
 
Section III: RISK MANAGEMENT 
1. Which of the following risk management strategies have you used in the past or do you currently use in your 
operation? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Cash and other forward contracts  d) Crop revenue insurance  g) Futures and options  
b) Marketing cooperative   e) Enterprise diversification h) Other (specify) 
c) Crop yield insurance   f) Contract production 
 
2. Of the risk management strategies never used in your operation, which ones are you likely to use in the 
future? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a) Cash and other forward contracts  d) Crop revenue insurance  g) Futures and options  
b) Marketing cooperative   e) Enterprise diversification h) Other (specify) 
c) Crop yield insurance   f) Contract production 
 
3. Relative to other investors, how would you characterize yourself? (Circle one) 
 
a) I tend to take on substantial risks in my investment decisions. 
b) I neither seek nor avoid risk in my investment decisions. 
c) I tend to avoid risk when possible in my investment decisions. 
 
4. Do you feel that the risk management tools currently available to beef cattle producers are adequate? 
 
a) yes  b) no 
5. How important do you feel risk management strategies are for the success of your cattle operation? 
 
a) Very important   c) Not very important 
b) Somewhat important  d) Not important at all 
 
6. Would you be willing to participate in educational seminars to learn more about livestock revenue 
protection and other risk management strategies? 
 
a) yes  b) no 
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Investment 
Option 
 
Lowest Net Return 
(1/3 Chance) 
 
Average Net Return 
(1/3 Chance) 
 
Highest Net Return 
(1/3 Chance) 
Investment 1 $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
Investment 2 $8,170 $10,600 $13,030
Investment 3 $6,420 $11,200 $15,980
Investment 4 $5,420 $11,200 $16,980
Investment 5 $3,440 $10,600 $17,760
 
Of these investments, please circle the investment that you would choose (Circle one): 
 
a) Investment 1  c) Investment 3  e) Investment 5 
b) Investment 2  d) Investment 4 
 
 
 
Suppose you have $100,000 that you can invest in one of five different investment options.  These options 
and possible returns are illustrated in the chart and table below.  With Investment 1, you are certain to 
receive $10,000 or a 10% return.  Therefore, at the end of the year you will have $100,000 + $10,000 = 
$110,000.  However, you can increase your average net return by selecting a more risky investment.  In 
Investment 2, for example you have a 1/3 chance of receiving an average net return of $10,600.  However, 
your risk is increased since you would also have a 1/3 chance of receiving $8,170 and a 1/3 chance of 
receiving $13,030.  Please examine the five investments and answer the following question.    
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Section IV: DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. In what year were you born? 
 
19 
 
2. How many years have you been operating a farm?         (years) 
 
3. Do you have off-farm employment? If yes, how many hours per week?  (Circle one)  
 
a) yes  hrs/wk   b) no  c) retired 
 
4. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed? 
 
a) Less than high school  d) Completed a 4-yr college degree 
b) High school graduate  e) Completed a graduate degree 
c) Some college or technical school   
 
5. What was the total amount of agricultural product sales on your farm for 2000? 
 
a) Less than $10,000  d) $100,000 to 249,999   
b) $10,000 to 49,999  e) $250,000 to 499,999 
c) $50,000 to 99,999  f) $500,000 or more 
 
6. What percentage of your gross farm income comes from beef cattle production?  
 
a) 0 to 20 percent  c) 41 to 60 percent   e) 81 to 100 percent 
b) 21 to 40 percent  d) 61 to 80 percent 
 
Section V: REVENUE INSURANCE 
For this section, please review the following definitions of the various features that make up livestock 
revenue insurance policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Premium Price: The dollar amount the producer will pay for the insurance per hundredweight of 
cattle insured.  
 
Deductible/Coverage Level: The difference between the futures price and the price the producer 
wants to guarantee when the policy expires.  The deductible does not require an actual payment. 
  
Policy Length: The number of days that the producer selects to insure the price of his cattle. 
 
Price Series: This indicates whether a local, regional, or national price is used at the end of the 
period to determine the difference from the guaranteed price. 
 
Method of Marketing: This indicates whether producers purchase insurance from an agent in 
person, by telephone only, or through the Internet.    
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Please review the information in each of the cards presented by the interviewer.  Each card contains variations in 
the features of livestock revenue insurance products.  For a given economic scenario, please rate the product 
in each box using a scale from 0 to 10, where, 0 = Least preferred combination of product features and 10 
= Most preferred combination of product features.  
 
 
1. Who would you prefer to administer livestock revenue insurance? 
 
a) USDA  b) Private insurance companies c) No preference 
 
2. Whole-farm revenue insurance combines two or more enterprises and guarantees a percentage of the 
projected total revenue.  The total premium payment is significantly less than the sum of premiums required 
to insure each enterprise separately.  Would you prefer a whole-farm product that includes beef cattle as an 
enterprise? 
 
a) yes  b) no 
 
3. Please rank the influence from 1 (most influential) to 5 (least influential) of the following factors on your 
decision to purchase livestock revenue insurance. 
 
The attitude of other cattle producers toward livestock revenue insurance 
The amount of time and information required for purchasing a policy 
The reduction in the variability of revenue from livestock over time 
I currently use other forms of risk protection such as enterprise diversification or futures and 
options. 
      I believe the government will provide assistance in the event of a major price decline. 
 
4. How frequently do you check futures prices for beef cattle? 
 
a) Daily   c) Monthly 
b) Weekly  d) I never check futures prices 
 
5. Overall, I feel that livestock revenue protection will be beneficial to beef cattle producers. 
 
a) Strongly Agree  c) Disagree   e) Indifferent 
b) Agree   d) Strongly Disagree 
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Rating 
Purchase 
Decision 
Product 1   
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Product 4   
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Product 
 
Rating 
Purchase 
Decision 
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5    
Product 6   
Product 7    
Product 8   
Product 9   
Product 10   
Product 11   
Economic Scenario 1 
Current Price:  $90.00/cwt 
Futures Price: $100.00/cwt 
Economic Scenario 2 
Current Price: $70.00/cwt 
Futures Price: $80.00/cwt 
Economic Scenario 3 
Current Price: $80.00/cwt 
Futures Price: $80.00/cwt 
Economic Scenario 4 
Current Price: $100.00/cwt 
Futures Price: $90.00/cwt 
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Premium/Head: $2.24 = $11.20/head      $1.25 = $6.25/head      $0.50 = $2.50/head 
 
Based on 50 Calves @ 500 lbs each 
 
Economic Scenario 1 
Current Price: $90.00/cwt                      Futures Price: $100.00/cwt 
 
Calves 
Weight 
(cwt) 
Premium 
($/cwt) 
Total 
Premium ($)
Deductible 
($/cwt)  
Price 
Guarantee 
Revenue 
Guarantee 
50 5 $2.24 $560.00 $0.00 $100/cwt $25,000.00 
50 5 $1.25 $312.00 $5.00 $95/cwt $23,750.00 
50 5 $0.50 $125.00 $10.00 $90/cwt $22,500.00 
 
 
Economic Scenario 2 
Current Price: $70.00/cwt                     Futures Price: $80.00/cwt 
 
Calves 
Weight 
(cwt) 
Premium 
($/cwt) 
Total 
Premium ($)
Deductible 
($/cwt)  
Price 
Guarantee 
Revenue 
Guarantee 
50 5 $2.24 $560.00 $0.00 $80/cwt $20,000.00 
50 5 $1.25 $312.00 $5.00 $75/cwt $18,750.00 
50 5 $0.50 $125.00 $10.00 $70/cwt $17,500.00 
 
 
 Economic Scenario 3 
      Current Price: $80.00/cwt               Futures Price: $80.00/cwt 
 
Calves 
Weight 
(cwt) 
Premium 
($/cwt) 
Total 
Premium ($)
Deductible 
($/cwt)  
Price 
Guarantee 
Revenue 
Guarantee 
50 5 $2.24 $560.00 $0.00 $80/cwt $20,000.00 
50 5 $1.25 $312.00 $5.00 $75/cwt $18,750.00 
50 5 $0.50 $125.00 $10.00 $70/cwt $17,500.00 
 
 
Economic Scenario 4 
Current Price: $100.00/cwt                  Futures Price: $90.00/cwt 
 
Calves 
Weight 
(cwt) 
Premium 
($/cwt) 
Total 
Premium ($)
Deductible 
($/cwt)  
Price 
Guarantee 
Revenue 
Guarantee 
50 5 $2.24 $560.00 $0.00 $85/cwt $21,250.00 
50 5 $1.25 $312.00 $5.00 $80/cwt $20,000.00 
50 5 $0.50 $125.00 $10.00 $75/cwt $18,750.00 
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APPENDIX F:  DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCTS USED IN THE PURCHASE DECISION 
ANALYSIS 
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Table F.1:  Number of Producers Who Purchase Products Under Each Economic Scenario. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Product No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total All 
Scenarios 
1 25 48.1% 22 42.3% 8 15.4% 17 32.7% 72 
2 19 36.5% 18 34.6% 7 13.5% 14 26.9% 58 
3 13 25.0% 13 25.0% 6 11.5% 11 21.2% 43 
4 10 19.2% 10 19.2% 4 7.7% 10 19.2% 38 
5 15 28.9% 13 25.0% 4 7.7% 12 23.1% 44 
6 37 71.2% 34 65.4% 17 32.7% 26 50.0% 114 
7 7 13.5% 7 13.5% 3 5.8% 7 13.5% 24 
8 23 44.2% 21 40.4% 6 11.5% 16 30.8% 66 
9 16 30.8% 14 26.9% 5 9.6% 11 21.2% 46 
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APPENDIX G: ESTIMATED UTILITY AND RANKING OF ALL 81 PRODUCTS FOR 
THE FOUR ECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
 243
Table G.1: Estimated Utility Values for Insurance Products Under Economic Scenario 1. 
Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State In Person 8.65 1 34 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Telephone 8.40 2 36 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State In Person 8.24 3 37 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 7.99 4 37 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State In Person 7.90 5 27 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State In Person 7.69 6 28 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Internet 7.65 7 29 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.65 8 28 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State In Person 7.49 9 28 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.45 10 26 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State In Person 7.28 11 27 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Internet 7.25 12 31 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.24 13 27 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional In Person 7.11 14 26 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.04 15 24 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State In Person 6.97 16 29 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Internet 6.91 17 24 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.86 18 25 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Telephone 6.72 19 27 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Internet 6.70 20 21 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.70 21 23 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Internet 6.50 22 23 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.45 23 19 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional In Person 6.36 24 20 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Internet 6.29 25 24 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State In Person 6.22 26 24 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional In Person 6.16 27 21 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Internet 6.12 28 19 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 6.11 29 18 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State In Person 6.02 30 22 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Internet 5.98 31 22 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Telephone 5.97 32 22 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.95 33 12 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.91 34 19 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Telephone 5.77 35 22 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.75 36 16 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.71 37 16 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.70 38 10 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.50 39 15 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional In Person 5.43 40 16 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Internet 5.37 41 14 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Internet 5.23 42 15 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 5.18 43 13 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Internet 5.16 44 16 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Internet 5.02 45 13 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National In Person 5.02 46 14 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.96 47 11 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.77 48 15 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.75 49 13 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional In Person 4.68 50 12 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National In Person 4.61 51 10 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional In Person 4.48 52 11 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Internet 4.44 53 9 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 4.43 54 11 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.36 55 7 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National In Person 4.27 56 10 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 4.23 57 8 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National In Person 4.06 58 11 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Internet 4.02 59 6 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Telephone 4.02 60 9 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National In Person 3.86 61 6 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.81 62 10 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Internet 3.69 63 7 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National In Person 3.65 64 5 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Internet 3.61 65 3 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.61 66 6 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Internet 3.49 67 7 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.41 68 6 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National In Person 3.34 69 9 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Internet 3.28 70 5 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Telephone 3.09 71 8 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Internet 3.07 72 6 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Internet 2.87 73 2 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Internet 2.66 74 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National In Person 2.59 75 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National In Person 2.39 76 3 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Internet 2.35 77 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Telephone 2.34 78 5 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Telephone 2.14 79 4 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Internet 1.60 80 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Internet 1.39 81 1 
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Table G.2: Estimated Utility Values for Insurance Products Under Economic Scenario 2. 
Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State In Person 8.54 1 31 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Telephone 8.32 2 34 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State In Person 8.20 3 34 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 7.99 4 34 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State In Person 7.77 5 25 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State In Person 7.58 6 27 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.55 7 26 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Internet 7.55 8 26 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State In Person 7.43 9 26 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.36 10 26 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State In Person 7.24 11 27 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.22 12 25 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Internet 7.21 13 29 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.03 14 24 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State In Person 6.95 15 26 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Internet 6.78 16 23 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.76 17 23 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Telephone 6.74 18 24 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Internet 6.59 19 18 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.55 20 22 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Internet 6.44 21 22 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.42 22 21 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Internet 6.25 23 23 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.21 24 18 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State In Person 6.18 25 22 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State In Person 5.99 26 21 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.99 27 19 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Telephone 5.97 28 21 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Internet 5.96 29 20 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.80 30 18 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Telephone 5.78 31 21 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.78 32 17 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.77 33 18 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.65 34 12 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.59 35 16 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.46 36 14 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.44 37 10 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.43 38 14 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.25 39 13 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Internet 5.19 40 14 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional In Person 5.18 41 15 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Internet 5.00 42 12 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Internet 5.00 43 13 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 4.96 44 13 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National In Person 4.88 45 13 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.81 46 14 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.66 47 14 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.66 48 11 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National In Person 4.54 49 9 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.47 50 11 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional In Person 4.41 51 12 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.33 52 7 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional In Person 4.22 53 9 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 4.20 54 12 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Internet 4.19 55 9 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National In Person 4.11 56 9 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 4.01 57 8 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National In Person 3.92 58 11 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.90 59 9 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Internet 3.89 60 6 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National In Person 3.77 61 6 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.71 62 9 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National In Person 3.58 63 4 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.56 64 6 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Internet 3.55 65 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Internet 3.42 66 8 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.37 67 5 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National In Person 3.29 68 9 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Internet 3.23 69 6 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Internet 3.12 70 5 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Telephone 3.08 71 8 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Internet 2.93 72 6 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Internet 2.78 73 2 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Internet 2.59 74 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National In Person 2.52 75 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National In Person 2.33 76 1 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Telephone 2.31 77 5 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Internet 2.30 78 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Telephone 2.12 79 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Internet 1.53 80 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Internet 1.34 81 0 
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Table G.3: Estimated Utility Values for Insurance Products Under Economic Scenario 3. 
Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State In Person 8.31 1 17 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Telephone 8.12 2 16 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State In Person 8.09 3 18 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 7.89 4 17 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State In Person 7.51 5 13 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Internet 7.39 6 14 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State In Person 7.34 7 14 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.31 8 13 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State In Person 7.28 9 14 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Internet 7.16 10 15 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.15 11 13 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State In Person 7.12 12 15 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.09 13 11 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Telephone 6.92 14 14 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State In Person 6.81 15 14 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Telephone 6.61 16 13 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.59 17 10 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Internet 6.58 18 11 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Internet 6.42 19 9 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.40 20 8 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.36 21 6 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Internet 6.35 22 10 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Internet 6.19 23 10 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.17 24 7 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State In Person 6.00 25 11 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Internet 5.88 26 12 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State In Person 5.83 27 11 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Telephone 5.80 28 12 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.78 29 7 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.67 30 8 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Telephone 5.64 31 10 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.62 32 8 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.59 33 6 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.56 34 5 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.44 35 5 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.43 36 6 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.39 37 3 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.36 38 4 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.20 39 4 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional In Person 5.08 40 7 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Internet 5.07 41 9 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Internet 4.91 42 7 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 4.89 43 6 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.86 44 5 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.70 45 7 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National In Person 4.63 46 5 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.63 47 3 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.47 48 3 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.44 49 4 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National In Person 4.40 50 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional In Person 4.27 51 5 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.21 52 3 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Internet 4.16 53 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional In Person 4.11 54 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 4.08 55 5 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 3.92 56 2 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National In Person 3.82 57 4 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Internet 3.71 58 3 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National In Person 3.66 59 4 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.63 60 3 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National In Person 3.60 61 2 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Internet 3.48 62 2 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.47 63 2 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National In Person 3.43 64 1 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.40 65 2 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Internet 3.35 66 3 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.24 67 2 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Internet 3.19 68 1 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National In Person 3.12 69 4 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Telephone 2.93 70 4 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Internet 2.90 71 1 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Internet 2.74 72 1 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Internet 2.67 73 1 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Internet 2.51 74 0 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National In Person 2.31 75 1 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Internet 2.20 76 1 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National In Person 2.15 77 0 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Telephone 2.12 78 2 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Telephone 1.96 79 0 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Internet 1.39 80 1 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Internet 1.23 81 0 
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Table G.4: Estimated Utility Values for Insurance Products Under Economic Scenario 4. 
Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State In Person 8.44 1 25 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Telephone 8.19 2 26 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State In Person 8.01 3 26 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State In Person 7.77 4 21 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 7.77 5 26 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State In Person 7.54 6 20 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.53 7 21 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days State Internet 7.49 8 23 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State In Person 7.35 9 19 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Telephone 7.29 10 21 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State In Person 7.11 11 19 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Telephone 7.10 12 18 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Internet 7.06 13 24 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Telephone 6.86 14 18 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days State Internet 6.82 15 18 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State In Person 6.79 16 21 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.77 17 18 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days State Internet 6.58 18 20 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Telephone 6.55 19 19 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.52 20 17 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days State Internet 6.39 21 16 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 6.35 22 16 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days State Internet 6.16 23 19 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State In Person 6.13 24 14 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional In Person 6.10 25 15 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 6.09 26 14 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State In Person 5.89 27 14 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Telephone 5.88 28 15 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.87 29 13 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.86 30 11 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days State Internet 5.84 31 16 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.82 32 13 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional In Person 5.68 33 14 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Telephone 5.64 34 14 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.62 35 13 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional In Person 5.44 36 12 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 5.43 37 10 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 5.39 38 11 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 5.19 39 12 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days State Internet 5.17 40 12 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days Regional Internet 5.15 41 10 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional In Person 5.12 42 11 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days State Internet 4.94 43 14 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.91 44 12 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National In Person 4.91 45 11 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 4.88 46 11 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Internet 4.73 47 10 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.66 48 10 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Internet 4.49 49 11 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National In Person 4.49 50 9 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional In Person 4.46 51 10 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National In Person 4.24 52 8 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 4.24 53 7 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional In Person 4.22 54 8 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 4.21 55 9 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Internet 4.17 56 7 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National In Person 4.01 57 7 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.99 58 7 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 3.97 59 7 
$2.24/$0.00 180 Days National Internet 3.96 60 4 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National In Person 3.82 61 7 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.76 62 6 
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Product Attributes 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Estimated 
Utility Rank 
Number 
Purchased
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National In Person 3.58 63 4 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Telephone 3.57 64 6 
$1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Internet 3.53 65 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days Regional Internet 3.50 66 6 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Telephone 3.33 67 5 
$2.24/$0.00 90 Days National Internet 3.29 68 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days Regional Internet 3.27 69 7 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National In Person 3.26 70 8 
$2.24/$0.00 360 Days National Internet 3.05 71 2 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Telephone 3.02 72 8 
$1.25/$5.00 90 Days National Internet 2.87 73 2 
$1.25/$5.00 360 Days National Internet 2.63 74 2 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National In Person 2.60 75 4 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National In Person 2.36 76 3 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Telephone 2.35 77 5 
$0.50/$10.00 180 Days National Internet 2.31 78 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Telephone 2.11 79 4 
$0.50/$10.00 90 Days National Internet 1.64 80 3 
$0.50/$10.00 360 Days National Internet 1.41 81 1 
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APPENDIX H: PEARSON CORRELATION RESULTS TO TEST INTERNAL 
VALIDITY USING THE HOLDOUT CARD 
 256
Table H.1:  Test for Internal Validity Using the Predicted and Actual Rating for the 
Holdout Card in Each Economic Scenario. 
 
ECONOMIC SCENARIO 1 
                                 
   Variable           N          Mean       Std Dev           Sum          Minimum       Maximum 
   Predic1             52       4.68341       1.56839       243.53730       0.22220           7.27780 
   Actual1             52       4.48077       1.74323       233.00000      1.00000         10.00000 
 
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS, N = 52 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
                                               
              Predic1       Actual1 
 
                               Predic1       1.00000       0.66503 
                                                                  <.0001 
 
                             Actual1       0.66503       1.00000 
                                                                   <.0001 
 
 
ECONOMIC SCENARIO 2 
 
   Variable           N          Mean         Std Dev           Sum            Minimum       Maximum 
   Predic2             52         4.63106       1.58681        240.81520       0.22220            7.27780 
   Actual2             52         4.44231       1.71971        231.00000       1.00000          10.00000 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 52 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                                                 Predic2       Actual2 
 
                                       Predic2       1.00000       0.64805 
                                                                           <.0001 
 
                                        Actual2       0.64805       1.00000 
                                                             <.0001 
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ECONOMIC SCENARIO 3 
 
   Variable           N          Mean          Std Dev           Sum            Minimum       Maximum 
   Predic3             52         4.55307       1.56883          236.75980       0.22220           7.27780 
   Actual3             52         4.30769       1.63945          224.00000       1.00000         10.00000 
 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 52 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
 
                                                   Predic3       Actual3 
 
                                Predic3       1.00000       0.64986 
                                                                             <.0001 
 
                              Actual3       0.64986       1.00000 
                                                           <.0001 
                                          
 
ECONOMIC SCENARIO 4 
 
   Variable           N          Mean          Std Dev           Sum             Minimum       Maximum 
   Predic4             52         4.69837       1.71798          244.31520       0.22220          9.50000 
   Actual4             52         4.32692       1.58078          225.00000       1.00000          8.00000 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 52 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                                   Predic4       Actual4 
 
                                Predic4       1.00000       0.74084 
                                                                                         <.0001 
 
                                               Actual4       0.74084       1.00000 
                                                          <.0001 
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APPENDIX I: CLUSTER ANALYSIS TABLES 
 
 259
Table I.1: Cluster Membership Using Wards Method. 
Case 5 Clusters 4 Clusters 3 Clusters 2 Clusters 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 2 2 2 2 
5 3 3 3 2 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 
8 4 4 2 2 
9 1 1 1 1 
10 4 4 2 2 
11 4 4 2 2 
12 3 3 3 2 
13 1 1 1 1 
14 3 3 3 2 
15 3 3 3 2 
16 3 3 3 2 
17 1 1 1 1 
18 4 4 2 2 
19 2 2 2 2 
20 4 4 2 2 
21 4 4 2 2 
22 3 3 3 2 
23 1 1 1 1 
24 1 1 1 1 
25 3 3 3 2 
26 4 4 2 2 
27 3 3 3 2 
28 3 3 3 2 
29 3 3 3 2 
30 3 3 3 2 
31 5 1 1 1 
32 3 3 3 2 
33 4 4 2 2 
34 1 1 1 1 
35 3 3 3 2 
36 5 1 1 1 
37 4 4 2 2 
38 2 2 2 2 
39 3 3 3 2 
40 3 3 3 2 
41 3 3 3 2 
42 3 3 3 2 
43 3 3 3 2 
44 4 4 2 2 
45 3 3 3 2 
46 1 1 1 1 
47 4 4 2 2 
48 3 3 3 2 
49 2 2 2 2 
50 4 4 2 2 
51 3 3 3 2 
52 3 3 3 2 
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Table I.2:  Agglomeration Schedule Using Wards Linkage. 
Cluster Combined Stage Cluster First Appears 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Next Stage 
1 12 32 .389 0 0 11 
2 42 45 .786 0 0 18 
3 29 30 1.263 0 0 10 
4 47 50 1.930 0 0 32 
5 16 51 2.615 0 0 18 
6 34 46 3.334 0 0 8 
7 18 37 4.251 0 0 39 
8 17 34 5.271 0 6 27 
9 27 52 6.293 0 0 31 
10 29 41 7.497 3 0 20 
11 12 25 8.713 1 0 25 
12 8 44 10.097 0 0 16 
13 5 28 11.507 0 0 37 
14 21 26 13.120 0 0 32 
15 11 33 14.879 0 0 35 
16 8 10 16.735 12 0 38 
17 1 24 18.626 0 0 21 
18 16 42 20.523 5 2 37 
19 22 48 22.512 0 0 30 
20 29 43 24.626 10 0 24 
21 1 9 26.744 17 0 36 
22 31 36 28.910 0 0 48 
23 19 49 31.110 0 0 28 
24 15 29 33.471 0 20 31 
25 12 14 35.903 11 0 29 
26 2 4 38.374 0 0 43 
27 7 17 41.055 0 8 36 
28 19 38 43.920 23 0 43 
29 12 39 46.997 25 0 40 
30 22 40 50.350 19 0 34 
31 15 27 53.817 24 9 47 
32 21 47 57.391 14 4 35 
33 3 13 61.339 0 0 42 
34 22 35 66.084 30 0 44 
35 11 21 71.293 15 32 38 
36 1 7 76.585 21 27 41 
37 5 16 81.878 13 18 40 
38 8 11 87.452 16 35 45 
39 18 20 94.500 7 0 45 
40 5 12 101.957 37 29 44 
41 1 23 109.876 36 0 46 
42 3 6 118.319 33 0 46 
43 2 19 127.098 26 28 49 
44 5 22 139.000 40 34 47 
45 8 18 152.976 38 39 49 
46 1 3 167.143 41 42 48 
47 5 15 183.315 44 31 50 
48 1 31 201.423 46 22 51 
49 2 8 227.290 43 45 50 
50 2 5 277.375 49 47 51 
51 1 2 328.596 48 50 0 
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Table I.3:  Revenue Insurance Product Rating and Purchase Decision for Economic 
Scenario 1 by Cluster. 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Product Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Product 1 5.00 1 8.06 11 8.59 15 
Product 2 7.54 5 5.65 6 7.18 13 
Product 3 6.15 5 4.82 7 6.45 10 
Product 4 7.85 8 6.29 8 5.77 8 
Product 5 3.69 2 5.06 7 3.86 2 
Product 6 4.08 1 5.82 7 4.64 8 
Product 7 3.00 1 3.35 1 2.09 1 
Product 8 4.85 3 6.41 9 2.91 0 
Product 9 2.69 0 4.53 2 2.09 0 
Product 10 7.62 7 8.41 10 8.86 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 262
Table I.4:  Revenue Insurance Product Rating and Purchase Decision for Economic 
Scenario 2 by Cluster. 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Product Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Product 1 4.85 2 8.00 11 8.50 14 
Product 2 7.54 5 5.59 6 7.23 13 
Product 3 5.92 4 4.76 7 6.59 10 
Product 4 7.77 8 6.24 8 5.77 6 
Product 5 3.54 2 5.00 7 4.00 3 
Product 6 3.92 1 5.76 7 4.50 6 
Product 7 2.77 1 3.29 0 2.14 0 
Product 8 4.69 3 6.35 9 2.86 0 
Product 9 2.46 0 4.47 2 2.09 0 
Product 10 7.38 6 8.35 10 8.77 16 
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Table I.5:  Revenue Insurance Product Rating and Purchase Decision for Economic 
Scenario 3 by Cluster. 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Product Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Product 1 4.46 1 7.41 6 8.55 9 
Product 2 7.38 3 5.53 4 7.18 8 
Product 3 5.77 2 4.82 6 6.50 6 
Product 4 7.62 2 6.24 5 5.68 0 
Product 5 3.38 1 4.76 4 4.00 1 
Product 6 3.77 0 5.41 4 4.59 4 
Product 7 2.54 0 3.00 0 2.14 0 
Product 8 4.54 1 5.88 4 2.82 0 
Product 9 2.54 0 4.00 1 2.09 0 
Product 10 7.23 2 7.94 7 8.77 10 
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Table I.6:  Revenue Insurance Product Rating and Purchase Decision for Economic 
Scenario 4 by Cluster. 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Product Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Average 
Rating 
Number 
Purchased 
Product 1 4.54 0 7.94 9 8.64 13 
Product 2 7.23 4 5.53 3 7.14 9 
Product 3 6.00 3 4.76 6 6.36 7 
Product 4 7.46 4 6.41 8 5.59 5 
Product 5 4.00 2 4.94 5 3.77 2 
Product 6 4.00 2 5.82 4 4.68 6 
Product 7 2.77 1 3.35 1 2.09 1 
Product 8 4.69 2 6.41 7 2.86 0 
Product 9 2.85 1 4.41 1 2.09 0 
Product 10 6.77 4 8.35 9 8.86 13 
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Table I.7: Comparison of Means for Years Farming. 
YEARS FARMING 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  29.38462 21.58824 25.54545 
Variance 220.0828 189.5363 106.6116 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 1.471313* -0.98945 0.822722 
v=d.f. 26.79755 30.2759 20.06168 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
 
 
 
 
Table I.15: Comparison of Means for Farm Market Value. 
FARM MARKET VALUE 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  3.615385 4.117647 4.4090909 
Variance 2.236686 2.927336 3.1508264 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -0.85604 -0.518935 -1.41357* 
v=d.f. 29.50328 37.181614 31.06322 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
 
 
 
Table I.16: Comparison of Means for Percent of Agricultural Income from Beef Cattle. 
PERCENT OF AG. INCOME FROM BEEF CATTLE 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  4.461538 4.235294 3.863636 
Variance 1.633136 1.944637 1.663223 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic 0.461804 0.852661 1.332868* 
v=d.f. 29.06833 35.00507 27.43231 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
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Table I.18: Comparison of Means for Current or Previous use of Cash or Forward Pricing. 
CASH OR FORWARD PRICING 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  0.153846 0.470588 0.5 
Variance 0.130178 0.249135 0.25 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -2.01666*** -0.18234 -2.36752*** 
v=d.f. 29.87089 36.58243 33.767 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
 
 
 
 
Table I.24: Comparison of Means for Investment Options. 
INVESTMENT OPTIONS 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  1.769231 2.411765 2.636364 
Variance 0.792899 1.183391 1.049587 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -1.77795** -0.65573 -2.63008*** 
v=d.f. 29.88721 35.38491 30.40068 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
 
 
Table I.25: Comparison of Means for Gross Agricultural Sales. 
GROSS AGRICULTURAL SALES 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Mean  3.230769 3.529412 4.181818 
Variance 1.56213 1.307958 1.966942 
Comparison    
 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 2 Cluster 2 vs Cluster 3 Cluster 1 vs Cluster 3
t  statistic -0.67268 -1.59961* -2.07749** 
v=d.f. 26.56057 38.90827 29.85066 
* = significant at .10, ** = significant at .05, and *** = significant at .01 
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Table J.1:  Collinearity Diagnostics for Purchase Decision Model. 
   Proportion of Variation 
Number Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index HERD VIDEO PRIVATE AGE RISK1 EDUC1 DEBT1 DIVRSE FPRICE1 D1 D2 D4 
1 5.99415 1 0.00701 0.00663 0.00494 0.002 0.00592 0.00484 0.00401 0.00605 0.00573 0.00366 0.00366 0.00366
2 1.04294 2.39736 0.05028 0.06633 0.01013 0.00488 0.10047 0.0232 0.02354 0.12907 0.000779 0.00433 0.00433 0.00433
3 1 2.44829 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08715 0.3486 0.08715
4 1 2.44829 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.26145 0 0.26145
5 0.75666 2.81457 0.000199 0.1172 0.03996 0.000254 0.39003 0.06494 0.000571 0.05197 0.00815 0.000172 0.000172 0.000172
6 0.57659 3.22427 0.36359 0.05044 0.02431 0.000372 0.24542 0.08644 0.02329 0.01016 0.00737 0.00153 0.00153 0.00153
7 0.44444 3.67246 0.18204 0.21113 0.07431 0.00261 0.11705 0.16637 0.000171 0.000252 0.1231 0.00339 0.00339 0.00339
8 0.40201 3.86142 0.04547 0.37237 0.04277 0.000644 0.02908 0.042 0.05163 0.4127 0.05231 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059
9 0.31442 4.36622 0.21813 0.0206 0.00331 0.00502 0.00169 0.14459 0.02204 0.22356 0.16802 0.17748 0.17748 0.17748
10 0.22898 5.11637 0.09168 0.00553 0.05714 0.00768 0.05294 0.000255 0.38273 0.14856 0.000302 0.28937 0.28937 0.28937
11 0.17918 5.78393 0.02187 0.13114 0.59103 0.01275 0.01159 0.04406 0.02639 0.000127 0.58599 0.09166 0.09166 0.09166
12 0.06063 9.94286 0.01974 0.01864 0.1521 0.96379 0.04581 0.42328 0.46564 0.01756 0.04825 0.07391 0.07391 0.07391
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Table J.2:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Purchase Decision Model.       N=208       Prob >  |r|  under H0:  Rho=0. 
 HERD VIDEO PRIVATE AGE RISK1 EDUC1 DEBT1 DIVRSE FPRICE1 D1 D2 D4
    
HERD 1.0000 0.1888 0.0911 -0.2246 0.1736 -0.1315 0.0527 0.3632 0.0556 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  0.0063 0.1905 0.0011 0.0122 0.0584 0.4496       <.0001 0.4252 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
VIDEO 0.1888 1.0000 -0.2210 -0.3241 0.0913 -0.0122 -0.1946 0.3760 0.1375 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.0063  0.0013      <.0001 0.1897 0.8607 0.0048       <.0001 0.0476 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
PRIVATE 0.0911 -0.2210 1.0000 -0.0679 0.0692 -0.2737 0.1339 -0.0671 0.3852 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.1905 0.0013 0.3295 0.3208      <.0001 0.0538 0.3354      <.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
AGE -0.2246 -0.3241 -0.0679 1.0000 -0.2905 0.3188 0.3195 -0.3382 -0.1705 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.0011      <.0001 0.3295      <.0001      <.0001      <.0001      <.0001 0.0138 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
RISK1 0.1736 0.0913 0.0692 -0.2905 1.0000 -0.2012 -0.2206 0.1657 0.1826 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.0122 0.1897 0.3208      <.0001 0.0036 0.0014 0.0168 0.0083 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
EDUC1 -0.1315 -0.0122 -0.2737 0.3188 -0.2012 1.0000 -0.1397 -0.0397 0.0122 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.0584 0.8607      <.0001      <.0001 0.0036 0.0442 0.5693 0.8607 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
DEBT1 0.0527 -0.1946 0.1339 0.3195 -0.2206 -0.1397 1.0000 -0.2802 0.0201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.4496 0.0048 0.0538      <.0001 0.0014 0.0442      <.0001 0.7728 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
DIVRSE 0.3632 0.3760 -0.0671 -0.3382 0.1657 -0.0397 -0.2802 1.0000 0.1296 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
      <.0001      <.0001 0.3354      <.0001 0.0168 0.5693      <.0001 0.0620 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
FPRICE1 0.0556 0.1375 0.3852 -0.1705 0.1826 0.0122 0.0201 0.1296 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 0.4252 0.0476      <.0001 0.0138 0.0083 0.8607 0.7728 0.0620 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
   
D1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 -0.3333 -0.3333
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000      <.0001      <.0001 
   
D2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3333 1.0000 -0.3333
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000      <.0001      <.0001 
   
D4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3333 -0.3333 1.0000
 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table J.3: Products Selected to Evaluate Producer Purchase Decisions. 
Product Attributes 
Products 
Premium/ 
Deductible 
($/cwt) Policy Length Price Series 
Method of 
Marketing 
Product 1 $2.24/$0.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 2 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 3 $0.50/$10.00 180 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 4 $1.25/$5.00 90 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 5 $1.25/$5.00 360 Days Regional Telephone 
Product 6 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days State Telephone 
Product 7 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days National Telephone 
Product 8 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional In Person 
Product 9 $1.25/$5.00 180 Days Regional Internet 
 
 
Table J.4:  Number of Producers Who Purchase Products Under Each Economic 
Scenario. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Product No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Total All 
Scenarios 
1 25 48.1% 22 42.3% 8 15.4% 17 32.7% 72 
2 19 36.5% 18 34.6% 7 13.5% 14 26.9% 58 
3 13 25.0% 13 25.0% 6 11.5% 11 21.2% 43 
4 10 19.2% 10 19.2% 4 7.7% 10 19.2% 38 
5 15 28.9% 13 25.0% 4 7.7% 12 23.1% 44 
6 37 71.2% 34 65.4% 17 32.7% 26 50.0% 114 
7 7 13.5% 7 13.5% 3 5.8% 7 13.5% 24 
8 23 44.2% 21 40.4% 6 11.5% 16 30.8% 66 
9 16 30.8% 14 26.9% 5 9.6% 11 21.2% 46 
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Table J.5: Predictive Accuracy of Probit Models . 
PRODUCT 1 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 116 20 136 
1 44 28 72 69.23% 
Total 160 48 208  
PRODUCT 2 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 149 1 150 
1 58 0 58 71.63% 
Total 207 1 208  
PRODUCT 3 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 160 5 165 
1 31 12 43 82.69% 
Total 191 17 208  
PRODUCT 4 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 170 0 170 
1 38 0 38 81.73% 
Total 208 0 208  
PRODUCT 5 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 161 3 164 
1 40 4 44 79.33% 
Total 201 7 208  
PRODUCT 6 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 60 34 94 
1 25 89 114 71.63% 
Total 85 123 208  
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PRODUCT 7 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 183 1 184 
1 24 0 24 87.98% 
Total 207 1 208  
PRODUCT 8 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 132 10 142 
1 47 19 66 72.60% 
Total 179 29 208  
PRODUCT 9 
Predicted 
Actual 0 1 Total 
Percent 
 Accuracy 
0 161 1 162 
1 44 2 46 78.37% 
Total 205 3 208  
 
 
Table J6:  Overall Rank of Products Selected to Evaluate Producer Purchase Decisions 
Overall Rank 
Products Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Product 1 18 20 20 20 
Product 2 23 24 24 26 
Product 3 43 44 43 46 
Product 4 38 37 38 37 
Product 5 39 39 39 39 
Product 6 4 4 4 5 
Product 7 55 52 52 53 
Product 8 21 22 21 22 
Product 9 37 38 35 38 
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